Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Pacific Trades Construction & Development, Inc. was a defendant in a lawsuit that alleged, in part, that Pacific Trades was liable for damages for construction defects caused by Pacific Trades's negligent acts or omissions. Underwriters of Interest Subscribing to Policy Number A15274001 (Underwriters) undertook Pacific Trades's defense in that action under its Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy insuring Pacific Trades. ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company, which also insured Pacific Trades, declined to participate in funding Pacific Trades's defense, claiming (among other things) that a clause in its policy relieved ProBuilders of any duty to defend Pacific Trades when another insurer was doing so. Underwriters sought equitable contribution from ProBuilders for a portion of the defense costs. The parties filed cross-motions seeking summary adjudication of ProBuilders's liability for a portion of the defense costs. The trial court agreed with ProBuilders that a clause in its policy relieved it of any duty to defend Pacific Trades when (as here) another insurer was defending Pacific Trades, and entered summary judgment in favor of ProBuilders. Underwriters appealed that determination. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court erred in enforcing the clause in ProBuilders's policy and, because the other arguments raised by ProBuilders in support of its summary judgment motion on Underwriters's claim for equitable contribution did not support the judgment, the Court reversed the judgment. View "Underwriters of Interest v. ProBuilders Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a contract dispute between San Pasqual and the State governing San Pasqual's operation of a casino on its land. San Pasqual filed two suits against the State that were consolidated, alleging breach of contract and seeking damages for five years of lost profits. On appeal, San Pasqual challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to the State. The court agreed with the State that Section 9.4 of the Compact between the State and San Pasqual is unambiguous, applies to this action, and bars San Pasqual’s damages claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "San Pasqual Band of Mission Indians v. California" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, homeowners, brought this action against Defendants, the company that constructed Plaintiffs’ home and the developer of the lot on which the home was built, alleging negligent construction of the home. Defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that the action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat. 25-223. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed as to the developer but reversed as to the construction company, finding the action against it was not barred by section 25-223. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to affirm the judgment of the district court, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiffs’ claims at the expiration of the express one-year limited warranty issued by the construction company instead of the date the home was substantially completed. View "Adams v. Manchester Park" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs received internet and cable services from TWC in Chardon, Ohio. The Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCI), conducting an online investigation to identify individuals possessing and sharing child pornography, located a suspect using a public IP address of 173.88.218.170 and found images and movie files titled consistent with child pornography. The IP address of plaintiffs’ computers was 173.88.218.70. Responding to a subpoena for subscriber information for the .170 address, TWC indicated that it was assigned to plaintiffs. While executing a search warrant for plaintiffs’ residence, BCI agents determined that the IP address assigned to plaintiffs was the .70 address, not the .170 address. The search was terminated without discovery of any evidence of criminal activity. Plaintiffs alleged that the search was extensive, destructive, and in plain sight of neighbors; that TWC’s conduct was intentional and fraudulent; that disclosure of their subscriber information without authorization violated the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2707(a)); and state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed denial of TWC’s claim of immunity under section 2703(e), but found that 18 U.S.C. 2707(e)’s “good faith reliance” defense barred the claims and that the state-law claims failed because the factual allegations were insufficient to establish that TWC disclosed the information intentionally, wrongfully, or in breach of contract. View "Long v. Insight Commc'ns of Cent. Ohio, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the executrix of her husband's estate, along with her husband's former business, Federal City, filed suit against Life Investors for conversion and tortious interference with a contract. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of the complaint. The court concluded that this action is not barred by claim preclusion because the claims brought are not based upon the same cause of action as the prior suit. In this case, plaintiffs allege claims for conversion and tortious interference with contract against Life Investors because Life Investors removed over $400,000 from certain accounts to cover expenses above the alleged debt plaintiffs owed Life Investors. Life Investors removed these funds after the decision in the Maryland district court. The Maryland court never determined that plaintiffs lacked any interest in the assets in the accounts. Instead, it decided that plaintiffs were time-barred from bringing claims from a 2000 request for withdrawal of the assets and that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., claims were either time-barred or failed to allege a violation of ERISA law. Similarly, the claim is not barred by issue preclusion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Corrado v. Life Investors Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Life Investors filed suit against defendants, alleging breach of a settlement agreement that required defendants to repay advances of monies defendants received from Life Investors. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Life Investors. The court affirmed, concluding that defendants' laches defense failed because they cannot show unreasonable delay on the part of Life Investors in bringing this suit nor can defendants show that they were prejudiced; even if the alleged inconsistencies were material, defendants chose not to investigate further and thus the determination that they ratified the Settlement Agreement was correct; the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the question of ratification of the Settlement Agreement after certifying that question to the Iowa Supreme Court and receiving its answer; and defendants' attempt to argue an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., violation as a defense in this action is barred as a matter of issue preclusion. View "Life Investors Ins. Co. v. Federal City Region" on Justia Law

