Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Todd Kiser initiated this action by filing a form complaint against Noel Kiser and Marie McDowell alleging that Noel and Marie owed him a sum of money arising out of an asserted agreement among them regarding their father’s nursing care and cremation costs. The small claims court entered judgment in favor of Todd. Noel and Marie appealed the judgment to the district court. The district court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the brief filed by Noel and Marie had been untimely filed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the appeal on the basis of the briefing deadline imposed in the inapplicable Municipal Court Appellate Rules. Remanded to the district court for reinstatement of Noel and Marie’s appeal and for further proceedings. View "Kiser v. Kiser" on Justia Law

This lawsuit stemmed from an agreement between the ART entities and the Clapper entities to purchase several apartment complexes. The parties organized the transaction so that an intermediate entity, the Partnership, would be the nominal buyer of the properties. The court found that the ART entities waived their challenge to the district court’s general application of the 19% prejudgment interest rate, its use of a compounding interest calculation, and its calculation of prejudgment interest through and including the date of judgment. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions for the district court to reenter the portions of its first judgment that were affirmed in Art Midwest II, and to recalculate pre- and postjudgment interest on the section 4.02(d) of the Partnership Agreement award with reference to the date of the first judgment, October 11, 2011. View "Art Midwest, Inc. v. Clapper" on Justia Law

Mid-Continent Casualty Company appealed a circuit court judgment declaring that it had a duty to defend its named insured, Advantage Medical Electronics, LLC, in a pending legal action against Advantage. This case centered on Mid-Continent's duty to defend Advantage in a South Carolina litigation. Based upon both the allegations in the complaint and the undisputed facts, the Circuit Court concluded that the policy exclusions did not allow Mid-Continent to evade its obligation to provide a defense under the CGL policy it had issued to Advantage, and it entered a final judgment in favor of Advantage. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. Advantage Medical Electronics, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants Fabec and Lalo Scrolling Media for breach of contract, conversion, unjust enrichment, and related claims. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's grant of default judgment against them. The court concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiffs satisfied the amount in controversy requirement; the district court acted well within its discretion in concluding that Fabec’s noncompliance with the district court’s pretrial instructions justified the entry of a default judgment; but because Fabec was denied the opportunity to cross-examine plaintiffs' counsel, the court reversed that portion of the default judgment awarding plaintiffs $43,500 in attorney’s fees and remanded the case to the district court to hold a hearing on the amount and reasonableness of the fees. The court otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Giovanno v. Fabec" on Justia Law

Continental sells carbon black, a material used in rubber products. BRC makes rubber products for the automotive industry. The companies entered into a contract that stated: It is the intent of this agreement that Continental agrees to sell to BRC approximately 1.8 million pounds of carbon black annually. In 2010, Continental shipped 2.6 million pounds to BRC. In 2011, for various reasons, Continental was struggling to keep up with the total demand from all its customers. When Continental refused to confirm or ship some of BRC’s orders, BRC sued, alleging that Continental had breached and repudiated the contract. The district court entered judgment for BRC, finding that as a matter of law that the agreement was a “requirements contract,” meaning it obligated Continental to sell as much carbon black as BRC needed, and obligated BRC to buy all its carbon black exclusively from Continental. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded, finding that the agreement did not obligate BRC to buy any—much less all— of its carbon black from Continental. View "BRC Rubber & Plastics, Inc. v. Cont'l Carbon Co." on Justia Law

Duane Pankratz filed a complaint against Robert Cullum’s estate for breach of an oral promise to transfer corporate stock and for the recovery of corporate debt Robert Cullum allegedly personally guaranteed to pay. The Estate moved for summary judgment, asserting that there was no binding personal guaranty between Pankratz and Cullum and that the statute of limitations barred Pankratz’s claim for shares in Cullum’s corporation. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Estate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it ruled that Cullum’s personal guaranty must be in writing to be enforceable; and (2) the circuit court did not err when it granted summary judgment on Pankratz’s claim that Cullum breached the parties’ oral agreement to transfer corporate stock because Pankratz did not bring his claim within the relevant statute of limitations period. View "In re Estate of Cullum" on Justia Law

Exel, a shipping broker, sued SRT, an interstate motor carrier, after SRT lost a shipment of pharmaceutical products it had agreed to transport for Exel on behalf of Exel’s client, Sandoz. On summary judgment, the district court awarded Exel the replacement value of the lost goods pursuant to the transportation contract between Exel and SRT, rejecting SRT’s argument that its liability was limited under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 14706. The Sixth Circuit reversed. Whether SRT had limited its liability was a question of fact for a jury. To limit its liability under the Carmack Amendment, a carrier must: provide the shipper with a fair opportunity to choose between two or more levels of liability obtain the shipper’s written agreement as to its choice of liability; and issue a receipt or bill of lading prior to moving the shipment. SRT did not meet its burden on summary judgment of establishing that it provided Sandoz with the opportunity to choose between two or more levels of liability. SRT did not explain what “classification or tariff . . . govern[ed]” the shipment, nor indicate whether it made this information available to Sandoz. View "Exel, Inc. v. S. Refrigerated Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal was one of many concerning natural gas wells operated from 1978 to 1998 in Beckham County, Oklahoma. In the immediately preceding appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict for damages for breach of drilling leases for $3,650,000, but reversed two other jury awards in the amounts of $4,055,000.00 and $6,845,000.00. The trial court denied prejudgment interest and the royalty owners appealed. After review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) review of the issue of prejudgment interest is not precluded by the settled-law-of-the-case doctrine; (2) the Production Revenue Standards Act, 52 O.S. 2011 sec. 570 et seq., was inapplicable to the facts presented; and (3) because the plaintiff's claims were unliquidated, prejudgment interest was not recoverable pursuant to 23 O.S. 2011 sec. 6. View "Krug v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc." on Justia Law

Continental Partners bought a lot with two building pads from Yellowstone Development that was part of the Yellowstone Club subdivision. The purchase and sale agreement included an assurance that the houses Continental intended to build on the lot would have ski-in and gravity ski-out access built by the Yellowstone Club. During construction, Continental sold the homes to separate buyers, including the managing member of WLW Realty Partners, LLC. Before construction on the ski-out access on the two homes had begun, the Yellowstone Club filed for bankruptcy protection. The subsequent owners of Yellowstone Club informed the new owners that ski-out access to the homes would not be constructed. WLW Realty filed this action against Continental, alleging, inter alia, negligent misrepresentation and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA). After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for WLW Realty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred by (1) imposing liability on Continental for negligent misrepresentation, as WLW Realty failed to satisfy the first and second elements of the tort; and (2) finding that Continental had violated the MCPA, as Continental did not engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices. View "WLW Realty Partners, LLC v. Continental Partners VIII, LLC" on Justia Law

Quality Ag filed suit contending that it owns a sidetrack by means of adverse possession due to its continuous possession of the sidetrack from August 25, 2000 to August 25, 2010. BNSF has stored equipment on the sidetrack since one of its trains derailed near it on August 3, 2010. The district court granted summary judgment to BNSF, concluding that the adverse possession claim by Quality Ag was insufficiently pled, that BNSF owns the sidetrack, and that the agreement alleged by Quality Ag lacked consideration. The court concluded that Quality Ag's claim of adverse possession fails since it did not exclusively possess the sidetrack for at least ten years. Because Quality Ag has not shown that it owns the sidetrack, its breach of contract claim also fails. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Quality Ag. Serv. of Iowa, Inc. v. BNSF Railway" on Justia Law