Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

MB America, Inc. (MBA) and Alaska Pacific Leasing Company entered into an agreement whereby Alaska Pacific agreed to become a dealer for MBA’s line of products. A dispute later arose between the parties, and MBA sued Alaska Pacific in the district court. Alaska Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that MBA had prematurely filed its complaint because it had not complied with a prelitigation mediation provision in the agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alaska Pacific. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prelitigation provision in the parties’ contract was a condition precedent to litigation; (2) MBA did not initiate mediation as required under the agreement; and (3) therefore, the district court correctly granted Alaska Pacific’s motion for summary judgment and did not err in granting attorney fees to Alaska Pacific. View "MB America, Inc. v. Alaska Pacific Leasing Co." on Justia Law

Lloyd Anastasi loaned $2.4 million to a third party in exchange for a mortgage on a property supposedly owned by that third party. Fidelity Insurance Company insured that the third party had good title, but the warranty deed purporting to give title to the third party was forged. Anastasi was sued by the owners of the property, and Fidelity accepted tender of the claim under a reservation of rights. Anastasi later filed a bad faith and breach of contract claim against Fidelity, alleging that the lawsuit was used by Fidelity to delay paying him under the title insurance policy. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Fidelity. The intermediate court of appeals (ICA) remanded in part and vacated in part. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the ICA’s judgment insofar as it remanded to the circuit court an order allowing Fidelity to withhold certain documents that Anastasi requested during discovery under the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine; and (2) vacated the ICA’s judgment insofar it it concluded that Anastasi failed to show any genuine issue of material fact that Fidelity acted in bad faith. View "Anastasi v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Fifteen-year-old Haley Gores was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Steven Smith when Smith lost control of the vehicle. Haley was treated by Dr. Lisa Miller for injuries she received during the accident. Dawn Gores, Haley’s mother and conservator, signed a general release in exchange for a settlement with Smith and Smith’s insurer. The release did not specifically name the treating physician or clinic, but it released al other claims that might develop from the accident. Haley and Dawn subsequently filed a malpractice suit against Dr. Miller and Yankton Surgical Associates (YSA), Dr. Miller’s practice group. Dr. Miller and YSA filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the release discharged Plaintiffs’ claims against them. The circuit court granted summary judgment, concluding that, based on the language of the release, the malpractice claims were discharged as a matter of contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly determined that the release barred Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of contract. View "Gores v. Miller" on Justia Law

EventMonitor, Inc. terminated the employment of Anthony Leness, characterizing the termination as “without cause.” After discovering that Leness had copies the data on a company laptop computer EventMonitor retroactively characterized the termination as having been for cause and stopped paying Leness any severance payments. EventMonitor filed suit against Leness, alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of fiduciary duty. Leness counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Wage Act. A superior court judge entered judgment for Leness on EventMonitor’s claims and Leness’s counterclaims, finding that Leness had not engaged in defalcation of EventMonitor’s assets and had not committed a material breach of the employment contract, and thus that his termination could not have been for cause. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial judge correctly found that Leness did not commit a material breach of the employment contract and did not engage in defalcation of company assets, and therefore, Leness committed no act giving rise to a termination for cause; and (2) the trial judge correctly concluded that Leness was entitled to severance payments under the terms of the contract. View "EventMonitor, Inc. v. Leness" on Justia Law

TCF filed suit against Market, alleging claims concerning the statutes of limitations for fraud, contract, and negligence. TCF had entered into a contract with Market under which TCF purchased Field Asset Verifications for Minnesota properties in 2002. The district court granted summary judgment for Market. The court held that the district court properly held that TCF discovered sufficient facts so that the limitations period for TCF’s fraud claims expired before TCF filed suit in September 2011. The court also held that the non-fraud claims accrued more than six years before TCF filed suit and that the limitations period was not tolled to prevent expiration prior to September 2011. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "TCF Nat'l Bank v. Market Intelligence, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants brought a breach of contract action against Appellees, both in his and her representative capacity as trustee of two trusts. The lawsuit arose from a contract dispute over the purchase of real property in White County. The trial court awarded Appellants damages and an attorney fee award greatly reduced from the amount requested. Appellants appealed the reduced attorney-fee award, and Appellees cross-appealed, challenging the entry of judgment against them in their individual capacities. The court of appeals reversed and remanded on cross-appeal and dismissed the direct appeal as moot. Appellants filed a petition for review in the Supreme Court, alleging that the court of appeals’ decision was in conflict with prior holdings of published opinions of the Court. The Supreme Court denied the petition for review, holding that no conflict exists. View "Crenshaw v. McFalls" on Justia Law

