Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Ryan West, a former employee of Village Practice Management Company, LLC ("Village"), sought a declaratory judgment from the Court of Chancery of Delaware. West argued that Village could not declare a forfeiture of his vested Class B Units after he joined a competitor post-employment, as the Agreement did not limit post-employment competitive activities. Village contended that West forfeited his vested Class B Units by joining a competitor, invoking the Management Incentive Plan's ("Plan") forfeiture provisions.The Court of Chancery denied Village's motion to stay proceedings and compel West to submit his claims to Village's Compensation Committee. The court then granted West's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the Agreement only restricted "detrimental activity" during employment. Consequently, Village could not enforce a forfeiture of West's vested Class B Units for activities occurring after his resignation. The court also awarded West his attorneys' fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Court of Chancery's decision. The Supreme Court found that the term "Participant" in the Agreement could reasonably be interpreted to include former employees, making the Agreement ambiguous. Therefore, the grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of West was improper. The Supreme Court also reversed the award of attorneys' fees to West, as he was no longer the prevailing party. However, the Supreme Court upheld the Court of Chancery's denial of Village's request for a stay, distinguishing the case from others that required disputes to be resolved by a committee first. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Village Practice Management Company, LLC v. West" on Justia Law

Susan Miele was hired by Foundation Medicine, Inc. (FMI) in 2017 and signed a restrictive covenant agreement that included a nonsolicitation provision. In 2020, Miele and FMI executed a transition agreement upon her separation, which incorporated the restrictive covenant agreement and included a forfeiture clause. FMI paid Miele approximately $1.2 million in transition benefits. After joining Ginkgo Bioworks in 2021, Miele allegedly solicited FMI employees to join Ginkgo, leading FMI to cease further payments and demand repayment of benefits.Miele sued FMI in late 2021 for breach of the transition agreement, and FMI counterclaimed for breach of contract. Miele moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the provisions FMI relied on were unenforceable under the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act. A Superior Court judge granted Miele's motion in part, ruling that FMI could not enforce the forfeiture provision but allowed FMI to assert Miele's breach as a defense and seek damages. The judge concluded that the transition agreement qualified as a "forfeiture for competition agreement" under the act.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act does not apply to a nonsolicitation agreement, even if it includes a forfeiture provision. The court reasoned that the act explicitly excludes nonsolicitation agreements from its scope, and a forfeiture clause does not change this exclusion. The court reversed the Superior Court's order partially granting Miele's motion for judgment on the pleadings and remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Miele v. Foundation Medicine, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1997, William Brokaw Price’s parents entered into a contract with Carri Scharf Trucking, Inc. (CST) for surface-level mining on their property. The contract allowed CST to extract sand, gravel, and topsoil in exchange for royalty payments. As the contract neared its end in 2010, Bill Price, Brokaw’s father, communicated with CST about future plans for the property but passed away shortly after. Years later, Brokaw discovered that the property had not been reclaimed as required by the contract, leading to a dispute over CST’s reclamation obligations and alleged trespassing.The Prices sued CST for breach of contract, and CST counterclaimed for breach based on the Prices’ trespass accusations. The first trial ended in a mistrial, and the second trial resulted in a verdict for CST. The district court denied the Prices’ motion for judgment as a matter of law and rejected CST’s request for attorney’s fees under the contract’s fee-shifting provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the contract did not set a firm deadline for reclamation and allowed for a jury to resolve factual disputes about the instructions given by Bill Price. The jury had a sufficient basis for its verdict in favor of CST. Additionally, the court held that CST was not entitled to attorney’s fees because the contract’s fee-shifting provision only applied to parties enforcing the contract’s terms, and CST’s successful defense did not trigger that provision. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court in all respects. View "Price v Carri Scharf Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

