Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Zastrow appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. 961–1968, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982. The court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that defendants’ alleged predicate acts amount to or constitute a threat of continuing racketeering activity; even if plaintiff had produced evidence of a pattern of racketeering activity, he has not demonstrated the existence of an enterprise; and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's breach of contract claim dressed in civil RICO garb. The court also concluded that because plaintiff has alleged that Mercedes Greenway refused to sell him parts after he testified in support of some clients' discrimination claims, he has stated a claim for retaliation under section 1981. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's RICO claim and his section 1982 claim, but vacated as to the section 1981 claim, remanding for further proceedings. View "Zastrow v. Houston Auto Imports Greenway" on Justia Law

In a 1996 purchase and sale agreement Torch Energy Advisors Inc. sold its leasehold interests in undeveloped oil and gas fields located under federal waters. Certain interests were excluded from the conveyance. A decade later, a federal court determined that the federal government had repudiated the mineral leases because a statute enacted before the conveyance had been applied in a manner that precluded development of the leasehold interests. Consequently, the purchaser’s successor in interest, Plains Exploration & Production Company, was awarded restitution of the lease-bonus payments that Torch’s predecessor had paid to secure the leases. Torch claimed an ownership interest in approximately half of the judgment based on the terms of the excluded-assets provision in the 1996 agreement. Plains declined to pay. Torch sued, alleging contract and equitable theories of recovery. The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment in Plains’s favor. The court of appeals reversed in part and remanded the equity claim for a trial on the merits, concluding that Torch’s equitable claim hinged on the proper construction of the 1996 agreement’s terms. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the relevant excluded-assets provisions in the 1996 agreement were unambiguous and, as a matter of law, Torch did not retain ownership of the claimed asset. View "Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors, Inc." on Justia Law

Kachina Pipeline Co., a pipeline operator, and Michael Lillis, a natural-gas producer, entered into a Gas Purchase Agreement. Kachina bought, transported, and resold Lillis’s gas according to the Agreement. Lillis later entered into a separate purchase agreement and constructed his own pipeline to one of Davis Gas Processing’s plants. Thereafter, Lillis sued Kachina, asserting that Kachina breached the Agreement by deducting the costs of compression that occurred after Lillis delivered the gas to Kachina. Lillis also brought a fraud claim, asserting that Kachina represented it would release him from the Agreement. Kachina counterclaimed for breach of the Agreement and seeking declarations that it had the right to deduct compression charges under the Agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Kachina, declaring that the Agreement entitled Kachina to deduct the costs of compression from its payments to Lillis and that the Agreement gave Kachina the option to extend the arrangement for an additional five-year term. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Agreement unambiguously allowed neither the disputed deductions nor a five-year extension. Remanded. View "Kachina Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Lillis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a verbal contract with Jerry Morrison for the construction of a log home on her property. Plaintiff entered into a second verbal contract with James Phillips to build the basement walls and a chimney with two fireplaces. Concerned about the number of apparent defects in the construction and excessive costs of the labor and materials, Plaintiff fired Morrison. Plaintiff later filed suit against Morrison and Phillips (together, Defendants), alleging fraud and misrepresentation, breach of contract, and negligence, among other claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff only with respect to her negligence claim against Morrison. The jury further found that Plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages and/or was comparatively negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) limiting the time the parties had to present the case to the jury; (2) placing limitations on expert testimony; (3) granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Phillips; (4) denying Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to her negligence and breach of warranty claims against Morrison; (5) instructing the jury on comparative negligence; (6) instructing the jury on outrageous conduct; and (7) denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. View "Sneberger v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-insurance intermediaries were Brown & Brown, Inc., a Florida corporation, and its New York subsidiary, Brown & Brown of New York, Inc. (BBNY). When Theresa Johnson began working for BBNY she signed an employment agreement that contained a Florida choice-of-law provision and a non-solicitation provision precluding Johnson from soliciting, accepting, or servicing any customer of Plaintiffs. One month after Johnson was terminated, she began working for a competitor of BBNY. Plaintiffs commenced this action against Johnson and her new employer (collectively, Defendants) alleging that Johnson breached the employment agreement by soliciting Plaintiffs’ customers. The Appellate Division dismissed the portion of the breach of contract cause of action based on the non-solicitation provision, concluding that the provision was overbroad and unenforceable and that the choice-of-law provision was unenforceable as against public policy. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the agreement’s choice-of-law provision was unenforceable in relation to the non-solicitation provision; and (2) questions of fact existed as to whether Plaintiffs engaged in overreaching or used coercion to obtain the non-solicitation restrictive covenant, and therefore, dismissal was inappropriate. View "Brown & Brown, Inc. v Johnson" on Justia Law

