Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Lewis sued the video-sharing service, YouTube, for breach of contract it deleted her "channel." YouTube filed a filed a request for judicial notice of the YouTube Community Guidelines and several e-mails between Lewis and YouTube.The trial court granted the request for judicial notice and entered a judgment of dismissal. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that no provision in the Terms of Service could serve as the basis for the relief that Lewis sought. The court noted that YouTube has restored service for Lewis. View "Lewis v. YouTube" on Justia Law

Leon and Brenda Rogers purchased a home from Jeffrey Wright. The Rogers subsequently discovered several defects in the home and sued Wright, JWright Development, LLC, and JWright Companies, Inc. (collectively, the JWright defendants), alleging breach of contract, negligence, breach of warranty, and negligent and intentional misrepresentation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the JWright defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s order on the negligence claim but otherwise affirmed, holding (1) issues of material fact existed regarding whether the builder of the Rogers’ home breached its legal duty to build the home in a reasonable and workmanlike manner; and (2) the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the JWright defendants on the remainder of the Rogers’ claims. View "Rogers v. Wright" on Justia Law

These consolidated actions involved an original action in the Supreme Court and an appeal of a judgment of the court of appeals and concerned the interpretation of several nearly identical oil and gas leases. In the original action, Relator, an absent and unnamed plaintiff in a class action, challenged the court of appeals’ order tolling the leases in the class action pending appeal and sought writs of prohibition and mandamus. The appeal challenged the court of appeals’ interpretation of the leases in the class action. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in the class action, holding that the court of appeals correctly interpreted the leases; (2) denied a writ of mandamus or prohibition in the original action because Relator had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by moving to intervene in the appeal and because the court of appeals did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to issue an order tolling the leases; and (3) denied the motions of the appellee in the appeal to toll the terms of the leases. View "State ex rel. Claugus Family Farm, L.P. v. Seventh Dist. Court of Appeals" on Justia Law

Segal, a lawyer, CPA, and insurance broker, and his company, were indicted for racketeering, mail and wire fraud, making false statements, embezzlement, and conspiring to interfere with operations of the IRS. Convicted in 2004, Segal was sentenced to 121 months in prison. After further proceedings, in 2011, he was resentenced to time served and ordered to pay $842,000 in restitution and to forfeit to the government his interest in the company and $15 million. In 2013, the parties entered a binding settlement that specified the final disposition of Segal’s assets. After the district judge approved the settlement the parties disagreed and returned to court. The agreement gave Segal two of eight insurance policies on his life outright and an option to purchase the others, but required that he exercise the option within six months of approval of the settlement. He opted to purchase one policy before the deadline and asked for an extension, claiming that the government had not promptly released money owed to him and had delayed his efforts to obtain information from the insurance companies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed refusal to extend the deadline, but reversed with respect to claims relating to Segal’s right to repurchase his shares of the Chicago Bulls basketball team. View "United States v. Segal" on Justia Law

Patterson Enterprises, Inc., appealed and Titan Machinery, Inc., cross-appealed a judgment and an order denying their post-judgment motions after the district court ordered Patterson to pay Titan $88,707.75 due under several oral equipment leases. Patterson argued the district court erred in admitting into evidence an exhibit summarizing amounts Patterson owed Titan under the oral leases, the court erred in awarding Titan $5,617.63 for finance charges and the court erred in finding the equipment did not breach an implied warranty of merchantability. In its cross-appeal, Titan argued the court clearly erred in calculating the amount Patterson owed Titan for three items of leased equipment. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the debt summary into evidence. The Supreme Court was unable to understand the basis for the court's decision regarding late payment charges as a component of Patterson's obligations to Titan, and reversed and remanded for findings addressing this issue. The Court reversed and remanded for findings about the implied warranty of merchantability. The Court was not convinced the trial court erred in calculating Patterson's lease payments for certain items of equipment. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Titan Machinery, Inc. v. Patterson Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

