Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Before he died, John Markey entered into a contract with his second wife, Frances, to make and not revoke a mutual will providing that, upon the death of whomever died later, the couple’s estate would be divided equally between John’s son, David, and Frances’s granddaughter. After John died, Frances breached the contract, instead leaving everything to her own children. Approximately nine months after Frances’s death, David filed suit to enforce the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that a breach of contract regarding mutual wills is neither a “claim” in probate nor a will contest and is therefore subject to the three-month statute of limitations for suits challenging the distribution pursuant to a probated will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the statutory definition of “claim” under the Probate Code includes an action for breach of a contract to make and not revoke a will. Remanded to consider the timeliness of David’s claim, considered under the Probate Code. View "Markey v. Estate of Markey" on Justia Law

Libby O’Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC (LOKC) filed a complaint for breach of contract against Sharon Blanchard and simultaneously filed a motion for approval of attachment and trustee process against Blanchard’s property. Blanchard objected to LOKC’s motion but did include a supporting affidavit or other supporting documentation. The district court determined that Blanchard had waived her objection to the motion and considered the merits of the attachment motion without a hearing. The court then ordered attachment and trustee process against Blanchard’s real and personal property. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the district court’s findings in support of attachment and trustee process were supported by competent evidence in the motion record. View "Kingsley v. Blanchard" on Justia Law

Falco sold insurance for Farmers, under a 1990 Agent Agreement, which provided that Falco would be paid Contract Value upon termination of the Agreement. As a Farmers agent, Falco was entitled to borrow money from the Credit Union. In 2006, Falco obtained a $28,578.00 business loan and assigned his interest in his Agreement receivables—including Contract Value—as security. The loan document gave the Credit Union authority to demand payments that Farmers owed Falco; it could tender Falco’s resignation to levy on Falco’s Contract Value. Falco failed to make payments and filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, listing the loan on his schedules. Falco received a discharge in February 2011, covering his liability under his Credit Union loan. In April 2011, the Credit Union notified Farmers that Falco had defaulted and exercised the power of attorney to terminate his Agent Agreement. Farmers notified Falco that the resignation had been accepted, calculated Contract Value as $104,323.30, paid the Credit Union $29,180.92, and paid the balance to Falco. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that the Credit Union’s secured interest survived bankruptcy; it did not tortuously interfere with Falco’s Agreement because it had a legal right to terminate the Agreement; and Falco failed to show an underlying wrongful act or intentional tort as required under civil conspiracy. View "Falco v. Farmers Ins. Grp." on Justia Law

Falco sold insurance for Farmers, under a 1990 Agent Agreement, which provided that Falco would be paid Contract Value upon termination of the Agreement. As a Farmers agent, Falco was entitled to borrow money from the Credit Union. In 2006, Falco obtained a $28,578.00 business loan and assigned his interest in his Agreement receivables—including Contract Value—as security. The loan document gave the Credit Union authority to demand payments that Farmers owed Falco; it could tender Falco’s resignation to levy on Falco’s Contract Value. Falco failed to make payments and filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, listing the loan on his schedules. Falco received a discharge in February 2011, covering his liability under his Credit Union loan. In April 2011, the Credit Union notified Farmers that Falco had defaulted and exercised the power of attorney to terminate his Agent Agreement. Farmers notified Falco that the resignation had been accepted, calculated Contract Value as $104,323.30, paid the Credit Union $29,180.92, and paid the balance to Falco. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants, finding that the Credit Union’s secured interest survived bankruptcy; it did not tortuously interfere with Falco’s Agreement because it had a legal right to terminate the Agreement; and Falco failed to show an underlying wrongful act or intentional tort as required under civil conspiracy. View "Falco v. Farmers Ins. Grp." on Justia Law

