Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Quest filed suit seeking payment from Angeles for out-of-network laboratory testing services ordered by in-network physicians for Angeles patients. The trial court granted summary adjudication for Angeles for all but two causes of action that were subsequently dismissed. Summary judgment was then entered for Angeles. The court concluded that the referral of specimens to Quest by Angeles physicians who either misidentified the patient‘s IPA/payor or failed to identify an IPA/payor at all did not create an implied-in-fact contract that Angeles would pay for the tests; there is no evidence of an agency relationship between Angeles and its in-network physicians; Angeles does not exercise control over the manner in which the physicians provide medical care to their patients; and the physicians who used Quest drop boxes after the November 30, 2009 termination date did so based on their membership in a Quest-affiliated IPA, their mistaken belief that the patient also belonged to that IPA, or some other error. The court also concluded that there is no implied-in-law or quasi-contract where there is no evidence that Angeles actually paid its in-network laboratory a lower capitation rate as a result of the work that was misdirected to Quest and Quest has not identified a statute or regulation that requires an IPA to pay an out-of-network laboratory where there is no contractual obligation to do so. The court rejected Quest's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Unilab Corp. v. Angeles-IPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Master Purchase/Service Agreement (MPSA) containing a provision that, under certain conditions, allowed the prevailing party in a dispute arising under the MPSA to recovery attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff brought suit in the Delaware Superior Court, and then Defendant filed in New Jersey. The venue dispute ended with the Delaware Superior Court granting Defendant’s motion to stay in favor of the New Jersey action, which effectively mooted the Delaware action. Plaintiff sought a voluntary dismissal, but Defendant wanted dismissal with prejudice and to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the action. The Court of Chancery dismissed this action under Court of Chancery Rule 419(a)(2), without prejudice. As a condition of dismissal, the Court retained jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees and costs to Defendant in accordance with the MPSA, holding (1) dismissal without prejudice was appropriate as to the venue dispute; and (2) while waiting for the final outcome of the New Jersey action would be the preferable approach before awarding attorneys’ fees, at this point, under the terms of the MPSA, Defendant was entitled to its attorneys’ fees that were incurred in this action. View "Avaya, Inc. v. Charter Commc’ns Holding Co., LLC" on Justia Law

In general, an overriding royalty on oil and gas production must bear its share of postproduction costs unless the parties agree otherwise. The Hyder family leased 948 mineral acres to Chespeake Exploration, LLC. The Hyders and Chesapeake agreed that the overriding royalty in the parties’ lease was free of production costs but disputed whether it was also free of postproduction costs. The trial court rendered judgment for the Hyders, awarding them postproduction costs that Chesapeake wrongfully deducted from their overriding royalty. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the parties’ lease clearly freed the overriding royalty of postproduction costs. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC v. Hyder" on Justia Law

Defendant, an attorney, represented Plaintiff in post-final judgment divorce proceedings. Defendant later withdrew as counsel with the family court’s approval. Three years later, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging legal malpractice, negligence, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. The superior court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant on each of Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s legal malpractice and fraud claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and the trial justice did not err in concluding that the discovery rule did not toll the statute of limitations; (2) Plaintiff’s malpractice claims necessarily failed because she did not retain an expert witness to testify in support of her case; and (3) Plaintiff’s remaining claims on appeal were wholly without merit. View "Behroozi v. Kirshenbaum" on Justia Law

Sophie Danforth entered into a purchase and sales agreement (PSA) with Timothy and Rebecca More, pursuant to which Danforth agreed to sell, and the Mores agreed to purchase, certain real estate. The PSA provided that $30,000 would be paid as a deposit at the time the PSA was executed. The Mores failed to appear at the scheduled closing. Thereafter, Danforth filed an amended complaint alleging breach of contract, requesting that she be allowed to retain the Mores’ deposit, and seeking declaratory relief, asking the court to construe the terms of the PSA and to order the escrow agent to disburse the deposit to Danforth. The hearing justice granted summary judgment in favor of Danforth, concluding that Danforth was entitled to retain the deposit. The court further denied Danforth’s motion for attorney’s fees but awarded prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no error in the grant of summary judgment in favor of Danforth, the award of prejudgment interest to Danforth, and the denial of attorneys’ fees. View "Danforth v. More" on Justia Law

