Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

GA entered into a blanket purchase agreement (BPA 218), with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in June 2011, to furnish trained service dogs for disabled veterans. A year later, the contracting officer sent an email questioning GA's performance. On August 31, 2012, the officer sent notice terminating BPA 218 for default and suspending open orders, informing GA that it had the right to appeal under the disputes clause of the contract. On December 21, 2012, GA sent a letter to the VA’s Rehabilitation Research & Development Service, arguing that it had fulfilled its duties and that the default termination should be converted to a termination for the convenience of the government. On February 28, 2013, GA sent the contracting officer a “formal demand.” On March 21, the officer sent a letter stating that she had received the claim but needed supporting documentation. GA began compiling documentation, but on May 3, the officer sent another letter, stating that she would not reconsider her decision, but that GA could appeal under 41 U.S.C. 7104(b). On January 7, 2014, GA filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, finding the claim time-barred because, while the February 2013 letter qualified as a request for reconsideration, the officer did not reconsider, so the statute of limitations never tolled. The Federal Circuit reversed. The 12-month statutory appeal period did not begin to run until the officer rejected the request for reconsideration on May 3. View "Guardian Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Reddick was employed as an FDIC “Investigation Specialist” by an initial two-year term appointment, set to expire in September 2012. In April 2012, the FDIC offered him an extension of the initial term for an additional two years. The offer stated that the “extended employment” would be “effective [September], 2012” and that the “extended appointment is subject to the conditions of employment [included in the initial appointment offer] and subject to your continued successful performance.” Reddick accepted the offer days after receipt. The FDIC revoked the extension offer in August 2012. Reddick filed a grievance on the theory that the revocation of the offer was an adverse action under 5 U.S.C. 7512 and that he was entitled to procedural protections that the FDIC did not provide him. The matter was referred to arbitration under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator found the extension offer to be conditioned on Reddick’s “satisfactory work performance” and that the revocation was supported by sufficient justification. The Federal Circuit dismissed an appeal. The extension offer was still revocable by the FDIC even after acceptance by Reddick; it never matured into an effective extension, so Reddick was not “removed.” View "Reddick v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

Cherri Porter’s beachfront vacation home was completely destroyed during Hurricane Katrina. Porter claimed the destruction was the result of a barge, owned by Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.–Biloxi, breaking free from its moorings and alliding with her home. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy excluded from coverage damage caused by water or windstorm, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company denied Porter’s claim. Porter filed suit against the insurance agent who maintained the policy, Max Mullins, against State Farm, and against Grand Casino. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of each defendant, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Porter filed a petition for writ of certiorari claiming genuine issues of fact existed as to each defendant, and the Mississippi Supreme Court granted her petition. Because Porter’s all-risk insurance policy unambiguously excluded from coverage loss that would not have occurred absent water damage, no genuine issue of material fact existed as to Porter’s bad-faith denial of coverage claim against State Farm. Additionally, Porter failed to produce sufficient evidence showing a genuine issue of fact as to whether Grand Casino breached its duty to take reasonable measures to prevent foreseeable injury. The Court therefore affirmed the decisions of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals as to all issues. View "Porter v. Grand Casino of Mississippi, Inc.- Biloxi" on Justia Law

Virginia Fuel Corporation and Lambert Coal Company entered into an agreement by which Virginia Fuel agreed to acquire certain assets owned by Lambert. James C. Justice Companies, Inc. executed a guaranty guaranteeing Lambert’s obligations under the agreement. After Virginia Fuel stopped making payments under the agreement, Lambert filed suit against Virginia Fuel and Justice Companies, alleging breach of the agreement and breach of the guaranty. Virginia Fuel and Justice Companies counterclaimed for breach of contract. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Lambert and dismissed Defendant’s affirmative defense of recoupment as well as Defendants’ counterclaim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment to Lambert on its complaint, sustaining Lambert’s demurrer to Defendants’ counterclaim, and dismissing Defendants’ defense of recoupment. View "Virginia Fuel Corp. v. Lambert Coal Co." on Justia Law

