Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The respondents, Shared Towers VA, LLC and NH Note Investment, LLC, appealed, and petitioner Joseph Turner, individually and as trustee of the Routes 3 and 25 Nominee Trust, cross-appealed, Superior Court orders after a bench trial on petitioner’s petition for a preliminary injunction enjoining a foreclosure sale and for damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. The parties’ dispute stemmed from a commercial construction loan agreement and promissory note secured by a mortgage, pursuant to which petitioner was loaned $450,000 at 13% interest per annum to build a home. Respondents argued the trial court erred when it: (1) determined that they would be unjustly enriched if the court required the petitioner to pay the amounts he owed under the note from November 2009 until April 2011; (2) applied the petitioner’s $450,000 lump sum payment to principal; (3) excluded evidence of the petitioner’s experience with similar loans; (4) ruled that, because the promissory note failed to contain a "clear statement in writing" of the charges owed, as required by RSA 399-B:2 (2006), respondents could not collect a $22,500 delinquency charge on the petitioner’s lump sum payment of principal; and (5) denied the respondents’ request for attorney’s fees and costs. Petitioner argued that the trial court erroneously concluded that respondents’ actions did not violate the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded: contrary to the trial court’s decision, petitioner’s obligation to make the payments was not tolled. Because the loan agreement and note remained viable, it was error for the trial court to have afforded the petitioner a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. The trial court made its decision with regard to the payment of $450,000 in connection with its conclusion that the petitioner was entitled to a remedy under an unjust enrichment theory. Because the Supreme Court could not determine how the trial court would have ruled upon this issue had it not considered relief under that equitable theory, and because, given the nature of the parties’ arguments, resolving this issue requires fact finding that must be done by the trial court in the first instance, it vacated that part of its order and remanded for further proceedings. In light of the trial court’s errors with regard to the attorney’s fees and costs claimed by respondents, the Supreme Court vacated the order denying them, and remanded for consideration of respondents’ request for fees and costs. The Supreme Court found no error in the trial court’s rejection of petitioner’s CPA claim. View "Turner v. Shared Towers VA, LLC" on Justia Law

Gail and Scott Helm filed a personal injury action against Gallo Realty, Inc., one of its real estate agents, and 206 Massachusetts Ave, LLC (owner of the property). The Helms rented a beach house at 206 Massachusetts Avenue in Lewes for a week in 2010. As Gail descended the stairs, she fell and sustained injuries. Gail sought to recover damages based on claims of negligence and breach of contract; Scott claimed loss of consortium. The Superior Court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment, dismissing the Helms' claims. The Helms appealed, arguing: (1) the Superior Court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the issue of primary risk assumption and comparative negligence as a matter of law; (2) the Superior Court erred in holding that an indemnification clause provision in the lease protected defendants from liability; and (3) the Superior Court erred in granting summary judgment on the contract claims. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court applied both the doctrine of primary assumption of risk and the doctrine of comparative negligence incorrectly. The record reflected that the Superior Court never specifically based its decision on the indemnification clause. The Superior Court's initial ruling in favor of defendants was only on the negligence claims. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the record reflected that the Superior Court's dismissive rulings on the Helms' contract claim was "cursory and inextricably intertwined" with its erroneous rulings on the negligence claims. As such, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Helm v. 206 Massachusetts Avenue,LLC" on Justia Law

Dennis and Charlene Deckert appealed the grant of summary judgment dismissing their action for a declaratory judgment and specific performance of an option to purchase certain Burleigh County real property and quieting title to the property in Margaret McCormick and Judy Hertz. Because the Supreme Court concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact that the Deckerts did not properly exercise the gratuitous option before it was revoked, the Court affirmed the judgment. View "Deckert v. McCormick" on Justia Law

Milwaukee County calculates pension payments for its retired employees by multiplying a retiree’s final average salary by a certain percentage known as a multiplier. The resulting number is then multiplied by the retiree’s total years of county service. Suzanne Stoker and her labor union filed a complaint against the County and the Milwaukee County Pension Board, arguing that an ordinance passed by the County in 2011 that reduced the multiplier for all county service performed on or after the effective date of the ordinance was a breach of contract because she had a vested right to have the former, higher multiplier apply to her post-2011 county service and because she did not personally consent to the reduction. The circuit court granted summary judgment and declaratory and injunctive relief to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the County did not breach Stoker’s contractual right to retirement system benefits earned and vested when it amended the pension multiplier, and the County did have the ability to make the reductions of the multiplier without Stoker’s personal consent. Remanded. View "Suzanne Stoker v. Milwaukee County" on Justia Law