Dannelly Enterprises, LLC ("Dannelly"), appealed a circuit court order granting a motion to compel arbitration filed by Palm Beach Grading, Inc. ("PBG"). In the fall of 2006, PBG entered into negotiations with Corvias Military Living, LLC, f/k/a Picerne Military Housing LLC; Picerne Construction/FRK, LLC; Rucker-Picerne Partners, LLC; and Rucker Communities, LLC (collectively, "the contractors"), to perform work on a project known as the Ft. Rucker RCI Family Housing, Munson Heights, Phase 1A, at Fort Rucker, Alabama. Apparently, in preparing to bid on the project, PBG contacted various subcontractors, including Dannelly, to get bids for various aspects of the project that PBG would be responsible for if it entered into an agreement with the contractors to complete the project. Although the work order issued by PBG stated that "[a] Sub-contract will be created by PBG for billing purposes," neither party submitted into evidence such a contract between PBG and Dannelly. PBG argued that Donnelly accepted benefits under existing contracts because Dannelly was hired by PBG to perform work on the project and was paid for the work it completed. The Supreme Court found, however, that PBG did not present any argument as to why it believed Dannelly was not simply operating under and benefiting from the agreement between PBG and Dannelly, which was memorialized by PBG's work order. The Court concluded that PBG failed to demonstrate that the arbitration provision in the master subcontract agreement applied to the third-party claims it asserted against Dannelly. Furthermore, there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Dannelly and PBG entered into PBG's standard subcontract agreement. The case was reversed and remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Dannelly Enterprises, LLC v. Palm Beach Grading, Inc." on Justia Law

After the American Association of Neurological Surgeons' (AANS) Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) recommended that plaintiff's membership be suspended for six months, he appealed to the AANS Board of Directors. The Board downgraded the suspension to a censure, but plaintiff subsequently resigned from the AANS and filed suit, claiming that the censure harmed his future employment opportunities as an expert witness. Plaintiff filed suit against the AANS for tortious interference with prospective business relations; breach of contract (the AANS bylaws); and impairment of an important economic interest from denial of due process. The court concluded that plaintiff received sufficient due process, including notice, a hearing, and multiple levels of appeal, before he was censured for failing to review all pertinent and available records prior to testifying. Because the district court found only one basis of the censure to be unsupported by due process, the district court was correct in setting aside only that portion of the censure. The court further concluded that no Texas court has recognized a breach of contract challenge to a private association’s disciplinary process. Therefore, plaintiff failed to state a plausible breach of contract claim on which relief could be granted, and the district court properly dismissed. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Barrash v. Amer. Ass'n of Neurological Surgeons" on Justia Law

The Regional Utility Service Systems Commission (RUSS) brought a breach of contract action against the City of Mount Union. The district court entered judgment in favor of RUSS. The clerk of court subsequently issued a writ of general execution commanding the county sheriff to levy on all bank accounts held by the City at Iowa State Bank in Mount Union. The City filed a motion to quash the garnishment on the grounds that the bank account was exempt from execution under Iowa Code 627.18. The district court denied the motion to quash and claim of exemption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the bank account was exempt under section 627.18 because the general funds in the account were “necessary and proper for carrying out the general purpose” for which the City was organized. View "Reg’l Util. Serv. Sys. v. City of Mount Union" on Justia Law

Mind & Motion entered into a real estate purchase contract (REPC) with Celtic Bank to buy a piece of property the Bank had acquired from a developer through foreclosure. The REPC required Celtic Bank to record plats by a certain date for the first phase of development of condominiums on the land and allowed Mind & Motion discretion to extend the recording deadline as necessary to allow the Bank sufficient time to record. Mind & Motion extended the recording deadline once but declined to extend it a second time. Mind & Motion subsequently sued Celtic Bank for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mind & Motion, ruling that the recording provision was a covenant, not a condition. Celtic Bank appealed, arguing that the recording provision was unambiguously a condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the recording provision is a covenant, not a condition; and (2) there is no latent ambiguity in the REPC. View "Mind & Motion Utah Invs., LLC v. Celtic Bank Corp." on Justia Law

The Indiana State Fair Commission manages the Indiana State Fair. Since the 1990s, the Commission has utilized Mid-America Sound to provide equipment for the concerts and other events that take place at the Fair. In August 2011, on the closing night of the Fair, the Mid-America’s roof collapsed, killing seven people. The victims and families filed lawsuits, including as defendants Mid-America and the Commission. Mid-America filed a third-party lawsuit claiming that the Commission was required to indemnify it for Mid-America’s own negligence in relation to the roof collapse due to years-long course of conduct in paying invoices that had standard indemnity language on the back. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the terms of Mid-America’s invoices to the Commission did not clearly and unequivocally provide for retroactive application, the Court will not infer such a provision from a course of dealing. View "Mid-America Sound Corp. v. Ind. State Fair Comm’n" on Justia Law