Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Ben Lack was employed as a draftsman at Marshall Hunn's architectural design firm. After Lack resigned from his position from a project for Hunn's client, Dan Wilson Homes, Dan Wilson hired Lack to complete the project. Hunn filed suit alleging that Lack and Wilson secretly agreed to cut Hunn out of the business relationship. The district court granted summary judgment to Lack and Wilson on many claims and ruled in favor of them on the remaining claims. The court affirmed the judgment, concluding that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Lack and Wilson never made the alleged secret agreement and Hunn's legal theories lack merit. View "Hunn v. Dan Wilson Homes Inc." on Justia Law

The Illinois Business Brokers Act of 1995 requires brokers for the sale of businesses in the state to register. Brokerage agreements must be in writing. Promises to pay unregistered brokers for their services are unenforceable. Global Technology, apparently unaware of the statute, orally agreed with Satyam Computer Services (based in India) to act as a broker in the purchase of Bridge Strategy, an Illinois business. Global brokered the acquisition, but Satyam refused to pay. Global sued, seeking a 3% commission ($600,000). Satyam contended that Bridge had compensated Global for its services as an intermediary and that it had never promised any additional compensation. When the litigation was four years old, Satyam moved for summary judgment with a new argument: that Global is not registered under the Act. Global argued that the Act is an affirmative defense, which under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) had to appear in Satyam’s answer. Finding that Global had not suffered prejudice, the court excused Satyam’s delay and entered judgment in its favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rule 8(c) does not provide a consequence for delay. District judges have authority to authorize a litigant to assert an affirmative defense despite its omission from the answer. View "Global Tech. & Trading, inc. v. Tech Mahindra Ltd." on Justia Law

In 2003, the governors of Cedar Rapids Lodge obtained the rights to build an AmericInn franchise. The company used Lightowler as the project architect. Lightowler used a standard form agreement that specified that its terms would be governed by the law of North Dakota. After changes requested by the Fire Marshal and for compliance with franchise standards, Lightowler submitted revised plans in February, 2004. Construction began in January 2004. In July, 2004, Lidberg of AmericInn led a construction site visit attended by the governors, and Olson, a Lightowler engineer. Lidberg and Olson prepared reports detailing deficiencies. The last act performed by Lightowler on the project was a response to the contractor in September, 2004. Lidberg led a second site visit in October, 2004, produced a report identifying additional deficiencies, and sent it to Siebert and Lightowler. The hotel opened for business in December, 2004, but problems continued. In December, 2009 Cedar Rapids Lodge brought claims against its former governors and others involved in the hotel project and alleging professional negligence by Lightowler. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lightowler, concluding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under either North Dakota or Iowa law. View "Cedar Rapids Lodge & Suites, LLC v. Lightowler Johnson Assocs., Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this residential construction dispute was whether the statutory cap on exemplary damages is waived if not pleaded as an affirmative defense or avoidance. The trial court affirmed an exemplary damages award in excess of the statutory cap because Petitioner did not assert the cap until her motion for a new trial. The court of appeals affirmed the exemplary damages award, concluding that the statutory cap on exemplary damages did not apply because Petitioner failed to expressly plead the cap as an affirmative defense. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in relation to the exemplary cap, holding (i) the exemplary damages cap is not a matter ”constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” and need not be affirmatively pleaded because it applies automatically when invoked and does not require proof of additional facts, and (ii) because Petitioner timely asserted the cap in her motion for new trial, the exemplary damages must be capped at $200,000; and (2) affirmed in all other respects. View "Zorilla v. Aypco Constr. II, LLC" on Justia Law

The Pifer Group, Inc., appealed, and Judith Liebelt and Sandra and Dennis Janke cross-appealed, a judgment awarding Pifer Group $8,215.81 for breach of two land auction sale agreements. Liebelt and the Jankes entered into separate land auction sale agreements with Pifer Group to auction their Cass County farmland. On the morning of the scheduled auction, Liebelt and the Jankes sent Pifer Group an email stating: "We are withdrawing from today's 11am land auction and will refuse any and all bids pursuant to our contract agreement." No auction sale was held. Pifer Group sued Liebelt and the Jankes for breach of the auction sale agreements and sought damages based on full sales commissions that would have been owed if the sales occurred. Construing the auction sale agreements, the district court on summary judgment awarded Pifer Group only cancellation fees of $8,215.81 and rejected the arguments of Liebelt and the Jankes that the agreements were void as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the auction sale agreements are enforceable and the district court did not err in its interpretation of them. View "Pifer Group, Inc. v. Liebelt" on Justia Law

