Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed an action against Defendant within the extended statute of limitations set by a tolling agreement. Plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited the action and refiled it within one year but after the extended statute of limitations in the tolling agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant, determining that the case was not timely filed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the tolling agreement precluded application of the savings statute and, therefore, Plaintiff’s claims were barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the parties’ agreement, the savings statute applied to save the suit that Plaintiff refiled after the extended statute of limitations set in the tolling agreement but within the one-year period provided by the savings statute. Remanded. View "Circle C. Constr., LLC v. Nilsen" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Shakeri and Taji filed suit against ADT, alleging a breach of contract claim and tort claims under Texas law for negligence, fraud, unconscionable conduct, and breach of the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance. Plaintiffs were robbed at gunpoint and injured at their jewelry store. During the robbery, Shakeri pushed the button to trigger the alarm system multiple times, but the alarm system and the backup alarm failed to work. The district court ultimately dismissed plaintiffs’ tort claims and limited their contractual recovery in three separate orders. Determining that plaintiffs are bound by the terms of a 1999 Contract, the court concluded that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' negligence claim where Shakeri's injury is the kind of physical harm that is not covered by the economic loss rule and is not defeated by the existence of a contract between the parties; plaintiffs failedto state adequate claims for breach of the implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance under Texas law; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ unconscionable conduct claim; and plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement claim is barred under Texas law. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' negligence claim and remanded for further proceedings on this claim. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining tort claims. View "Shakeri v. ADT Security Servs." on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a dispute regarding a contract the parties entered into, which gave Lewmar the exclusive right to manufacture and sell Steinerʹs patented sailboat winch handle, a device used to control the lines and sails of a sailboat. The parties resolved the dispute when Lewmar made, and Steiner accepted, an offer of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After judgment was entered, Steiner moved for attorneysʹ fees of $383,804 and costs of $41,470. The district court denied attorneysʹ fees but awarded costs of $2,926. The court concluded that Steiner was precluded from seeking fees pursuant to the Agreement in addition to the $175,000 settlement amount because claims under the Agreement were unambiguously included in the Offer; Steiner was not precluded from seeking attorneysʹ fees under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. 42‐110g(d), because the Offer did not unambiguously encompass claims for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA; and the court remanded for the district court to clarify whether it considered the claim for attorneys' fees under CUTPA on the merits and if not, to do so. Finally, the court concluded that the district court correctly added costs under the ʺcosts then accruedʺ provision of Rule 68. View "Steiner v. Lewmar, Inc." on Justia Law

Lopez & Medina Corp. (L&M) filed a lawsuit against several insurers for Patriot Air, LLC, alleging that the insurers were liable for L&M’s breach of contract claims against Patriot Air. The district court dismissed L&M’s complaint, concluding that the relevant insurance policy did not provide coverage for contract claims. The First Circuit affirmed. L&M and its owner subsequently filed the complaint in this action seeking recovery in tort for Patriot Air’s negligence arising out of the same set of facts that underlay the previous suit’s breach of contract claims. The district court dismissed the case on the ground of res judicata. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court correctly invoked res judicata in dismissing the action. View "Medina-Padilla v. US Aviation Underwriters, Inc." on Justia Law

Cook Timber Company sued Georgia Pacific Corporation, claiming breach of contract and antitrust violations, both unilaterally and through a conspiracy with other market participants. The circuit judge granted Georgia Pacific a directed verdict on Cook Timber’s conspiracy and breach-of-contract claims, but the jury returned a verdict for Cook Timber on its unilateral antitrust claim. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded. Because Cook Timber failed to present sufficient evidence to support its unilateral antitrust claims, the jury’s verdict on that claim was reversed. Further, the Court reversed the directed verdict on Cook Timber’s breach-of-contract claim. The Court affirmed the circuit judge’s decision to grant Georgia Pacific a directed verdict on the conspiracy claim. View "Georgia Pacific Corporation v. Cook Timber Company, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal arose from the City's contract with Ambac to provide municipal bond insurance. The City filed suit against Ambac alleging that Ambac breached an agreement to provide a credit enhancement, that there was error in the principal cause, that Ambac acted in bad faith, and that the City had detrimentally relied on Ambac’s representations and assurances regarding the value of its credit enhancement product. The district court granted Ambac's motion to dismiss. The court concluded that the district court did not err in dismissing the City's breach of contract claim because the district court properly interpreted the Policy and because the City’s argument that it created a written and oral contract with Ambac for credit enhancement is not plausible based on the facts alleged. The court also concluded that any error about what the City was purchasing when it paid Ambac in excess of six million dollars was a unilateral error by the City because of the clear language of the Policy, and any unilateral error by the City about what it was purchasing from Ambac was not reasonable or excusable. Because the City’s proffered error is unreasonable, it does not vitiate consent. Because the City has failed to establish the existence of a larger credit enhancement agreement between it and Ambac, the City’s bad faith claim concerning this purported agreement necessarily fails. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the City's detrimental reliance claim where the City and Ambac are sophisticated parties that engaged in arm’s length negotiations with respect to this bond offering. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "New Orleans City v. AMBAC Assurance Corp." on Justia Law