This case involved three small school districts, Northeast Community School District, East Central Community School District, and Preston Community School District. In 2010, the school boards of Northeast and East Central entered into a whole grade sharing agreement. Thereafter, citizens from Preston and East Central voted to reorganize their districts and merge the districts together into a new school district called Easton Valley Community School District (Easton). The Easton school board subsequently sent a notification of cancellation of the agreement to the superintendent of Northeast, claiming that when East Central ceased to exist the agreement was null. Northeast filed a petition for declaratory action and mandamus and then amended its petition alleging repudiation of the agreement. The district court granted summary judgment for Easton, concluding (1) the agreement and the reorganization were valid but that the two were in direct conflict, and (2) the East Central school board did not have the ability to bind Easton as its successor corporation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement could bind the reorganized school district. View "Northeast Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Easton Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

In 1997, Appellant began working for Banco Popular de Puerto Rico (BPPR). After Appellant retired in 2009, BPPR made a final calculation of Appellant’s pension, which yielded monthly payments significantly lower than earlier estimates had suggested. Seeking the higher amount he had expected, Appellant brought claims under ERISA, a theory of estoppel, and Puerto Rico contract law. The district court (1) dismissed the ERISA and contract claims, concluding that Appellant failed to state a claim under ERISA and that ERISA preempted the commonwealth claims; and (2) granted summary judgment against Appellant on the estoppel claim, concluding that the unambiguous terms of the benefits plan precluded a claim for estoppel. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Appellant could not recover under ERISA because he could not be awarded relief under the terms of BPPR’s retirement plan; (2) the district court properly held that Appellant’s commonwealth claims “relate to” the ERISA-regulated plan and, accordingly, they were preempted; and (3) because Appellant did not show any ambiguity in the plan, his equitable estoppel claim necessarily failed. View "Guerra-Delgado v. Banco Popular de P.R." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a property owner, and Defendant, a tenant, entered into a one-year commercial rental lease agreement. Prior to the end of the one-year term, the parties extended the lease for a nine-year term. Several months after executing the lease extestion, Defendant vacated the premises and ceased paying rent. Plaintiff commenced this action for rent arrears and an amount equal to the future remaining rent owed on the lease. Supreme Court entered judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $1,488,604, consisting of the rent remaining due under the lease, reduced by the amount of rent Plaintiff was able to collect by reletting the premises. Defendants appealed, arguing that Plaintiff was barred from collecting unpaid future rents pursuant to an acceleration clause in the leasehold agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding that the court below erred by limiting the damages hearing to whether Plaintiff relet the premises without allowing Defendants the opportunity to present evidence that the undiscounted accelerated rent amount was disproportionate to Plaintiff’s actual losses, notwithstanding that Plaintiff had possession and no obligation to mitigate. View "172 Van Duzer Realty Corp. v Globe Alumni Student Assistance Ass’n, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a law student, filed a breach of contract suit against a lawyer who extended a "million-dollar challenge" on national television while representing a client accused of murder. The lawyer denied payment, claiming that he did not make a serious offer. The court concluded that the district court properly applied Florida law to plaintiff's claim. The court did not find that the lawyer's statements were such that a reasonable, objective person would have understood them to be an invitation to contract, regardless of whether the court looks to the unedited interview or the edited television broadcast seen by plaintiff. Neither the content of the lawyer's statements, nor the circumstances in which he made them, nor the conduct of the parties reflects the assent necessary to establish an actionable offer. The court found no genuine issue as to whether the parties' conduct implied a contractual understanding where the lawyer's spoken words, the circumstances in which those words were said, and the parties' conduct are all undisputed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Kolodziej v. Mason" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a construction company, filed a five-count complaint in superior court against Defendants, alleging breach of contract, quantum meruit, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Prompt Payment Act. In the fifth count of the complaint, Plaintiff sought enforcement of a mechanic’s lien it recorded against Defendants’ property. Plaintiff then moved for summary judgment on its claims for breach of contract, violation of the Prompt Payment Act, and enforcement of the mechanic’s lien. The superior court granted summary judgment for Plaintiff on those three counts but made no mention of Plaintiff’s quantum meruit or unjust enrichment claims. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, as there was no final judgment on any of Plaintiff’s causes of action where two of Plaintiff’s claims were still pending. View "Warren Constr. Group, LLC v. Reis" on Justia Law

Danko practiced law with the firm of O’Reilly & Collins, until, in 2009, Danko sued O’Reilly, as an individual, and O’Reilly & Collins, for unpaid wages. Before trial, O’Reilly, as an individual, obtained directed verdict. In 2012, judgment was entered in favor of Danko for more than $2,000,000. Danko filed moved to amend the judgment and the costs and fee order “to include Terry O’Reilly as a judgment debtor for all amounts owed to Michael Danko” on the ground that O’Reilly knew that the firm owed Danko more than $2 million, but drew out all the firm’s available funds without reserving any amounts to satisfy the debt he knew was owed to Danko, telling Danko “you will not be able to execute on any judgment.” The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s amendment of the judgment, citing Code Civ. Proc., 187. The court rejected arguments that the amendment was entered in violation of a stay in the bankruptcy of the firm; the amendment was precluded by the doctrine of res judicata; and the amendment was contrary to the principles governing collateral estoppel. View "Danko v. O'Reilly" on Justia Law