Zastrow appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. 961–1968, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982. The court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that defendants’ alleged predicate acts amount to or constitute a threat of continuing racketeering activity; even if plaintiff had produced evidence of a pattern of racketeering activity, he has not demonstrated the existence of an enterprise; and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's breach of contract claim dressed in civil RICO garb. The court also concluded that because plaintiff has alleged that Mercedes Greenway refused to sell him parts after he testified in support of some clients' discrimination claims, he has stated a claim for retaliation under section 1981. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's RICO claim and his section 1982 claim, but vacated as to the section 1981 claim, remanding for further proceedings. View "Zastrow v. Houston Auto Imports Greenway" on Justia Law

In a 1996 purchase and sale agreement Torch Energy Advisors Inc. sold its leasehold interests in undeveloped oil and gas fields located under federal waters. Certain interests were excluded from the conveyance. A decade later, a federal court determined that the federal government had repudiated the mineral leases because a statute enacted before the conveyance had been applied in a manner that precluded development of the leasehold interests. Consequently, the purchaser’s successor in interest, Plains Exploration & Production Company, was awarded restitution of the lease-bonus payments that Torch’s predecessor had paid to secure the leases. Torch claimed an ownership interest in approximately half of the judgment based on the terms of the excluded-assets provision in the 1996 agreement. Plains declined to pay. Torch sued, alleging contract and equitable theories of recovery. The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment in Plains’s favor. The court of appeals reversed in part and remanded the equity claim for a trial on the merits, concluding that Torch’s equitable claim hinged on the proper construction of the 1996 agreement’s terms. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the relevant excluded-assets provisions in the 1996 agreement were unambiguous and, as a matter of law, Torch did not retain ownership of the claimed asset. View "Plains Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors, Inc." on Justia Law

Kachina Pipeline Co., a pipeline operator, and Michael Lillis, a natural-gas producer, entered into a Gas Purchase Agreement. Kachina bought, transported, and resold Lillis’s gas according to the Agreement. Lillis later entered into a separate purchase agreement and constructed his own pipeline to one of Davis Gas Processing’s plants. Thereafter, Lillis sued Kachina, asserting that Kachina breached the Agreement by deducting the costs of compression that occurred after Lillis delivered the gas to Kachina. Lillis also brought a fraud claim, asserting that Kachina represented it would release him from the Agreement. Kachina counterclaimed for breach of the Agreement and seeking declarations that it had the right to deduct compression charges under the Agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for Kachina, declaring that the Agreement entitled Kachina to deduct the costs of compression from its payments to Lillis and that the Agreement gave Kachina the option to extend the arrangement for an additional five-year term. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Agreement unambiguously allowed neither the disputed deductions nor a five-year extension. Remanded. View "Kachina Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Lillis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff entered into a verbal contract with Jerry Morrison for the construction of a log home on her property. Plaintiff entered into a second verbal contract with James Phillips to build the basement walls and a chimney with two fireplaces. Concerned about the number of apparent defects in the construction and excessive costs of the labor and materials, Plaintiff fired Morrison. Plaintiff later filed suit against Morrison and Phillips (together, Defendants), alleging fraud and misrepresentation, breach of contract, and negligence, among other claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff only with respect to her negligence claim against Morrison. The jury further found that Plaintiff had failed to mitigate her damages and/or was comparatively negligent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) limiting the time the parties had to present the case to the jury; (2) placing limitations on expert testimony; (3) granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Phillips; (4) denying Plaintiff’s motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to her negligence and breach of warranty claims against Morrison; (5) instructing the jury on comparative negligence; (6) instructing the jury on outrageous conduct; and (7) denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. View "Sneberger v. Morrison" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-insurance intermediaries were Brown & Brown, Inc., a Florida corporation, and its New York subsidiary, Brown & Brown of New York, Inc. (BBNY). When Theresa Johnson began working for BBNY she signed an employment agreement that contained a Florida choice-of-law provision and a non-solicitation provision precluding Johnson from soliciting, accepting, or servicing any customer of Plaintiffs. One month after Johnson was terminated, she began working for a competitor of BBNY. Plaintiffs commenced this action against Johnson and her new employer (collectively, Defendants) alleging that Johnson breached the employment agreement by soliciting Plaintiffs’ customers. The Appellate Division dismissed the portion of the breach of contract cause of action based on the non-solicitation provision, concluding that the provision was overbroad and unenforceable and that the choice-of-law provision was unenforceable as against public policy. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the agreement’s choice-of-law provision was unenforceable in relation to the non-solicitation provision; and (2) questions of fact existed as to whether Plaintiffs engaged in overreaching or used coercion to obtain the non-solicitation restrictive covenant, and therefore, dismissal was inappropriate. View "Brown & Brown, Inc. v Johnson" on Justia Law