Labonte Drywall Company signed a statewide agreement with Union, which allowed Labonte Drywall to hire Union carpenters for its business. The agreement required Labonte Drywall to allow an audit of its records. After Labonte Drywall did not respond to certain audit requests, Plaintiffs, the trustees for a group of Union-related benefits funds and their collection agency, filed this action against Labonte Drywall under ERISA and the Labor Management Relations Act, seeking enforcement of the agreement. After a bench trial, the district court found that Labonte Drywall had terminated the agreement, and therefore, Plaintiffs had no legal right to conduct the requested audit. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the Union had actual notice of Labonte Drywall’s letter terminating its obligations under the agreement; and (2) Labonte Drywall had no duty to submit to Plaintiffs’ audit requests. View "New England Carpenters Central v. Labonte Drywall Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Labonte Drywall Company signed a statewide agreement with Union, which allowed Labonte Drywall to hire Union carpenters for its business. The agreement required Labonte Drywall to allow an audit of its records. After Labonte Drywall did not respond to certain audit requests, Plaintiffs, the trustees for a group of Union-related benefits funds and their collection agency, filed this action against Labonte Drywall under ERISA and the Labor Management Relations Act, seeking enforcement of the agreement. After a bench trial, the district court found that Labonte Drywall had terminated the agreement, and therefore, Plaintiffs had no legal right to conduct the requested audit. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in finding that the Union had actual notice of Labonte Drywall’s letter terminating its obligations under the agreement; and (2) Labonte Drywall had no duty to submit to Plaintiffs’ audit requests. View "New England Carpenters Central v. Labonte Drywall Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In 2000, Employee began working for Employer on Employer's farmland. Employee alleged that Employer promised him eighty acres of farmland if he continued his employment for ten years. Although Employee worked for Employer for more than ten years, Employer never signed over the eighty acres to Employee and subsequently terminated Employee’s employment. Employee filed a complaint against Employer for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the part performance exception to the statute of frauds applied in this case and granted Employee specific performance of the contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeal improperly relied upon Employee’s testimony as to his intent because to prove part performance, the alleged acts of performance must establish the exception without the aid of such testimony; but (2) there was other sufficient evidence to support the grant of specific performance in Employee’s favor. View "Ficke v. Wolken" on Justia Law

In 2000, Employee began working for Employer on Employer's farmland. Employee alleged that Employer promised him eighty acres of farmland if he continued his employment for ten years. Although Employee worked for Employer for more than ten years, Employer never signed over the eighty acres to Employee and subsequently terminated Employee’s employment. Employee filed a complaint against Employer for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the part performance exception to the statute of frauds applied in this case and granted Employee specific performance of the contract. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeal improperly relied upon Employee’s testimony as to his intent because to prove part performance, the alleged acts of performance must establish the exception without the aid of such testimony; but (2) there was other sufficient evidence to support the grant of specific performance in Employee’s favor. View "Ficke v. Wolken" on Justia Law

In 2011, a tornado struck and substantially damaged Midwest’s building and its contents. After the tornado, the medical practice was to relocate, which required substantial work. Until construction was complete, Midwest operated out of a temporary location, but was unable to operate at its normal capacity. Moving the repaired MRI machine to the new building required a crane; it was necessary to reinforce floors; replace exterior brick; and install pipe, specialized heating and air conditioning equipment, and copper shielding. The new location opened about a year after the tornado. Cincinnati Insurance paid Midwest the policy limit of $2,414,161.26 for the building; the policy limit of $388,000 for business personal property; and $828,081.75 for business income interruption and extra expenses. . Midwest requested “Extra Expense” reimbursement for the costs to repair and relocate the MRI machine and to replace the other specialty equipment necessary for normal operations. Cincinnati denied payment, contending the expenditures were covered under the Building or Business Personal Property provisions, for which it had paid the policy limits. The district court found the claimed expenses were recoverable under the Extra Expense provision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that the language of the Policy does not specifically exclude coverage under the Extra Expense provision if the expenses happen to fall under another coverage in the Policy. View "Midwest Reg'l Allergy Ctr., P.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2011, a tornado struck and substantially damaged Midwest’s building and its contents. After the tornado, the medical practice was to relocate, which required substantial work. Until construction was complete, Midwest operated out of a temporary location, but was unable to operate at its normal capacity. Moving the repaired MRI machine to the new building required a crane; it was necessary to reinforce floors; replace exterior brick; and install pipe, specialized heating and air conditioning equipment, and copper shielding. The new location opened about a year after the tornado. Cincinnati Insurance paid Midwest the policy limit of $2,414,161.26 for the building; the policy limit of $388,000 for business personal property; and $828,081.75 for business income interruption and extra expenses. . Midwest requested “Extra Expense” reimbursement for the costs to repair and relocate the MRI machine and to replace the other specialty equipment necessary for normal operations. Cincinnati denied payment, contending the expenditures were covered under the Building or Business Personal Property provisions, for which it had paid the policy limits. The district court found the claimed expenses were recoverable under the Extra Expense provision. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, noting that the language of the Policy does not specifically exclude coverage under the Extra Expense provision if the expenses happen to fall under another coverage in the Policy. View "Midwest Reg'l Allergy Ctr., P.C. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co." on Justia Law