Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. alleging that the “comparison prices” on Kohl’s price tags were entirely fictional and selected to mislead consumers about the quality of the products sold by Kohl’s. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Kohl’s had improperly obtained money from her and other Massachusetts consumers in violation of Massachusetts statutory and common law. Plaintiff requested that a court order Kohl’s to restore this money and enjoin the store from continuing to violate Massachusetts law. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for damages and injunctive relief and her common law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment for the reasons stated in Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 15-2354, slip op. at 5-32 (1st Cir. July 26, 2017), also decided today; and (2) affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, holding that the district court did not err in denying the motion. View "Mulder v. Kohl's Department Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against Nordstrom, Inc. alleging that Nordstrom had improperly obtained money from her and other Massachusetts consumers and requesting that a court order Nordstrom to restore this money and enjoin Nordstrom from continuing to violate Massachusetts law. Plaintiff’s claims were based on her purchase of a cardigan sweater for $49.97 at a Nordstrom Rack outlet store in Boston, Massachusetts. The sweater’s price tag listed both the purchase price and a higher “Compare At” price of $218. Plaintiff claimed that the sweater was never sold for $218 but, rather, that Nordstrom uses the “Compare At” price tags to mislead consumers about the quality of its items. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A claim and her common law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiff did not adequately allege that she suffered a legally cognizable injury, her Chapter 93A claims for damages and injunctive relief were both properly dismissed; and (2) the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s remaining claims. View "Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury found that a staffing company violated the terms of the stock purchase agreement by which it had acquired another company, the district court entered a judgment against the staffing company for approximately $1.3 million in actual and liquidated damages. The Fifth Circuit affirmed and held that the staffing company's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence failed; the staffing company's argument that the liquidated damages clause was an illegal and unenforceable penalty provision failed because it forfeited the argument under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and 50, as well as failed to establish on the merits that the clause provided for a penalty; the challenge to the amount of the liquidated damages award failed because the district court's calculation of the damages was supported by the language of the stock agreement; and challenges to the jury instructions were rejected. View "NewCSI, Inc. v. Staffing 360 Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part an order of the district court entering judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on their complaint against Defendants for breach of contract, negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs had an enforceable contract to purchase real property; (2) the district court did not err in entering judgment against three of the defendants for actual damages; but (3) the case must be remanded for an entry of judgment against the remaining defendants because they were joined in this proceeding and Mont. Code Ann. 72-3-1012 required them to also bear the cost of the claim. View "Wood v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Lincoln Park’s dire financial condition led Michigan officials to place the city under the purview of an Emergency Manager pursuant to the Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Mich. Comp. Laws 141.1541. Emergency Manager Coulter, with the approval of Michigan’s Treasurer, issued 10 orders that temporarily replaced Lincoln Park retiree health-care benefits with monthly stipends that retirees could use to purchase individual health-care coverage. Retirees filed sui under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting violations of the Contracts Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Takings Clause. The district court rejected the Treasurer’s motion to dismiss, arguing qualified immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The court held, as a matter of first impression, that an alleged Contracts Clause violation cannot give rise to a cause of action under section 1983. With respect to other constitutional claims, the claimed property right derives from contract; a state contract action would be sufficient to safeguard the retirees’ contractual property rights. Because the state contract action is available as a remedy for any uncompensated taking the challenges to the constitutionality of Coulter’s orders are not ripe for resolution. As the claims fail on the merits, there is no need to evaluate the alleged immunity defenses. View "Kaminski v. Coulter" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendant on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Plaintiff, a South Carolina resident, brought this diversity suit against Defendant, a Puerto Rico company, alleging that Defendant breached his employment agreement by unilaterally terminating it early. Plaintiff sought damages for unpaid base salary and anticipated commissions on real estate sales. The district court found that Plaintiff’s employment was void because Plaintiff was effecting real estate broker duties without a license under Puerto Rico law. The First Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate where it was disputed whether Defendant was aware that Plaintiff did not have a broker’s license at any relevant time and whether some of the work Plaintiff performed and intended to perform was permissible without a broker’s license. View "Farthing v. Coco Beach Resort Management, LLC" on Justia Law

In this employment dispute, Employee filed an action in superior court alleging an unjust enrichment claim against Employee. Employee moved to compel arbitration under the parties’ employment contract’s arbitration provision and brought a claim for severance pay. The superior court granted the motion. Employer asserted various counterclaims. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Employer, finding that Employer properly rescinded the contract based on Employee’s underlying misrepresentations and omissions. The final arbitration award fully settled all claims and counterclaims submitted. The superior court confirmed the award but also granted Employer leave to amend its complaint to reassert its counterclaims. The superior court granted Employer’s motion to amend its complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employer, having not specifically challenged the contract’s arbitration provision, may not amend its complaint and litigate its various claims against Employee in this action. View "Hamblen v. Honorable Ralph Hatch" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ breach of contract against Defendant but on different grounds than those found by the district court. The district court dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over Defendant under Nebraska’s long-arm statute and alternatively found that Nebraska was an inconvenient forum. Defendant was a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New York. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendant failed to pay amounts due under a promissory note was moot; and (2) Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim for breach of the reinsurance participation agreement (RPA), which Defendant was alleged to have breached, because Plaintiffs were not parties to the RPA. View "Applied Underwriters, Inc. v. S.E.B. Services of New York, Inc." on Justia Law

In this construction contract dispute, White Flint express Realty Group Limited Partnership, LLLP (White Flint) was entitled to recover attorney’s fees in connection with an action to enforce the contract between White Flint and Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC (Bainbridge). The court of special appeals affirmed the fee award in favor of White Flint, ruling that the contract provided expressly for attorney’s fees to be recovered in a first-party indemnification action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the contract contained express provisions that authorized first-party fee shifting, and therefore, White Flint was entitled to attorney’s fees. View "Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint Express Realty Group Limited Partnership, LLLP" on Justia Law

In 2013, Scheurer applied to work at Richelieu which outsourced its staffing needs to Remedy, a temporary staffing agency. The application form she signed with Remedy for placement with Richelieu contained an arbitration agreement. She was assigned to work for Richelieu, but that assignment ended after some months. About a year later, Remedy placed Scheurer with Fromm. Scheurer alleges that while working at Fromm, her supervisor sexually harassed her and that Fromm took no serious action to address the sexual harassment and instead fired her. Fromm tried to arrange a work situation that would have separated Scheurer from the supervisor, but when that proved “impossible,” Fromm asked Remedy to assign Scheurer to another client. Scheurer filed suit against Fromm, but not Remedy, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 2000e‐2(a)(1) & 2000e‐3(a). Fromm argued that arbitration should be compelled under the contract law principle of equitable estoppel and because Fromm was a third‐party beneficiary of the Remedy agreement. The district court denied Fromm’s motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. There was no basis for finding that Fromm relied on Scheurer’s arbitration agreement since Fromm did not even know about it and Fromm was not a third‐party beneficiary of Remedy’s agreement with Scheurer. View "Scheurer v. Fromm Family Foods, LLC" on Justia Law