Over the course of seven years, Circle C, a contractor that built 42 warehouses at Fort Campbell Army base, paid some electricians about $9,900 less than the Davis-Bacon (40 U.S.C. 3142) wages specified in its contract with the Army. The government obtained a damages award of $763,000 under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. 3729, arguing that all of the electrical work was “tainted” by the $9,900 underpayment and, therefore, worthless. The Sixth Circuit, reversed the damage award and remanded for entry of an award of $14,748. Actual damages are the difference in value between what the government bargained for and what the government received. The government bargained for the buildings and payment of Davis-Bacon wages. It got the buildings but not quite all of the wages. The shortfall was $9,916--the government’s actual damages. That amount tripled is $29,748 (31 U.S.C. 3729(a)(1)(G)). Minus a $15,000 settlement payment, Circle C is liable for a total of $14,748. View "Wall v. Circle C Constr., LLC" on Justia Law

This was the third of three lawsuits arising from the development of condominiums at Lakeside Village on Hauser Lake in Lewis and Clark County. Cherrad, LLC (Cherrad) was the project’s developer and Mountain West Bank (Bank) was its lender. Craig Kinnaman was the general contractor on the project but died in 2007. In this third suit, the estate of Kinnaman (the Estate) brought eight claims against the Bank. The Bank moved for summary judgment on all the Estate’s claims on the grounds that the claims were barred by the compulsory counterclaim rule or the doctrine of claim preclusion. The district court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion (1) in granting the Bank’s motion to change venue; (2) in granting summary judgment in favor of the Bank on all claims; (3) by taking judicial notice of the record in previous actions; and (4) by denying the Estate’s motion for relief from judgment under Mont. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). View "Kinnaman v. Mountain West Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Quest filed suit seeking payment from Angeles for out-of-network laboratory testing services ordered by in-network physicians for Angeles patients. The trial court granted summary adjudication for Angeles for all but two causes of action that were subsequently dismissed. Summary judgment was then entered for Angeles. The court concluded that the referral of specimens to Quest by Angeles physicians who either misidentified the patient‘s IPA/payor or failed to identify an IPA/payor at all did not create an implied-in-fact contract that Angeles would pay for the tests; there is no evidence of an agency relationship between Angeles and its in-network physicians; Angeles does not exercise control over the manner in which the physicians provide medical care to their patients; and the physicians who used Quest drop boxes after the November 30, 2009 termination date did so based on their membership in a Quest-affiliated IPA, their mistaken belief that the patient also belonged to that IPA, or some other error. The court also concluded that there is no implied-in-law or quasi-contract where there is no evidence that Angeles actually paid its in-network laboratory a lower capitation rate as a result of the work that was misdirected to Quest and Quest has not identified a statute or regulation that requires an IPA to pay an out-of-network laboratory where there is no contractual obligation to do so. The court rejected Quest's remaining claims and affirmed the judgment. View "Unilab Corp. v. Angeles-IPA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Master Purchase/Service Agreement (MPSA) containing a provision that, under certain conditions, allowed the prevailing party in a dispute arising under the MPSA to recovery attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff brought suit in the Delaware Superior Court, and then Defendant filed in New Jersey. The venue dispute ended with the Delaware Superior Court granting Defendant’s motion to stay in favor of the New Jersey action, which effectively mooted the Delaware action. Plaintiff sought a voluntary dismissal, but Defendant wanted dismissal with prejudice and to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the action. The Court of Chancery dismissed this action under Court of Chancery Rule 419(a)(2), without prejudice. As a condition of dismissal, the Court retained jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees and costs to Defendant in accordance with the MPSA, holding (1) dismissal without prejudice was appropriate as to the venue dispute; and (2) while waiting for the final outcome of the New Jersey action would be the preferable approach before awarding attorneys’ fees, at this point, under the terms of the MPSA, Defendant was entitled to its attorneys’ fees that were incurred in this action. View "Avaya, Inc. v. Charter Commc’ns Holding Co., LLC" on Justia Law