Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Excel Construction entered into a contract with the Town of Lovell to replace the Town's water and sewer system mains and service connections. Excel subsequently filed a complaint against the Town of breach of contract and related claims. The district court dismissed Excel's claims for failure to submit a governmental notice of claim that met the itemization requirements of the Wyoming Constitution and Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Excel's notice of claim met the itemization requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-39-113(b)(iii) and Wyo. Const. art. XVI, 7; (2) Excel complied with the service requirements of Wyo. Const. art. XVI, 7 when it served its notice of claim on the mayor, town administrator, town attorney, and town project engineer; and (3) the district court had jurisdiction to consider Excel's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Remanded.

Celeste Grynberg and her husband were co-owners of Grynberg Petroleum. Celeste filed a complaint for declaratory relief, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion against L&R Exploration Venture and numerous individuals and entities having an interest in the venture (collectively L&R), claiming that L&R owed her compensation for services Grynberg Petroleum provided to L&R and that she was entitled to payment of those amounts. The district court granted summary judgment for L&R and dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata, finding that Celeste was in privity with parties involved in prior litigation in Colorado and New York and her complaint involved the same subject matter and issues resolved in those proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Celeste was in privity with her husband, who was a party in the New York proceedings, as the assignee of his interest in L&R and with Grynberg Petroleum as the co-owner of the company and was bound by the prior rulings.

Kelly Shaffer received breast reduction surgery for medical purposes, after which she was hospitalized for a methicillin-resistant stophylococcus aureaus (MRSA) infection. Shaffer's insurer, WINhealth Partners (WIN), refused to pay for the treatment Shaffer received for her MRSA infection on the basis that it arose from treatment to improve appearance. Shaffer subsequently sued WIN, alleging breach of contract and bad faith contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of WIN, concluding that the insurance contract language clearly and unambiguously excluded coverage for Shaffer's breast reduction surgery as well as treatment of complications arising from non-covered services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to WIN because, based on the evidence in the record, the language of the insurance contract unambiguously provided coverage to Shaffer's non-cosmetic breast reduction surgery. Remanded with directions for the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of Shaffer on her claims for treatment of her MRSA infection.

George Sonnett, Jr. and Wendy Burgers-Sonnett purchased twenty acres of land and improvements from Elk Ridge Lodge, which Elk Ridge conveyed by warranty deed. The Sonnetts financed part of the purchase price by giving Elk Ridge a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the property. After the Sonnetts defaulted on the note, Elk Ridge filed suit against the Sonnetts seeking judgment and foreclosure on the property, and the Sonnetts filed counterclaims alleging breach of warranty. Both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Elk Ridge on its foreclosure claim and denied Elk Ridge's request for attorneys' fees. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions in both appeals, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Elk Ridge and in denying summary judgment to the Sonnetts on their counterclaim of breach of warranty; (2) the record did not support the applicability of the Sonnetts' equitable defenses of equitable estoppel, waiver, or laches; and (3) the district court reasonably concluded that Elk Ridge was not entitled to attorneys' fees.

Ron and Linda Reece and Greg and Staci Hunter agreed to flip a house and put their agreement in writing. Mr. Reece supplied the labor and submitted invoices for expenses incurred to Mrs. Hunter. Later, the Hunters became dissatisfied with the progress on the project, told Mr. Reece to stop working on the project, and hired other contractors to complete the project. The Reeces then filed suit against the Hunters, alleging that, under the contract, the Reeces were entitled to payment for Mr. Reece's labor on the project in addition to one half of the profits. The district court found that the parties' contract was not valid because there had been no meeting of the minds regarding an essential term of the agreement, that being whether Mr. Reece was to be paid for his work in addition to receiving one half of the profits. The court then invoked the theory of unjust enrichment to award all of the profits to the Reeces. The Hunters appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, given the language of the written agreement and the parties' stipulation that it was a valid contract, the district court erred in finding there was no contract.

Petitioner entered into a contract with respondent for the construction of a hotel. After seventeen months of work on the project, petitioner terminated the contract with respondent and respondent subsequently filed a lien against the hotel property for amounts it claimed remained owing. Petitioner filed a petition to strike the lien pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-1-311(b), which the district court denied on the ground that petitioner failed to prove respondent knew, when it filed its claim of lien, that the lien was groundless or contained a material misstatement or false claim. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the district court improperly placed the burden of proof on petitioner and that the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous. The court affirmed and held that, although it agreed that the burden of proof under the statute was on the lien claimant, the court found that the district court's ruling was properly based on the evidence presented by the lien claimant, respondent, and on the failure of petitioner to allege proper grounds for relief under the statute.

The City of Torrington ("city") filed suit against Strong Construction, Inc. ("Strong") alleging breach of contract claims based on Strong's failure to supply and install water pump motors that conformed to contract specifications. At issue was whether the district court's judgment in favor of the city was supported by the record. The court affirmed and held that the district court's determination was not clearly erroneous where there was ample evidence to support the district court's decision that the Centripro Guidelines were provided to Baker & Associates, the city's engineer, prior to approval of the project submittals; where Strong breached the agreement with the city by failing to provide motors that conformed to the specifications in the parties' agreement; where section 13.07 of the General Conditions did not preclude the city's breach of contract claim and the repair obligation, by its terms, was not limited to one year; and where the court found no basis in common law to extend apportionment of damages to breach of contract claims and the comparative fault statute was not applicable to the breach of contract action.

Joe's Concrete and Lumber, Inc. ("Joe's Concrete") sought attorneys fees from Concrete Works of Colorado, Inc. ("CWC") after CWC breached its contract with Joe's concrete. At issue was whether the district court properly denied attorneys fees. The court held that Joe's Concrete was entitled to recover its attorneys fees where the attorneys fees were not an element of damages to be proved at trial but were collateral to the merits of the case.