James Pyne, who died during these proceedings, was the founder and sole stockholder of Remet Corporation. Pyne sold Remet’s stock and facilities, along with real property he had been leasing to Remet, to Burmah Castro Holding, Inc. The sales agreement contained an indemnification provision obligating Pyne to indemnify, defendant, and holder the buyer harmless for certain environmental losses. Remet later received a letter from the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) notifying Remet that it was a potentially responsible party for environmental contamination at the Erie Canal Site adjacent to Remet’s real property. Remet filed notices of claim against Pyne’s estate seeking indemnification for environmental liabilities under the sales agreement. Remet then brought this action against the Estate asserting claims for contractual and common-law indemnification. Supreme Court granted Remet summary judgment on liability. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding that DEC’s letter did not require Remet to take action. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the letter was sufficiently coercive and adversarial as to require action in connection with any environmental law pursuant to the sales agreement; and (2) Remet was entitled to contractual indemnification for past and future environmental losses arising out of DEC’s investigation and remediation of the Erie Canal Site. View "Remet Corp. v. Estate of Pyne" on Justia Law

In 2009, John Flynn joined the law firm of Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. (LLO). In 2011, Flynn left LLO to open his own practice. LLO and Daniel Lilley subsequently filed a complaint against Flynn seeking a judicial declaration that any contingency fees earned in cases that Flynn brought to LLO were the property of LLO to be distributed at Lilley’s sole discretion and seeking the return of such fees that Flynn had already received. Flynn counterclaimed. In 2012, the superior court denied LLO’s motion to consolidate this case with the closely-related cases at issue in Tucker v. Lilley. After a jury trial, the superior court entered judgment awarding Flynn unpaid salary from his tenure at LLO and apportioned attorney fees between the parties in cases that Flynn brought to LLO from his former law firm. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the superior court abused its discretion in declining to consolidate this case with the cases at issue in Tucker v. Lilley, as this case was an integral member of the set of cases that “must be resolved in one consolidated action before a single fact-finder.” Remanded with instructions to grant LLO’s motion to consolidate. View "Daniel G. Lilley Law Office, P.A. v. Flynn" on Justia Law

Morady sold life insurance policies. Davis, a former lawyer, approached elderly African-Americans and paid them small amounts to become the nominal applicant-buyers of the policies, with Morady as the insurance agent, and to put the policies into an irrevocable trust, with Davis as trustee. The beneficial interest in the trust would be sold to an investor who would pay the remaining premiums and wait for the death of the insured. The insurer would not have sold the policies had it known that the premiums would be paid by an unrelated third party in the expectation that the policy would be transferred to him; its contracts with agents, including Morady, required them to conform to an “absolute prohibition against participation in any type of premium financing scheme involving an unrelated third party,” but the law allows an investor to purchase the beneficial interest in an existing life insurance policy. The net loss to Ohio National (beyond $120,000 commissions paid to Morady) was $605,000 in litigation expenses to void the policies. The total death benefits specified in the illegal policies amounted to $2.8 million. The Seventh Circuit agreed that Morady’s conduct constituted fraud and a breach of her contract and affirmed summary judgment, with damages of $726,000. View "Ohio Nat'l Life Assurance Corp. v. Davis" on Justia Law

Appellants and the company they own filed suit against David Fisher and other defendants, alleging claims arising from an unfulfilled real estate purchase agreement. Fisher filed an answer and counterclaim. Three years later, Fisher filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Appellants filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy case, requesting a determination that their claims against Fisher were not dischargeable in bankruptcy. The district court subsequently dismissed Appellants’ claims. Thereafter, the bankruptcy court ruled that Appellants’ claims against Fisher were dischargeable in bankruptcy. Appellants then filed a motion to modify the district court’s order dismissing the action and a renewed motion for summary judgment. The district court denied both post-dismissal motions, noting that the matter had already been dismissed. On appeal, the Supreme Court treated Appellants’ motions as motions for relief from the dismissal order pursuant to Wyo. R. Civ. P. 60(b) and affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’ motions. View "Bartel v. West" on Justia Law