Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

At dispute in this decade-old case was the various rice dishes offered for sale in the food court at the Providence Place Mall. These consolidated appeals represented the second and third times that the Supreme Court was asked to entertain fragmented issues. Cathay Cathay, Inc., Japan Cafe of Providence Place, Inc., Surf & Turf Grille, Inc., and Gourmet India all entered into lease agreements to operate restaurants in the food court. Each lease agreement set forth restrictions on the foods each restaurant could serve. Cathay Cathay and Surf & Turf (collectively Plaintiffs) brought this action against Rouse Providence, LLC, Gourmet India, and Japan Cafe seeking to enjoin the two restaurants from selling the foods to which they had alleged exclusive rights. Plaintiffs also requested that the court order Rouse to enforce its lease agreements with Cathay Cathay and Surf & Turf against Gourmet India and Japan Cafe, alleging that the restaurants violated their lease agreements by selling prohibited foods. After protracted litigation, a second trial justice entered partial final judgment in favor of Rouse. The Supreme Court vacated the partial final judgment, holding that the trial justice abused her discretion in determining that there was a previous adjudication on the merits of Plaintiffs’ contractual claims against Rouse. Remanded. View "Cathay Cathay, Inc. v. Vindalu, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident. Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against the adverse driver. Plaintiff settled the claim for the adverse driver’s automobile-liability-insurance policy limits. Before dismissing the suit, however, Plaintiff asserted a claim against his own automobile liability insurer, State Farm, for underinsured motorist benefits (UIM). Plaintiff’s insurance policy contained a limitation provision that gave Plaintiff two years from the date of the accident or date of the last basic reparation benefit payment within which to make a UIM claim. Plaintiff filed his UIM three years after the date of the accident. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm, concluding that the explicit terms of Plaintiff’s policy rendered his UIM claim untimely. The court of appeals reversed, holding that State Farm’s time limitation on UIM claims was unreasonable and therefore void. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State Farm policy provision was not unreasonable. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riggs" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were three different versions of an account agreement between Appellees, who are customers of Bank of the Ozarks, and Ozarks, which holds the accounts. The agreements included an arbitration provision. Appellees filed a class-action complaint against Ozarks, and Ozarks filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration provision in the account agreement was unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a determination as to whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate. On remand, the circuit court determined that there was not a valid agreement to arbitrate. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the agreement lacked mutuality of obligation and in thus denying Ozarks’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Bank of the Ozarks, Inc. v. Walker" on Justia Law

Beverly, a former Abbott employee whose employment was terminated on October 20, 2010, filed suit against Abbott. She alleged that during her employment, Abbott had discriminated and retaliated against her on the basis of her German nationality in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, as well as on the basis of her disabilities in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court denied Abbott’s motion for summary judgment and the parties engaged in a private mediation. During mediation, the parties signed a handwritten agreement stating that Beverly demanded $210,000 and mediation costs in exchange for dismissing the lawsuit. Abbott later accepted Beverly’s demand and circulated a more formal settlement proposal. After Beverly refused to execute the draft proposal, Abbott moved to enforce the original handwritten agreement. The court found that the parties entered into a binding settlement agreement and granted Abbott’s motion to enforce. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the handwritten agreement was valid and enforceable, since its material terms were clearly conveyed and consented to by both parties, and the existence and content of the draft proposal do not affect enforceability. View "Beverly v. Abbott Labs., Inc." on Justia Law

APM, a property management company, sought a builders risk insurance policy from TCI Insurance Agency, Inc. to cover an apartment building under construction in Fargo. Jay Alsop, APM's president, discussed insurance policies with TCI's agent Devin Gaard. One policy in particular, from Philadelphia Insurance Company, covered lost rent and other "soft costs," such as interest. Alsop also received a quote from a different insurance agency for another policy from Travelers Insurance Company, which was cheaper than the Philadelphia policy. The Travelers policy did not have coverage for lost rent and soft costs. Alsop informed Gaard about the Travelers policy and requested Gaard to procure the policy as it was quoted by the other agency, without change. A fire at the construction site delayed the opening of the apartment building for five months. APM filed a claim under the insurance policy for damages caused by the fire, including lost rent and interest charges. Travelers paid part of the claim, but denied the claim for lost rent and interest because the policy did not provide coverage for those costs. APM sued TCI, alleging TCI and Gaard were negligent for failing to offer APM a policy endorsement that provided additional coverage for lost rent and soft costs. TCI denied liability and moved for summary judgment, claiming that APM did not request the additional coverage for lost rent and soft costs and that TCI and Gaard were not required to offer the additional coverage to APM. The district court granted TCI's motion, concluding APM failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Gaard breached his duty to APM. The court also concluded Gaard's duty was not enhanced because APM failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact indicating a special relationship existed between APM and TCI. On appeal, APM argued the district court erred in deciding there were no genuine issues of material fact as to whether: (1) Gaard breached his duty to APM; and (2) a special relationship existed between APM and TCI. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to TCI. View "APM, LLP v. TCI Insurance Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

