Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Jackman Construction, Inc. was awarded a contract to improve the Town of Baggs' water treatment plant. After the project suffered significant delays, payments were submitted and accepted, and a dispute ensued as to whether or not the last payment constituted "final payment." Jackman filed a governmental claim as well as a complaint for breach of contract, seeking damages from the Town. The Town filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that under the clear and unambiguous terms of the contract, Jackman agreed to waive all claims by accepting "final payment," which it did.

KM Upstream, LLC and Newpoint, Inc. entered into a contract whereby Newport would construct for KM's amine plant. Newpoint subcontracted with Elkorn Construction, Inc. to build the foundation and perform other work. Elkhorn subsequently filed a lien statement with the county clerk. Elkhorn later filed a complaint against KM for, inter alia, foreclosure of the lien as a mechanic's lien. Newpoint was later added as a defendant. The district court granted summary judgment to Elkhorn to allow foreclosure on the mechanic's lien. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment; but (2) reversed and remanded the district court's determination that $181,369 of Elkhorn's lien claim was disputed and its subsequent order subtracting that amount from Elkhorn's judgment.

Soon after Yale Preston was employed by Pennaco Energy, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Marathon Oil Company (collectively referred to as Marathon), Preston signed an employee agreement with a disclosure and assignment of intellectual property clause. The present dispute centered around allegations of patent infringement and questions of ownership of two patents that covered a baffle system that Preston invented. The district court found that Preston was the sole inventor of the patents and that the employee agreement was a valid contract, pursuant to which Preston was required to assign his ownership interest in the patents to Marathon. At issue on appeal was the validity of the assignment of intellectual property rights given to Marathon without an additional consideration other than continued at-will employment. The Supreme Court accepted certification and held that continuing the employment of an existing at-will employee constitutes adequate consideration to support an agreement containing an intellectual property-assignment provision.

In 2003, Shaw Construction obtained a line of credit from Rocky Mountain Hardware (RMH). Over the years, RMH supplied hardware for several jobs on which Shaw was the general contractor. In 2007, Shaw began work on a project for Snake River Sporting Club in which it acted as construction manager rather than general contractor. Although RMH was chosen as the hardware supplier, no separate contract was executed between RMH and either Shaw or Snake River. After none of the balance due was paid, RMH filed the instant action against Shaw, claiming Shaw was obligated to pay the outstanding balance and that RMH had a written contract with Shaw by virtue of the 2003 credit agreement. Shaw claimed Snake River was responsible for all payments to suppliers. The district court ordered Shaw to pay for the hardware furnished by RMH on the project as well as contractual interest and attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly ruled the credit agreement applied in this case and, pursuant to its terms, Shaw was responsible for the principal balance due on the hardware contract, together with contractual interest and attorney fees.

John and Minerva Sutherland entered into a mining lease granting Meridian Granite Company the right to conduct mining operations on the Sutherlands' property. A dispute developed between the Sutherlands and Meridian regarding the Sutherlands' obligation to pay taxes relating to the mineral production. The dispute led to litigation. The district court granted Meridian's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the Sutherlands were obligated to pay the disputed taxes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in allowing Meridian to deduct ad valorem and severance taxes from payments to the Sutherlands when such tax payments were not required by the State, as the Sutherlands and Meridian agreed in the mining lease that the Sutherlands would pay the taxes.

This case involved a dispute between a surface owner and a timber estate owner. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court reversed a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the surface owner and remanded for proceedings to examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the timber estate owner's predecessor in interest's (Union Pacific) reservations of timber in deeds from the early 1900s in order to determine the parties' intent with regard to the duration of the timber estates. The district granted judgment in favor of the surface owner, concluding (1) Union Pacific intended to reserve only those trees in existence at the time of the grant and of sufficient size to be suitable for use in construction, and (2) Union Pacific's timber reservations had expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly ruled, on the evidence before it, that Union Pacific intended its reservation of timber to include only trees of a suitable size which existed on the subject properties at the time of the deeds; and (2) the evidence presented at trial clearly established that such timber no longer existed on the properties.

Appellant was injured when she was involved in a motor vehicle accident. The other vehicle involved in the accident, a truck, was listed on two different insurance policies: an Allstate policy issued to Jeremy Lucas and a Mountain West policy issued to Wyoming Electric Company. Appellee, Mountain West, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, requesting that the district court find Mountain West did not have to cover the truck under the policy. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mountain West, finding that the owner of Wyoming Electric had given the truck to Lucas and, therefore, the truck was no longer covered under the company's insurance policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that although the truck was titled and registered in the name of Wyoming Electric and was still listed as a specific vehicle on the Mountain West Policy, Mountain West was not required to pay under the policy because, on the date of the accident, Wyoming electric no longer owned the truck and the truck was no longer covered under the Mountain West insurance policy.

This was the second of two related lawsuits filed by Torrington Livestock Cattle Company (TLCC) against Daren and Jennifer Berg. In the first suit, Daren was found liable for breach of contract, conversion, and fraud. The court entered judgment in the favor of TLCC in the amount of $517,635, but the judgment remained unsatisfied. While the first suit was pending, the Bergs signed a promissory note with the First Bank of Torrington. As collateral, the bank acquired security interests in a variety of the Bergs' property, including livestock and ranching equipment. Later, the bank assigned the promissory note to TLCC. After the Bergs did not make the first payment, TLCC commenced the instant action, alleging breach of contract for promissory note and to enforce security agreement. The district court determined that no material issues of fact existed and TLCC was entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court based upon the deficient brief offered by the Bergs and their failure to follow the rules of appellate procedure.

Majorie Bedessem, as trustee of her revocable trust, filed a complaint against David and Susan Cunningham, seeking enforcement of an easement across the Cunningham property to access the Bedessem property. Bedessem claimed an implied access easement or, in the alternative, access pursuant to the restrictive covenants applicable to both properties. The district court granting Cunninghams' summary judgment motion after finding no evidence of an implied easement and that the restrictive covenants authorized only the Architectural Control Committee to sue for enforcement of the covenants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it ruled that Bedessem did not have standing to enforce a restrictive covenant against Cunninghams, as the covenants granted the Architectural Control Committee the sole right to enforce the covenants.

R & R Rig Service moved Universal Drilling Company's drilling rig under a time and materials contract. Universal refused to pay R & R's invoice, claiming that it should only have to pay the amount it paid to have the rig moved a few weeks later by a different company. R & R brought suit for payment of the services it rendered, and Universal counterclaimed on the basis of fraud and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court generally ruled in favor of R & R and against Universal, although it refused to grant R & R's request for pre-judgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the district court (1) did not err in awarding damages; (2) did not err in ruling that Universal had failed to prove its fraud claim; (3) properly denied Universal's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (4) erred in denying R & R's request for prejudgment interest. Remanded with directions to award R & R prejudgment interest.