Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Universal, a leather wholesaler located in North Carolina, filed suit against Koro, a leather company in Argentina, in North Carolina state court, alleging breach of contract. Koro removed to federal court and the district court granted its motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that Universal met its initial burden of demonstrating that Koro purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state by submitting affidavits stating that Koro contacted Universal in the forum state, conducted repeated in-person solicitations and meetings concerning the parties' business relationship there, and engaged in numerous business transactions over a two-year period. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Universal Leather v. KORO AR" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff fell behind on her payments to Attorney in the underlying litigation, Attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for Plaintiff and requested a charging lien in the amount of approximately $300,000. Plaintiff did not oppose Attorney’s withdrawal but did oppose the entry of a charging lien. The Court of Chancery found that a charging lien was appropriate and granted a charging lien in the amount of $200,000 against any judgment in this action, holding (1) a fee agreement between the parties did not preclude the entry of a charging lien; (2) the total amount of the charging lien that was appropriate in this case should not exceed Plaintiff’s lowest-possible net recovery of $263,872; and (3) Attorney was not liable to the experts for their fees, so there was no basis for include those fees in the charging lien. View "In re Zutrau v. Jansing & ICE Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Victor Deng and DM Technology & Energy, Inc. ("DM") appealed a judgment based on a jury's verdict in favor of Clarence "Buddy" Scroggins and Complete Lighting Source, Inc. ("Complete Lighting"), on their claims against Deng and DM alleging breach of contract and fraud. Upon review of the dispute, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of Scroggins and Complete Lighting on the fraud claim and remanded the case for the entry of an order granting a new trial as to that claim. The Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment in all other respects. View "Deng v. Scoggins" on Justia Law

The trial court granted a motion to enforce a settlement between plaintiffs and defendants. The trial court found that defendant Fair’s printed name at the end of his email where he had agreed to settlement terms set forth in an email from plaintiffs’ counsel was an “electronic signature” within the meaning of California’s Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Civ. Code, 1633.1) and what it referred to as the “common law of contract” or “contract case law.” Subsequently, plaintiffs requested attorney fees under a provision in an arbitration agreement between the parties. The trial court found plaintiffs to be the prevailing parties but denied the request for attorney fees because the matter never proceeded to arbitration and plaintiffs had failed to show that any contract authorized fees in the litigation. The court of appeal reversed the order enforcing the settlement: the agreement was not signed by plaintiffs and the trial court erred in determining that Fair’s printed name at the end of his email was enforceable. Since plaintiffs are not the prevailing party, they are not entitled to attorney fees. View "J.B.B. Inv. Partners v. Fair" on Justia Law

In 2006, Thompson signed a $354,800 mortgage note with AME as the lender. Several sections of the note and deed of trust noted AME’s intent to transfer the note. Its signature page contains a signed, undated stamp memorializing AME’s transfer to Countrywide and another signed, undated endorsement from Countrywide to blank. BOA purchased Countrywide and has the note. In 2012, BOA offered to short-sell her house in lieu of foreclosure. Thompson requested modification of her repayment terms under the HAMP program (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 12 U.S.C. 5201), that gives lenders incentives to offer modifications to borrowers with a payment-to-income ratio over 31%. Thompson claims that she complied with numerous document requests. BOA never granted her application. She sued BOA, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, and unidentified persons she believes to be the note’s true owners, claiming: that BOA falsely induced her to sign the mortgage by pretending it was an actual lender; that her title is clouded by the note’s transfer; and that BOA fraudulently induced her to seek modification, knowing it lacked authority to modify her terms or intending to drive her into foreclosure. The district court dismissed for failure to comply with pleading standards. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Thompson v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