VLM, a Montreal-based supplier, sold frozen potatoes to IT in Illinois. After nine successful transactions, IT encountered financial difficulty and failed to pay for the next nine shipments. Invoices sent after delivery included a provision purporting to make IT liable for collection-related attorney’s fees if it breached the contracts. VLM sued; the deadline for an answer passed. The court entered a default. On defendants' motion, the court vacated the default as to IT’s president only. All three defendants then filed answers, contesting liability for attorney’s fees. The judge applied the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code and found that the fee provision had been incorporated into the contract. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applied. On remand, the judge applied the Convention and held that the fee provision was not part of the contracts and that IT could benefit from this ruling, despite the prior entry of default. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. IT never expressly assented to the attorney’s fees provision in VLM’s trailing invoices, so under the Convention that term did not become a part of the contracts. VLM waived its right to rely on the default by failing to raise the issue until its reply brief on remand. View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co." on Justia Law

Retirees, dependents of retirees, and the union filed a class action suit against the retirees’ former employer, M&G, after M&G announced that the plaintiffs would be required to make health care contributions. The district court found M&G liable for violating a labor agreement and an employee welfare benefit plan and ordered reinstatement to the versions of the benefits plans they were enrolled in until 2007, to receive health care for life without contributions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. On remand, the Supreme Court directed the court to construe the parties’ agreements using “ordinary principles of contract law.” The Sixth Circuit remanded to the district court because prior factual determinations as to the parties’ agreements were made in the “shadow of Yard-Man,” a Sixth Circuit decision abrogated by the Supreme Court. View "Hobert Tackett v. M&G Polymers USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Corey Christy purchased a commercial general-liability insurance policy from Travelers in the name of his sole proprietorship, K&D Oilfield Supply. Subsequently, Christy registered his business as a corporation under the name K&D Oilfield Supply, Inc. Christy renewed his CGL Policy annually, but did not notify Travelers that he had incorporated his business. After Christy formed K&D, Inc., he was in an accident and made a claim under the CGL Policy. Travelers denied coverage based on Christy’s failure to inform it of the change in business form, and Christy filed this action. On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court found in favor of Travelers. Because there was a material factual dispute as to whether Christy knew or should have known Travelers would have considered the formation of K&D, Inc. material to its decision to renew the Policy, summary judgment based on Christy’s legal duty to speak was inappropriate. And because the existence of a legal duty governs whether Christy engaged in a material misrepresentation by not informing Travelers he had formed K&D, Inc., the Tenth Circuit held the district court erred in reforming the Policy on that basis at this stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. But because Christy had not met his burden to come forward with evidence in support of his claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim. View "Christy v. Travelers Indemnity" on Justia Law

Seahawk filed suit against insurers for proceeds covering the physical damage to a drilling rig and the loss on a drilling contract. The court concluded that, because there were two occurrences, the district court properly denied Seahawk’s claim for the cost of repairs between February and December 2010. That court’s proximate-cause analysis was the correct legal standard for determining the number of occurrences, and the district court did not clearly err in finding that the February storm was not the proximate cause of the sequence of losses following the July storm. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in rejecting Seahawk’s claim under the Contract Provision. The concurrent-cause doctrine applies, and Seahawk could not recover because it failed to comply with the requirements of that doctrine. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment for the insurers. View "Seahawk Liquidating Trust v. Certain Underwriters" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review centered on whether dissatisfied beneficiaries of a testator’s estate have standing to bring legal malpractice or claims against the attorney who drafted the testator’s estate planning documents. Specifically, petitioners Merridy Kay Baker and Sue Carol Kunda sought to sue respondents Wood, Ris & Hames, Professional Corporation, Donald L. Cook, and Barbara Brundin (collectively, the Attorneys), who were the attorneys retained by their father, Floyd Baker, to prepare his estate plan. Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to abandon what was known as the "strict privity rule," which precluded attorney liability to non-clients absent fraud, malicious conduct or negligent misrepresentation. The advocated instead for a "California Test" and for an extension of the third-party beneficiary theory of contract liability (also known as the Florida-Iowa Rule), both of which petitioners asserted would allow them as the alleged beneficiaries of the estate, to sue the Attorneys for legal malpractice and breach of contract. After review of this case, the Supreme Court declined to abandon the strict privity rule, and rejected petitioners' contention that the court of appeals erred in affirming dismissal of their purported fraudulent concealment claims. View "Baker v. Wood, Ris & Hames" on Justia Law