The court originally remanded this case to the district court for additional fact-finding to establish complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants with instructions to reenter summary judgment if federal subject-matter jurisdiction could be properly established. After dismissing a nondiverse plaintiff it found was not a real party in interest to this case, the district court reentered its earlier grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer on all claims. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware and its grant of summary judgment to Lexington. The court concluded that the district court's dismissal of PMI Delaware pursuant to FRCP 21 as a "nominal or formal party" was proper because the district court found that though PMI Delaware was a named insured on the Insurance Policy, PMI Delaware would not be entitled to any portion of a successful judgment against Lexington because PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the party against whom Blue Cross had filed suit and PMI Florida, not PMI Delaware, was the only party that made a claim for coverage to Lexington. Further, PMI Delaware was not even a party to the underlying Blue Cross contract, which provided healthcare coverage only to PMI Florida’s leased employees. Further, the court affirmed the district court's holding that Lexington owed no coverage to PMI Florida. Here, the court saw no contractual ambiguity; the Insurance Policy issued by Lexington explicitly excludes the coverage sought by PMI Florida. Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on PMI Florida’s claims for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. Finally, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Lexington on its claim of negligent misrepresentation where no jury could reasonably find that Yoohoo justifiably relied on the statement at issue as an indication that there would be coverage under the policy. View "Payroll Mgmt., Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The underlying coverage dispute arose from the supplying of a defective ingredient for incorporation into Wisconsin Pharmacal Company (Pharmacal) probiotic supplement tablets. Pharmacal brought this action against Jeneil Biotech, Inc. and Nebraska Cultures of California, Inc. (the Insureds) and the Netherlands Insurance Company and Evanston Insurance Company (the Insurers), alleging numerous tort and contract claims. The Insurers moved for summary judgment, arguing that their respective insurance policies did not cover any damages that arose out of the causes of action against the Insureds. The circuit court granted the Insurers’ motions for summary judgment, determining that the facts of this case did not trigger the Insurers’ duties to defend. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the policies provided coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” in this case, and even if there were, certain exclusions in both policies applied to negate coverage. View "Wis. Pharmacal Co., LLC v. Neb. Cultures of Cal., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a black male of African descent who had a medical degree from the University of the West Indies, was terminated from his employment with Mount Auburn Hospital while completing the first year of his residency. Plaintiff filed a ten-count complaint against the Hospital and three physicians who supervised his work, asserting employment discrimination and breach of contract, among other claims. The Appeals Court reversed as to the discrimination and breach of contract claims. The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the judgments in favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims for employment discrimination and breach of contract, holding that Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment and that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to hear his claims. View "Bulwer v. Mount Auburn Hospital" on Justia Law

The underlying action in this case took place in a California court and resulted in a jury award of compensatory damages of $22.3 million in favor of Sierra Railroad Company and against Patriot Rail Company LLC. The jury also awarded punitive damages and exemplary damages in favor of Sierra. Sierra moved to amend the California judgment to add Gary Marino, the former Chairman, President and CEO of Patriot Rail, as a judgment debtor. Marino subsequently commenced this action seeking advancements of attorneys’ fees and expenses for the claims asserted against him in the post-judgment motion. The Court of Chancery granted summary judgment in favor of Marino, holding that Marino was entitled to some, but not all, of the fees and expenses that he has and will incur defending against the post-judgment motion. View "Marino v. Patriot Rail Co. LLC" on Justia Law