Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case involved a dispute between a surface owner and a timber estate owner. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the surface owner and remanded for proceedings to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the timber estate owner's predecessor in interest's (Union Pacific) reservations of timber in deeds from the early 1900s in order to determine the parties' intent with regard to the duration of the timber estates. The district granted judgment in favor of the surface owner, concluding (1) Union Pacific intended to reserve only those trees in existence at the time of the grant and of sufficient size to be suitable for use in construction, and (2) Union Pacific's timber reservations had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly ruled, on the evidence before it, that Union Pacific intended its reservation of timber to include only trees of a suitable size which existed on the subject properties at the time of the deeds; and (2) the evidence presented at trial clearly established that such timber no longer existed on the properties.

Appellant was injured when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The other vehicle involved in the accident, a truck, was listed on two different insurance policies: an Allstate policy issued to Jeremy Lucas and a Mountain West policy issued to Wyoming Electric Company. Appellee, Mountain West, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, requesting that the district court find Mountain West did not have to cover the truck under the policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mountain West, finding that the owner of Wyoming Electric had given the truck to Lucas and, therefore, the truck was no longer covered under the company's insurance policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the truck was titled and registered in the name of Wyoming Electric and was still listed as a specific vehicle on the Mountain West Policy, Mountain West was not required to pay under the policy because, on the date of the accident, Wyoming electric no longer owned the truck and the truck was no longer covered under the Mountain West insurance policy.

This was the second of two related lawsuits filed by Torrington Livestock Cattle Company (TLCC) against Daren and Jennifer Berg. In the first suit, Daren was found liable for breach of contract, conversion, and fraud. The court entered judgment in the favor of TLCC in the amount of $517,635, but the judgment remained unsatisfied. While the first suit was pending, the Bergs signed a promissory note with the First Bank of Torrington. As collateral, the bank acquired security interests in a variety of the Bergs' property, including livestock and ranching equipment. Later, the bank assigned the promissory note to TLCC. After the Bergs did not make the first payment, TLCC commenced the instant action, alleging breach of contract for promissory note and to enforce security agreement. The district court determined that no material issues of fact existed and TLCC was entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court based upon the deficient brief offered by the Bergs and their failure to follow the rules of appellate procedure.

Majorie Bedessem, as trustee of her revocable trust, filed a complaint against David and Susan Cunningham, seeking enforcement of an easement across the Cunningham property to access the Bedessem property. Bedessem claimed an implied access easement or, in the alternative, access pursuant to the restrictive covenants applicable to both properties. The district court granting Cunninghams' summary judgment motion after finding no evidence of an implied easement and that the restrictive covenants authorized only the Architectural Control Committee to sue for enforcement of the covenants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it ruled that Bedessem did not have standing to enforce a restrictive covenant against Cunninghams, as the covenants granted the Architectural Control Committee the sole right to enforce the covenants.

R & R Rig Service moved Universal Drilling Company's drilling rig under a time and materials contract. Universal refused to pay R & R's invoice, claiming that it should only have to pay the amount it paid to have the rig moved a few weeks later by a different company. R & R brought suit for payment of the services it rendered, and Universal counterclaimed on the basis of fraud and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court generally ruled in favor of R & R and against Universal, although it refused to grant R & R's request for pre-judgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in awarding damages; (2) did not err in ruling that Universal had failed to prove its fraud claim; (3) properly denied Universal's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) erred in denying R & R's request for prejudgment interest. Remanded with directions to award R & R prejudgment interest.

Landlord leased commercial real property to Tenant. Landlord granted Tenant permission to renovate the property on the condition that Tenant would pay for the renovations. Tenant thereafter contracted with Contractor to perform the work. When Tenant defaulted on its payments to Contractor, Contractor filed a lien against Landlord's property. Contractor thereafter filed a complaint against Landlord and Tenant, asserting various claims and seeking to foreclose on its lien. The district court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment, concluding that, pursuant to Wyoming's lien statutes, a valid mechanic's lien did not exist because Landlord did not agree to pay for the renovations to the property and that Tenant was not acting as Landlord's agent in contracting for the improvements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court correctly interpreted Wyo. Stat. Ann. 29-2-105(a)(ii) to require a finding of agency between the landlord and tenant before a mechanic's lien may attach to the landlord's property for work performed at the tenant's behest; and (2) in this case, that relationship did not exist.

Appellant was physically injured as a result of an accident caused by an underinsured motorist. Prior to the accident, Appellant purchased a Dairyland Insurance Policy through his insurance agent, Jonathan Schrack. Although Appellant requested full coverage, the policy did not include underinsured motorist coverage. When the other driver's insurance did not fully cover Appellant's damages, Appellant sued Dairyland and Schrack (Defendants), raising numerous theories as to why he should recover under the Dairyland policy. The district court granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) Wyoming's uninsured motorist statutes unambiguously do not require insurers to provide underinsured motorist liability coverage; (2) Appellant's failure to read the policy was available as a defense to Defendants as to Appellant's negligence and contract claims against them and barred application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel; and (3) the doctrine of reasonable expectations was not available to alter the unambiguous terms of the policy.

Appellant, Whitney Holding Corporation, challenged a decision of the district court quieting title in a certain mineral estate in favor of Appellees, Clarence and Peggy Terry. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that the parties intended, and the limited warranty deed conveying the property from Whitney to the Terrys reflected, that Whitney did not reserve a mineral interest in the property; (2) the district court properly determined that the deed was ambiguous and did not err in considering extrinsic evidence to interpret the deed; and (3) the Terrys' quiet title action was not barred by the statute of limitations.

This case began in 2004 when Margo Belden and Fish Creek Designs, LLC filed suit against John Thorkildsen, claiming a breach of the LLC agreement and that Thorkildsen and his wife owned Fish Creek for payments it made on a loan. The case was appealed and remanded several times, largely in relation to Thorkildsen's motion for attorney fees and costs. In the fourth appeal of this matter, the Supreme Court took the unusual step of making a factual determination that the attorney fees Thorkildsen requested were reasonable and, in a specific remand, directed the district court to enter an order awarding Thorkildsen attorney fees in the amount of $77,475. In the fifth appeal of the matter, Thorkildsen challenged the district court's entry of the order the Court directed, claiming he was entitled to prejudgment interest on the fee award. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the award of Thorkildsen's attorney fees was not a liquidated claim, and therefore, Thorkildsen was not entitled to prejudgment interest on the award.

James Schlinger owned and operated Curtis Excavation and WW Construction. Schlinger, acting as president of WW Construction, entered into an oral agreement to lease his business and all associated equipment and land to Christopher McGhee and Jack Robinson. McGhee and Robinson formed Curtis-Westwood Construction as the entity to lease and operate the business. After eight months, Schlinger determined McGhee and Robinson were not properly managing the business and terminated the oral lease agreement. The parties disputed the financial implications of the termination. After a bench trial, the district court determined that Schlinger breached his oral agreement with Appellees, McGhee, Robinson, and Curtis-Westood Construction, and that Schlinger owed Plaintiffs $206,875. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's judgment on Appellees' breach of contract claim and rejected Appellants' argument that they should be awarded breach of contract damages, holding that the district court committed clear error in awarding damages as there was insufficient evidence in the record to justify an award of damages to either party; and (2) affirmed the district court's denial of Schlinger's claims for recovery under the theory of unjust enrichment, holding that Schlinger's claims were unsupported by the evidence.