Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Landlord leased commercial real property to Tenant. Landlord granted Tenant permission to renovate the property on the condition that Tenant would pay for the renovations. Tenant thereafter contracted with Contractor to perform the work. When Tenant defaulted on its payments to Contractor, Contractor filed a lien against Landlord's property. Contractor thereafter filed a complaint against Landlord and Tenant, asserting various claims and seeking to foreclose on its lien. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, pursuant to Wyoming's lien statutes, a valid mechanic's lien did not exist because Landlord did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Tenant was not acting as Landlord's agent in contracting for the improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic's lien may attach to the landlord's property for work performed at the tenant's behest; and (2) in this case, that relationship did not exist.

Appellant was physically injured as a result of an accident caused by an underinsured motorist. Prior to the accident, Appellant purchased a Dairyland Insurance Policy through his insurance agent, Jonathan Schrack. Although Appellant requested full coverage, the policy did not include underinsured motorist coverage. When the other driver's insurance did not fully cover Appellant's damages, Appellant sued Dairyland and Schrack (Defendants), raising numerous theories as to why he should recover under the Dairyland policy. The district court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) Wyoming's uninsured motorist statutes unambiguously do not require insurers to provide underinsured motorist liability coverage; (2) Appellant's failure to read the policy was available as a defense to Defendants as to Appellant's negligence and contract claims against them and barred application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel; and (3) the doctrine of reasonable expectations was not available to alter the unambiguous terms of the policy.

Appellant, Whitney Holding Corporation, challenged a decision of the district court quieting title in a certain mineral estate in favor of Appellees, Clarence and Peggy Terry. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the parties intended, and the limited warranty deed conveying the property from Whitney to the Terrys reflected, that Whitney did not reserve a mineral interest in the property; (2) the district court properly determined that the deed was ambiguous and did not err in considering extrinsic evidence to interpret the deed; and (3) the Terrys' quiet title action was not barred by the statute of limitations.

This case began in 2004 when Margo Belden and Fish Creek Designs, LLC filed suit against John Thorkildsen, claiming a breach of the LLC agreement and that Thorkildsen and his wife owned Fish Creek for payments it made on a loan. The case was appealed and remanded several times, largely in relation to Thorkildsen's motion for attorney fees and costs. In the fourth appeal of this matter, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of making a factual determination that the attorney fees Thorkildsen requested were reasonable and, in a specific remand, directed the district court to enter an order awarding Thorkildsen attorney fees in the amount of $77,475. In the fifth appeal of the matter, Thorkildsen challenged the district court's entry of the order the Court directed, claiming he was entitled to prejudgment interest on the fee award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the award of Thorkildsen's attorney fees was not a liquidated claim, and therefore, Thorkildsen was not entitled to prejudgment interest on the award.

James Schlinger owned and operated Curtis Excavation and WW Construction. Schlinger, acting as president of WW Construction, entered into an oral agreement to lease his business and all associated equipment and land to Christopher McGhee and Jack Robinson. McGhee and Robinson formed Curtis-Westwood Construction as the entity to lease and operate the business. After eight months, Schlinger determined McGhee and Robinson were not properly managing the business and terminated the oral lease agreement. The parties disputed the financial implications of the termination. After a bench trial, the district court determined that Schlinger breached his oral agreement with Appellees, McGhee, Robinson, and Curtis-Westood Construction, and that Schlinger owed Plaintiffs $206,875. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's judgment on Appellees' breach of contract claim and rejected Appellants' argument that they should be awarded breach of contract damages, holding that the district court committed clear error in awarding damages as there was insufficient evidence in the record to justify an award of damages to either party; and (2) affirmed the district court's denial of Schlinger's claims for recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment, holding that Schlinger's claims were unsupported by the evidence.

Excel Construction entered into a contract with the Town of Lovell to replace the Town's water and sewer system mains and service connections. Excel subsequently filed a complaint against the Town of breach of contract and related claims. The district court dismissed Excel's claims for failure to submit a governmental notice of claim that met the itemization requirements of the Wyoming Constitution and Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Excel's notice of claim met the itemization requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-39-113(b)(iii) and Wyo. Const. art. XVI, 7; (2) Excel complied with the service requirements of Wyo. Const. art. XVI, 7 when it served its notice of claim on the mayor, town administrator, town attorney, and town project engineer; and (3) the district court had jurisdiction to consider Excel's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Remanded.

Celeste Grynberg and her husband were co-owners of Grynberg Petroleum. Celeste filed a complaint for declaratory relief, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion against L&R Exploration Venture and numerous individuals and entities having an interest in the venture (collectively L&R), claiming that L&R owed her compensation for services Grynberg Petroleum provided to L&R and that she was entitled to payment of those amounts. The district court granted summary judgment for L&R and dismissed the complaint on the basis of res judicata, finding that Celeste was in privity with parties involved in prior litigation in Colorado and New York and her complaint involved the same subject matter and issues resolved in those proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Celeste was in privity with her husband, who was a party in the New York proceedings, as the assignee of his interest in L&R and with Grynberg Petroleum as the co-owner of the company and was bound by the prior rulings.

Kelly Shaffer received breast reduction surgery for medical purposes, after which she was hospitalized for a methicillin-resistant stophylococcus aureaus (MRSA) infection. Shaffer's insurer, WINhealth Partners (WIN), refused to pay for the treatment Shaffer received for her MRSA infection on the basis that it arose from treatment to improve appearance. Shaffer subsequently sued WIN, alleging breach of contract and bad faith contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of WIN, concluding that the insurance contract language clearly and unambiguously excluded coverage for Shaffer's breast reduction surgery as well as treatment of complications arising from non-covered services. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to WIN because, based on the evidence in the record, the language of the insurance contract unambiguously provided coverage to Shaffer's non-cosmetic breast reduction surgery. Remanded with directions for the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of Shaffer on her claims for treatment of her MRSA infection.

George Sonnett, Jr. and Wendy Burgers-Sonnett purchased twenty acres of land and improvements from Elk Ridge Lodge, which Elk Ridge conveyed by warranty deed. The Sonnetts financed part of the purchase price by giving Elk Ridge a promissory note secured by a mortgage on the property. After the Sonnetts defaulted on the note, Elk Ridge filed suit against the Sonnetts seeking judgment and foreclosure on the property, and the Sonnetts filed counterclaims alleging breach of warranty. Both parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Elk Ridge on its foreclosure claim and denied Elk Ridge's request for attorneys' fees. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decisions in both appeals, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Elk Ridge and in denying summary judgment to the Sonnetts on their counterclaim of breach of warranty; (2) the record did not support the applicability of the Sonnetts' equitable defenses of equitable estoppel, waiver, or laches; and (3) the district court reasonably concluded that Elk Ridge was not entitled to attorneys' fees.

Ron and Linda Reece and Greg and Staci Hunter agreed to flip a house and put their agreement in writing. Mr. Reece supplied the labor and submitted invoices for expenses incurred to Mrs. Hunter. Later, the Hunters became dissatisfied with the progress on the project, told Mr. Reece to stop working on the project, and hired other contractors to complete the project. The Reeces then filed suit against the Hunters, alleging that, under the contract, the Reeces were entitled to payment for Mr. Reece's labor on the project in addition to one half of the profits. The district court found that the parties' contract was not valid because there had been no meeting of the minds regarding an essential term of the agreement, that being whether Mr. Reece was to be paid for his work in addition to receiving one half of the profits. The court then invoked the theory of unjust enrichment to award all of the profits to the Reeces. The Hunters appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, given the language of the written agreement and the parties' stipulation that it was a valid contract, the district court erred in finding there was no contract.