In this suit alleging breach of an insurance contract, plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for directed verdict. Plaintiff contended that the trial court’s intended jury instruction violated the efficient proximate cause doctrine and there was sufficient evidence to permit the jury to determine whether plaintiff met his burden of proving his claim for punitive damages. The court concluded that plaintiff’s interpretation of the Other Coverage 9 provision is the correct interpretation, consistent with the efficient proximate cause doctrine. A policy cannot extend coverage for a specified peril, then exclude coverage for a loss caused by a combination of the covered peril and an excluded peril, without regard to whether the covered peril was the predominant or efficient proximate cause of the loss. Because the trial court granted the motion for a directed verdict based on the effect the erroneous proposed jury instruction would have had on plaintiff’s case, the court reversed and remanded as to this issue. Because defendant's special instruction No. 12 improperly shifted the burden of proof, the trial court erred in its decision to instruct the jury with defendant’s proposed special instruction and in granting defendant’s motion for directed verdict based on the decision to give that instruction. The court reversed and remanded as to this issue. Finally, the court found no error in the trial court's punitive damages claim. View "Vardanyan v. Amco Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After its 2010 merger with Continental Airlines, United Airlines made changes to its frequent‐flier rewards program. In 2014, a member of United’s MileagePlus rewards program claimed that United breached a contract by reducing his anticipated program benefits. The Seventh Circuit concluded (Lagen decision) that the reduction of benefits was not a breach of contract because the program rules allowed United to change the benefits at any time. The plaintiffs in this case also sued for breach of contract. Relying on Lagen, the district court granted summary judgment to United. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the case was different from Lagen because it concerned changes to the “Premier” status program. United did promise to provide the plaintiffs with premier benefits in 2012 that matched the premier benefits previously available in 2011 and cannot be liable for breaching a contract that it did not make. View "Hammarquist v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a home-improvement contract between Petitioner, a construction company, and Respondents, homeowners. Both parties argued that the other breached the contract. The superior court determined that the matter must be referred to arbitration under an arbitration provision in the contract. The arbitrator found in favor of Petitioner. Petitioner filed this action seeking to confirm the arbitration award and moved for summary judgment. Only after Petitioner filed its summary judgment motion did Respondents file an answer opposing confirmation of the award. The Court of Chancery granted the petition to confirm, holding that summary judgment was appropriate in this case. View "SC&A Constr., Inc. v. Potter" on Justia Law

The Institute filed the underlying complaint, alleging claims for unjust enrichment, right of publicity, and misappropriation under Michigan common law for Target’s sales of all items using the name and likeness of Rosa Parks. The district court dismissed the complaint. The court concluded that Target's use of Rosa Parks’s name and likeness in the books, movie, and plaque is necessary to chronicling and discussing the history of the Civil Rights Movement. These matters are quintessentially embraced and protected by Michigan’s qualified privilege. Michigan law does not make discussion of these topics of public concern contingent on paying a fee. Therefore, all six books, the movie, and the plaque are protected under Michigan’s qualified privilege protecting matters of public interest. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Rosa and Raymond Parks Inst. for Self Dev. v. Target Corp." on Justia Law

John and Kimberly Nooney purchased tickets from StubHub, Inc. for a concert. The tickets were invalid, and the Nooneys were denied access to the concert. The Nooneys sued StubHub for breach of contract and fraudulent inducement. The circuit court granted StubHub’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but in doing so, the circuit court considered a document that was not attached to the complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the circuit court (1) did not err in considering the document without converting the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because the document was referenced in the complaint; but (2) erred in dismissing the complaint on the merits, as the Nooneys’ complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Nooney v. StubHub, Inc." on Justia Law

The Omaha Police Officers Association (Union) and the City of Omaha (City) entered into a collective bargaining agreement that was to remain in effect from 2008 until 2013. In 2014, the Union filed a complaint against the City requesting that the district court declare that the collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the City had rolled over to the 2014 calendar year. In support of its complaint, the Union claimed that the City did not timely provide written notice of its intent to negotiate or modify the terms of the contract for 2014. The City, in turn, argued that the Union’s action was barred by the doctrines of waiver and equitable estoppel. The district court granted summary judgment to the Union. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the City failed to establish the required elements of equitable estoppel; (2) the Union did not waive its stated intention to allow the Contract to extend for another year; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the parties to pay their own attorney fees. View "Omaha Police Union Local 101 v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law