ItalFlavors filed suit against Caffe Vergnano, blaming the failure of an Italian cafe venture on Caffe Vergnano's failure to offer support. The parties had entered into an agreement, the Commercial Contract, which appears to be a franchise agreement setting forth the rights and responsibilities of the parties. The second agreement is the Hold Harmless Agreement. Caffe Vergnano filed a petition to compel arbitration and the district granted the petition. The court concluded that the declaration in the Hold Harmless Agreement signed contemporaneously with the Commercial Contract proves that the latter was a mere sham to help Hector Rabellino obtain a visa. Therefore, the court concluded that the Commercial Contract was not a contract and is thus unenforceable. Because the court found that the document the parties described as the Commercial Contract was a sham, the arbitration clause is no more enforceable than any other provision in that document. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Casa del Caffe Vergnano v. ItalFlavors, LLC" on Justia Law

After Pauline Tillman Wagner and Ida Roberson died in Mississippi nursing homes run by Golden Living Southaven and Golding Living Center Batesville, Wagner's son (Sammy Gross) and Roberson's daughter (Shirley Cotton) filed suit against the nursing homes. After removal to federal court, the district court subsequently denied Southaven and Batesville's motion to compel arbitration based on arbitration agreements that the adult children had signed for their mothers when admitting them to the homes. The court held that the Mississippi Supreme Court would not adopt the district court’s formal device requirement and would instead permit parties to establish the existence of an agency relationship with other types of evidence. The court concluded that Gross's sworn testimony is competent evidence on the question of Gross’s agency and its scope. Because the existence and scope of an actual agency relationship is a question of fact the district court did not reach, the court could not decide the actual agency issue as a matter of law. Therefore, the court remanded for the district court for a factual finding on this issue in the first instance. Likewise, the same situation applies to Cotton, and the court remanded for the district court for a factual finding on this issue in the first instance. The court rejected defendant's estoppel argument. Finally, the court concluded that Batesville's apparent authority argument fails because it failed to put forth evidence of detrimental reliance; the district court properly rejected Batesville's ratification theory based on insufficient evidence; and the court declined to address the forum issue. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "Gross v. GGNSC Southaven, LLC" on Justia Law

Loftness filed suit against Terry Twiestmeyer, Steven Hood, and TAI, seeking a declaratory judgment involving contracts associated with the development, manufacture, and sale of grain-bagging equipment. Defendants asserted counterclaims against Loftness for breach of two contracts: an Override Agreement and a non-disclosure agreement (NDA). On remand, the district court granted Loftness's motion for summary judgment on the claim for breach of the NDA. The court concluded that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding TAI’s claim that Loftness had breached the NDA by disclosing and using confidential information when it agreed to have Brandt Industries sell Loftness manufactured grain-bagging equipment. In this case, so long as Loftness continued to pay TAI, TAI reasonably may have considered Loftness’s use of TAI’s confidential information as part of the Brandt Industries relationship to be a non-competitive use. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Loftness Specialized Farm v. Twiestmeyer" on Justia Law

After Strine Printing Company terminated Richard Bisbano’s employment, Bisbano filed an eight count complaint against Strine Printing and its president, alleging, inter alia, wrongful termination. During the pendency of that lawsuit, the parties disagreed about the exact amount of commissions that Strine owed Bisbano. The federal district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all counts. Bisbano subsequently filed another lawsuit against Strine Printing and Menasha Packaging Company, LLC in superior court, alleging unpaid commissions. The trial justice ruled in favor of Defendants, concluding that the three-year statute of limitations contained in Rhode Island’s Payment of Wages Act barred the claim and that res judicata barred Bisbano’s contract claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this action was barred by the statute of limitations contained in the Payment of Wages Act; and (2) because the statute of limitations issue is dispositive, the Court shall not address the issue of res judicata. View "Bisbano v. Strine Printing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Pennaco Energy Inc. acquired mineral leases beneath a surface estate owned by Brett Sorenson, Trustee of the Brett L. Sorenson Trust. A surface damage and use agreement between the parties granted Pennaco access to and use of the land for exploration and production of minerals, and, in return, required Pennaco to pay for the damage to and use of the surface estate, and to reclaim the land once operations ended. When Pennaco refused to perform its obligations under the contract, Soreson brought this lawsuit. The jury rendered a verdict finding that Sorenson suffered more than $1 million in damages. The district court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and also awarded Sorenson costs and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err by (1) ruling that Pennaco remained liable under the surface damage and use agreement after assignment, and (2) using a 2.5 multiplier to enhance the lodestar amount in awarding attorney fees. View "Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Sorenson" on Justia Law