Two certificateholders in ACE Securities Corp., Home Equity Loan Trust sued DB Structured Products (DBSP) for failure to repurchase loans that purportedly did not conform to the representations and warranties of DBSP, which sponsored the transaction. The Trust later sought to substitute itself as plaintiff in place of the certificateholders. DBSP moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely, arguing that the Trust’s claims accrued as of March 28, 2006, more than six years before the Trust filed its complaint. DBSP further contended that the certificateholders did not validly commence this action and lacked standing to sue. Supreme Court denied DBSP’s motion to dismiss and held the Trust’s action to be timely.The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Trust’s cause of action against DBSP for breach of representations and warranties accrued at the point of contract execution on March 28, 2006; and (2) even assuming that the certificateholders possessed standing to sue, the two certificateholders did not validly commence this action because they failed to comply with the contractual condition precedent to suit. View "ACE Sec. Corp. v DB Structured Prods., Inc." on Justia Law

Farmer owned Arkat Nutrition, which owned the Plant One feed mill in Arkansas. Arkat Land owned Plant Two, which was leased to Arkat Nutrition, which produced animal feed. In 2007, a tornado damaged Plant One. Arkat decided not to repair the plant because its equipment had little useful life remaining. Debris from the tornado was removed, leaving scrap with potential value. Friedman made an oral contract with Farmer to act as a broker for the remaining Plant One equipment. Arkat Nutrition says that it was understood that it could also continue to attempt to find a buyer on its own. Friedman disagrees. Friedman sold some equipment and received a commission of $25,000. In 2010, Arkat Nutrition and Arkat Land transferred assets to a new company, Animal Nutrition, the equity interests of which were sold to Dad’s Products, which was not to be responsible for any investor or third-party claims against Animal Nutrition. Farmer claims that sale was planned since 2002. Dad’s later changed its name to Ainsworth and hired a third-party to remove remaining Plant One scrap. Friedman sued. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants, rejecting alter-ego claims and claims of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel, and noting the limitations period. View "Friedman v. Farmer" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Dominican Republic and INDRHI for breach of contract and unjust enrichment related to an irrigation project in the Dominican Republic. After the district court entered a default judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendants moved to vacate the default judgment. The district court denied the motion and defendants appealed. While that appeal was pending, the Dominican Republic moved to vacate the default judgment for voidness under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). The district court denied the motion on the merits, finding that the Dominican Republic had waived its sovereign immunity. The Dominican Republic appealed. In these consolidated appeals, the court concluded that the district court erred by denying the Dominican Republic’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate for voidness the default judgment entered against the foreign nation because at least one statutory exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-1611, applies; the district court abused its discretion by denying the Dominican Republic and INDRHI’s Rule 60(b)(1) motion to vacate for excusable neglect the default judgment entered against them because the factual findings underlying the district court's decision were unsupported by the record; and therefore, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Architectural Ingenieria Siglo XXI v. Dominican Republic" on Justia Law

The Delaware Supreme Court certified two questions of New York law to the New York Court of Appeals. This case was a consolidated appeal in an insurance-coverage dispute from separate trial court judgments by the Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Superior Court. Viking Pump, Inc. and Warren Pumps, LLC sought to recover under policies issued to Houdaille Industries, Inc. Viking claimed it was the successor to insurance policies that Liberty Mutual Insurance Company issued to Houdaille, or in the alternative, sought partition of the Liberty policy limits. Liberty, Viking and Warrant settled their dispute, but Viking and Warren then filed new complaints in the Court of Chancery against more than twenty other insurers that had issued excess policies to Houdaille. The Court of Chancery held that Houdaille's policies unambiguously provided for an all sums allocation. The case was then transferred to the Superior Court to determine several other issues. That court held that as a matter of New York law, Viking and Warren were obligated to horizontally exhaust all triggered "primary and umbrella insurance layers before tapping" any of Houdaille's excess coverage. The legal insurers in this appeal were controlled by New York law. As such, the Delaware Supreme Court certified two questions of New York law to the New York Court of Appeals, centering on the proper method of allocation and interpretation of the policies at issue here. View "In Re Viking Pump, Inc." on Justia Law

Developer filed suit against the University after the University terminated the lease agreement between the parties because Developer failed to make a rental payment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University. The court vacated and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that there is a genuine dispute whether a rental payment was due on May 30, 2013, and therefore whether the University was entitled to terminate the lease and to collect damages. View "Howard Town Center Developer v. Howard University" on Justia Law