A contractor hired a subcontractor to work on a remote bridge construction project. The scope of the work changed, and neither party kept detailed records of the changes and associated costs. Years after the project was completed, the subcontractor sued for damages, claiming unpaid work. The superior court found that the subcontract did not govern the extra work, awarded some damages to the subcontractor, and precluded some claims due to discovery violations. The court also found the contractor to be the prevailing party and awarded attorney’s fees. Both parties appealed.The superior court denied summary judgment motions from both parties, finding factual disputes. It precluded the subcontractor from pursuing certain damages claims due to insufficient documentation but allowed evidence for contingent findings. After a bench trial, the court awarded the subcontractor $191,443.42, later reduced to $146,693.42 upon reconsideration. The court found the contractor to be the prevailing party under Rule 68 and awarded attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Alaska reviewed the case. It concluded that the superior court abused its discretion by precluding the subcontractor’s claims for snowmachine use and labor without considering less severe sanctions. The court affirmed the superior court’s findings on other damages but reversed the awards for Morris Johnson’s labor and boat use, remanding for recalculation. The prevailing party determination and attorney’s fee award were vacated and remanded for reconsideration. The court otherwise affirmed the superior court’s judgment. View "Johnson v. Albin Carlson & Co." on Justia Law

White Knight Development, LLC entered into a contract in 2015 to purchase land from Dick and Julie Simmons for $400,000. The contract included a "buy-back" provision allowing White Knight to require the Simmonses to repurchase the property if certain restrictions were extended. When the restrictions were extended in October 2016, White Knight invoked the buy-back provision, but the Simmonses refused to repurchase the property. White Knight sued for breach of contract and sought specific performance and damages related to the delay in performance.The trial court found that the Simmonses breached the contract and awarded White Knight specific performance, ordering the Simmonses to repurchase the property for $400,000. Additionally, the court awarded White Knight $308,136.14 in damages for various costs incurred due to the delay in performance. These costs included property taxes, loan interest, and other expenses related to the property and White Knight's business operations.The Court of Appeals for the Tenth District of Texas modified the judgment by deleting the $308,136.14 monetary award but otherwise affirmed the trial court's decision. The court acknowledged that monetary compensation could be awarded alongside specific performance in narrow circumstances but found no express statement by the trial court that the monetary award was equitable in nature.The Supreme Court of Texas held that while specific performance usually precludes a monetary award, there are narrow circumstances where both can be awarded. The court concluded that the trial court's findings supported an equitable monetary award to account for the delay in performance. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and remanded the case for further review of the monetary award consistent with the principles announced. View "WHITE KNIGHT DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. SIMMONS" on Justia Law

Two air ambulance providers, Guardian Flight, LLC, and Med-Trans Corporation, sued Health Care Service Corporation (HCSC) for failing to timely pay dispute resolution awards under the No Surprises Act (NSA). The providers also claimed that HCSC improperly denied benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and was unjustly enriched under Texas law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas dismissed the providers' complaint. The court found that the NSA does not provide a private right of action for enforcing dispute resolution awards. It also dismissed the ERISA claim for lack of standing, as the providers did not show that the beneficiaries suffered any injury since the NSA shields them from liability. Lastly, the court dismissed the quantum meruit claim, stating that the providers did not perform their services for HCSC's benefit. The court also denied the providers' request for leave to amend their complaint, deeming it futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the NSA does not contain a private right of action and that the statute's text and structure support this conclusion. The court also upheld the dismissal of the ERISA claim, reiterating that the beneficiaries did not suffer any concrete injury. Finally, the court affirmed the dismissal of the quantum meruit claim, as the providers did not render services for HCSC's benefit. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint. View "Guardian Flight v. Health Care Service" on Justia Law