In 1997, Memorylink’s founders approached Motorola about jointly developing a handheld camera that could wirelessly transmit and receive video signals. After a successful demonstration, they sent Motorola a letter, agreeing “that any patents would be jointly owned by Motorola and Memorylink,” agreeing that Motorola should “head up the patent investigation,” and providing a “Wireless Multimedia Core Technology Overview for Patent Review” Motorola’s attorney sent a letter concerning the patent applications, stating an understanding that the inventors were Memorylink’s founders and Motorola employees Schulz and Wyckoff. A proposed patent filing agreement was enclosed. The named inventors signed an invention disclosure and an Assignment of rights to Motorola and Memorylink. Memorylink sued Motorola in 2008, alleging patent infringement and torts sounding in fraud, and seeking a declaration that the Assignment was void for lack of consideration. The district court rejected Memorylink’s argument that its claims did not accrue until an inventorship problem was discovered and dismissed most claims, reasoning that Memorylink should have known that the Motorola employees were not co-inventors in 1998, so that its claims were untimely. The court found that the consideration issue was a contract claim, not time-barred, but granted Motorola summary judgment. The Federal Circuit affirmed. View "Memorylink Corp. v. Motorola Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

The McTaggarts filed suit against the former trustee and trust advisor of their family trust, alleging improper handling of their trust funds. The former trustee and trust advisor moved to dismiss the case or have the case stayed pending arbitration, based on an arbitration provision in a wealth-management agreement between the former trustee and trust advisor. The trial court found that, because the McTaggarts did not sign the agreement containing the arbitration provision and because the agreement specifically excluded nonsignatories, including third-party beneficiaries, the arbitration provision was not binding on the McTaggarts. The former trustee and trust advisor appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pinnacle Trust Company, L.L.C., EFP Advisors, Inc. v. McTaggart" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute between Franks and Union Pacific over whether Franks has the right to cross Union Pacific's train tracks on certain property in Caddo Parish originally owned by the Levy family at the turn of the 20th Century. On appeal, Franks challenged the district court's final judgment granting summary judgment for defendant and dismissing Franks's claims with prejudice. Franks argued that the district court erred in denying the existence of a predial servitude in the three crossings at issue. The court concluded that, under the law applicable to the interpretation of the 1923 deed, the contract is unambiguous; it does not establish a predial servitude with respect to Texas and Pacific Railway Company's obligation to provide three crossings across what was then its property; but, rather, it is merely a personal obligation which does not bind the railway's successors-in-interest. View "Franks Investment Co, L.L.C. v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Westar Energy was an electric company based in Topeka, Kansas that owned several sources of electricity, including the Jeffrey Energy Center (JEC). The JEC was a coal-fired power plant composed of three units: Unit 1, Unit 2, and Unit 3. In 2005, Westar began a project to upgrade the JEC’s existing flue gas desulfurization (FGD) system. Wahlcometroflex Inc. (Wahlco) was a Delaware corporation that designed and manufactured a number of products including FGD dampers. On December 22, 2006, Westar and Wahlco entered into a contract under which Wahlco agreed to manufacture and deliver dampers to Westar for Units 1, 2, and 3. This case involved a dispute over the meaning and application of a liquidated damages in that contract provision under Kansas law. The district court held that Westar did not need to establish that Wahlco's late delivery of the equipment actually delayed Westar’s production schedule in order to recover contractual liquidated damages. Finding no error in that judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Wahlcometroflex v. Westar Energy" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an asset purchase agreement (the Agreement) that contained a provision requiring submission of all disputes concerning the “validity, interpretation and enforcement” of the Agreement to an arbitrator for binding resolution. Plaintiff sued Defendant in federal district court, asserting claims for fraud and breach of contract arising out of the Agreement. Defendant answered the complaint, and the parties began discovery. Several months later, Plaintiff moved to stay proceedings pending arbitration. A magistrate judge denied the motion to stay on the ground that Plaintiff had waived its arbitral rights. The district judge summarily affirmed the denial of the stay. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that Plaintiff, through its conduct, waived its right to demand arbitration. View "Joca-Roca Real Estate, LLC v. Brennan, Jr." on Justia Law