Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

James Armour’s employment contract with AM General LLC entitled him to payment of a long-term incentive plan (LTIP). When Armour retired, he was to receive a lump sum LTIP payment, but instead he started receiving quarterly installment payments in the form of checks. AM General attempted to make the final installment payment with a subordinate promissory note. Armour rejected the Note and requested full payment. Thereafter, AM General filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not breached the LTIP portion of its agreement with Armour. Armour counterclaimed, asserting that AM General breached the employment agreement by failing to pay Armour the full LTIP payment when it was due and claiming that, by attempting to pay the remaining portion of the LTIP payment with a promissory note, AM General breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Armour. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a genuine issue of material fact with regard to how “payment” could be made under the LTIP provision of the agreement. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the grant of summary judgment, holding that AM General breached its employment agreement with Armour because the Note did not constitute payment under the employment agreement. View "AM General LLC v. Armour" on Justia Law

In 2000, plaintiff accepted the Gray law firm’s offer of employment as an associate attorney, including a provision requiring both parties to submit all disputes relating to the employment relationship to binding arbitration. In 2005, Gray merged into DLA Piper. In 2006, plaintiff signed a “Confidential Resignation Agreement and General Release of Claims.” DLA agreed to continue to provide insurance and other benefits until August 2006, when his employment would officially terminate. The Termination Agreement is silent concerning dispute resolution. Plaintiff later sued, alleging: breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; breach of contract; promissory fraud; and constructive fraud, arguing that the firm had “undervalued” his benefits by computing them based on “artificially reduced salary figures.” DLA sought to compel arbitration. Plaintiff asserted the Termination Agreement constituted a novation, extinguishing the arbitration provision, and that even if the provision had survived, claims involving the benefit plan were not subject to arbitration. The court compelled arbitration. In 2013, the arbitrator determined DLA had breached the Termination Agreement and plaintiff had suffered emotional distress, and awarded $41,000 in contract damages plus interest, $45,000 in emotional distress damages, and $7,535.67 in costs. The court of appeal affirmed confirmation of the award. View "Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary" on Justia Law

Petitioner was terminated from her position as the Clerk-Treasurer of the Town of Hurlock two and one-half years after she entered into a written employment agreement with the Mayor-elect. Under the employment agreement, Petitioner was to serve a four-year term. Petitioner brought this action against Respondent, the Town, alleging breach of contract and seeking damages and other relief. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the four-year term of employment in the agreement was inconsistent with the Town Charter and therefore ineffective. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the language of the Town Charter means that an official like the Clerk-Treasurer is an at-will employee; and (2) the Mayor and Council of Hurlock lacked authority under the Town Charter to enter into an agreement conferring a fixed term of employment in this case. View "Clough v. Mayor & Council of Hurlock" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, 19 workers employed by Degeller, filed a class action suit on behalf of themselves and similarly situated Deggeller employees. The court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the breach of contract claim where the workers’ allegation that Deggeller failed to pay the prevailing wage stated a valid claim for breach of their employment contracts. The court also concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the workers' claim for statutory damages under 26 U.S.C. 7434 because they alleged that Deggeller intentionally filed fraudulent tax documents on their behalf. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals of these claims and vacate its decision under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c)(3) not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Arkansas minimum wage claim. View "Cuellar-Aguilar v. Deggeller Attractions, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs (collectively, “Pegasus”) sued one defendant (“VarigLog”) for breach of contract and conversion and sought to hold other defendants (“MP defendants”) liable for VarigLog’s conduct on an alter ego theory. Pegasus served a notice to produce documents seeking electronically stores information (ESI) concerning Pegasus’s claims and VarigLog’s relationship with the MP defendants. VarigLog’s production was unsatisfactory to Pegasus. Supreme Court appointed a discovery referee to assist Pegasus and VarigLog in resolving the dispute. During the conferences it was established that computer crashes resulted in the loss of much of the ESI, and that data recovery efforts had proven unsuccessful. Pegasus moved for the imposition of spoliation sanctions against VarigLog and the MP defendants. Supreme Court granted the motion, concluding that the evidence was negligently destroyed. The Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Appellate Division erred in determining that Pegasus had not attempted to make a showing that the destroyed documents were relevant to its claim. Remanded to the trial court for a determination as to whether the evidence was relevant to the claims asserted against Defendants and for the imposition of an appropriate sanction should the trial court decide that a sanction is warranted. View "Pegasus Aviation I, Inc. v Varig Logistica S.A." on Justia Law

In IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A., the Court of Appeals held that, where parties include a New York choice-of-law clause in a contract, such a provision demonstrates the parties’ intent that courts not conduct a conflict-of-laws analysis. In the instant case, Plaintiff was a New York not-for-profit corporation that administered a retirement plan and a death benefit plan. Decedent was enrolled in both plans. Decedent named Appellants as beneficiaries. Both plans stated that they shall be governed by and construed in accordance with New York law. After Decedent died, a Colorado court admitted his will to probate. Plaintiff was unsure to whom the plan benefits should be paid after Decedent’s death and commenced a federal interpleader action against Decedent’s Estate, the personal representative (PR) of the Estate, and Appellants. A federal district court directed Plaintiff to pay the disputed funds to the PR, concluding that Colorado’s revocation law terminated any claims to the plans by Appellants. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals answered by extending the holding in IRB to contracts that do not fall under Gen. Oblig. Law 5-1401 and clarifying that this rule obviates the application and both common-law and conflict-of-laws principles and statutory choice-of-law directives, unless the parties expressly indicate otherwise. View "Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Jeffrey Huber brought this action against his former employer, Lightforce USA, Inc. (“LFUSA”), for breach of contract and failure to pay wages. Huber’s claims centered on two employment agreements: a Company Share Offer (“CSO”), and a Deed of Non-Disclosure, Non-Competition and Assignment (“NDA”). Huber claimed that upon his termination LFUSA was obligated to pay him the value of 30% of the goodwill of LFUSA under the CSO and twelve months’ pay under the NDA. The parties agreed that the CSO was a deferred compensation plan and was, therefore, governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). At a bench trial, Huber succeeded only on his breach of contract claim under the NDA. Huber timely appealed the district court’s rulings on summary judgment: (1) holding that the amount owed under the NDA was not wages under the Idaho Wage Claims Act, (2) dismissing his wrongful termination claim, and (3) holding that the CSO was a “top hat” plan under ERISA and, therefore, exempt from ERISA’s vesting and anti-forfeiture provisions. Huber also appealed the district court’s ruling at trial that Huber forfeited the benefit under the CSO, and the district court’s rulings on post-trial motions: (1) denying his claim for equitable relief, (2) calculating Huber’s award of prejudgment interest, and (3) awarding attorney fees and costs to LFUSA. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court in part and reversed in part, finding: (1) the CSO was a top hat plan under ERISA and that Huber forfeited the benefit under the CSO; (2) it was proper to deny Huber’s claim for equitable relief and denying Huber’s motion to amend his complaint to conform to the evidence; (3) the district court erred by ruling that the amount owed under the NDA was not "wages" under the Idaho Wage Claims Act; (4) the district court erred with respect to prejudgment interest and costs and fees to LFUSA. The case was remanded back to the district court to treble the $180,000 judgment. Post-judgment interest shall accrue on the trebled amount of $540,000 from December 10, 2013, the date of entry of the judgment. View "Huber v. Lightforce USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a bank, filed suit against multiple defendants for fraud, constructive fraud, civil conspiracy, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Tennessee Securities Act. Three non-resident defendants (the “Ratings Agencies”) moved to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding that Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction under a theory of general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction; but (2) vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff’s action against the Ratings Agencies on the theory of conspiracy jurisdiction, holding that although Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy jurisdiction at this point, the case must be remanded for the trial court to determine if Plaintiff should be allowed to conduct jurisdictional discovery on the conspiracy theory of personal jurisdiction in a manner consistent with the guidelines set forth in this opinion. View "First Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. First Tennessee Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A landowner filed a complaint for breach of contract against the predecessor in interest to Huntington National Bank. The trial judge ruled in favor of the landowner and awarded damages. The court of appeals reversed on the issue of the proper standard for calculating damages and remanded the case for a recalculation. On remand, the trial judge ordered a new evidentiary hearing on damages, concluding that the court could not arrive at a proper measure of damages without additional testimony. Huntington filed this action in procedendo and prohibition in the court of appeals and filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s order. The court of appeals (1) dismissed the appeal on grounds that the order requiring a new hearing was not a final appealable order, and (2) dismissed the procedendo and prohibition petition, concluding that Huntington had an adequate remedy by way of appeal and that the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction by ordering an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Huntington had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal and that the trial judge’s jurisdiction to order the evidentiary hearing and to determine damages based on new evidence was not patently and ambiguously lacking. View "State ex rel. Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Kontos" on Justia Law

BLB filed suit against Jet Linx and Jamie Walker for damages arising from breach of contract. Jet Linx counterclaimed. The district court awarded damages to both parties and both parties appealed. The court concluded that cost-of-repair damages as argued by BLB would result in windfall and, therefore, in economic waste, a result the district court properly avoided. The court further concluded that diminution in value provides the appropriate measure of damages. Finally, the district court did not err in finding that BLB failed to prove its damages with sufficient certainty because BLB did not offer evidence of the reduced value of either airplane resulting from Jet Linx’s failure to provide a complete set of maintenance records and parts tags. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment for Jet Linx. View "BLB Aviation South Carolina v. Jet Linx Aviation, LLC" on Justia Law