West Virginia filed a complaint in state court against CaremarkPCS Health, LLC, a pharmacy benefit manager (PBM), alleging that Caremark unlawfully drove up the cost of insulin, causing financial harm to the state. The complaint included state law claims of civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, fraud, and breach of contract. Caremark removed the case to federal court under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), arguing that its conduct in negotiating rebates, which is central to the complaint, was performed under the direction of the federal government as part of its work for federal health plans.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia found that removal was unwarranted and remanded the case to state court. The district court concluded that Caremark failed to meet the requirements for federal officer removal and noted that West Virginia had disclaimed any federal claims in its complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Caremark was entitled to remove the case to federal court under § 1442(a)(1). The court found that Caremark acted under a federal officer because it administered health benefits for federal employees under contracts with FEHBA carriers, which are supervised by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The court also determined that Caremark had a colorable federal defense, specifically that federal law preempted West Virginia's claims. Finally, the court concluded that the charged conduct was related to Caremark's federal work, as the rebate negotiations for federal and non-federal clients were indivisible. Thus, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's remand decision and returned the case to the district court for further proceedings. View "West Virginia ex rel. Hunt v. CaremarkPCS Health, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Tom Smith Masonry (Smith Masonry) and WIPI Group USA, Inc. (WIPI) entered into a contract for Smith Masonry to construct a fence on WIPI’s property. After completing most of the work, Smith Masonry requested final payment, which WIPI withheld due to a dispute over the installation of a gate operator. Smith Masonry filed a mechanic’s lien and subsequently a lawsuit to foreclose on the lien, seeking the unpaid balance. WIPI counterclaimed for breach of contract and other issues, seeking damages for alleged faulty workmanship.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Lincoln County, South Dakota, denied relief to both parties, finding that Smith Masonry’s work was defective and that WIPI’s damages were not established with exactitude. Smith Masonry appealed, and the South Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded, directing the lower court to enter a judgment of foreclosure in favor of Smith Masonry for the full amount of the lien and to reconsider Smith Masonry’s request for attorney fees.On remand, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of Smith Masonry on the lien but denied the request for attorney fees. Smith Masonry appealed again. The South Dakota Supreme Court found that the circuit court violated the law of the case doctrine by revisiting issues already settled in the first appeal and by speculating on what might have occurred had the trial resumed. The Supreme Court also held that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying attorney fees based on irrelevant factors and an overly narrow interpretation of the statute governing attorney fees in mechanic’s lien cases.The South Dakota Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s denial of attorney fees and remanded for a determination of an appropriate award of attorney fees consistent with its opinion. The court also awarded Smith Masonry $30,000 for appellate attorney fees. View "Smith Masonry v. Wipi Group Inc." on Justia Law

In June 2016, Terae Harris, driving an Enterprise rental car, backed out of a parking space and struck James Joplin on his motorcycle. Enterprise offered Joplin a $25,000 settlement in exchange for releasing all claims against both Enterprise and Harris. Joplin did not respond, and in May 2018, he sued Harris for $300,000. In May 2020, Joplin’s new attorney found the signed release and sent it to Enterprise, but it was illegible. Harris filed a plea of accord and satisfaction, claiming the release barred Joplin’s suit.The Circuit Court of Henrico County admitted an unsigned copy of the release as evidence, ruling that the parol evidence rule did not apply because the unsigned release was used to confirm the terms of the illegible signed release. The court granted Harris’ plea of accord and satisfaction, barring Joplin’s suit. Joplin appealed, arguing the unsigned release was improper parol evidence, his attorneys lacked authority to settle, and there was no mutual assent.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court, holding that the unsigned release was improper parol evidence and that Harris had not met the burden of proof for its admissibility. The court did not address Joplin’s other arguments.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and found that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the unsigned release. The court held that the parol evidence rule did not apply because the unsigned release was used to verify the terms of the illegible signed release, not to alter them. The court also found that the circuit court’s factual finding linking the two releases was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and entered final judgment for Harris. View "Harris v. Joplin" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller against Antero Resources Corporation. The plaintiffs, who own oil and gas interests in Harrison County, West Virginia, allege that Antero breached the terms of their leases by failing to pay the full one-eighth royalty specified in the leases. They argue that Antero improperly deducted postproduction costs from the gross sale proceeds of the gas, contrary to West Virginia Supreme Court precedents in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, presided over by Chief Judge Thomas S. Kleeh, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The first question asked whether the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend only to the "first available market" as opposed to the "point of sale" when the duty to market is implicated. The second question asked whether the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on natural gas liquids (NGLs) and, if so, whether lessors share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting the NGLs to sale.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reaffirmed its previous rulings in Wellman and Estate of Tawney, holding that the requirements extend to the point of sale, not just to the first available market. The court also held that royalties are payable on NGLs, but absent express language in the lease, lessors do not share in the costs of processing, manufacturing, and transporting residue gas and NGLs to the point of sale. The court emphasized that any deductions for postproduction costs must be clearly and unambiguously stated in the lease agreements. View "Romeo v. Antero Resources Corporation" on Justia Law