Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Jerry Herling Construction, Inc. (JHCI) contracted with Plaintiff for rental and service of earthmoving equipment but defaulted on the payments due under the contract. Plaintiff sued Jerry Herling, JHCI's CEO, seeking to enforce personal guaranties of JHCI's performance. Herling, in turn, argued that he was released from his guaranties because of an assignment of JHCI's retainage account and a settlement between other parties. The trial court granted summary judgment to Plaintiff, concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to judgment against Herling on his guaranties as a matter of law, and entered judgment against Herling in the amount of $1,383,473 based on his guaranties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Herling was entitled to credit for the $500,000 settlement. Remanded. View "Herling v. Wyo. Machinery Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs owned property that was conveyed by warranty deed to J.A. Reed. In 1968, Reed conveyed the property to Julianne Biggane, and in 2006, the Biggane Trust transferred the property to Plaintiffs. Prior to Reed's transfer of the property to Biggane, a pole line easement across the property was granted to PacifiCorp's predecessor in interest. Reed, however, signed the easement grant as president of Continental Live Stock Company, rather than in his personal capacity, at a time that the company had no interest in the underlying land. Therefore, the easement was a "wild deed." At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a "wild deed" can be the "root of title" under the Wyoming Marketable Title Act. This case arose when Plaintiffs filed an action seeking to have the easement declared invalid because it emanated from a wild deed. The district court held that the Act validated PacifiCorp's easement across Plaintiffs' property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a wild deed may constitute the root of title under the Act, and a wild deed serving as a root of title that does not bear a defect "on its face" is not an "inherent defect" in the chain of record title under the Act. View "Esterholdt v. PacifiCorp" on Justia Law

Western Wyoming Construction Company (WWC) submitted a bid for a highway project in Sublette County. The Board of County Commissioners of Sublette County (Commissioners) awarded the contract to another resident contractor whose bid was higher than WWC's. WWC filed a complaint in district court for an order awarding it the contract for the project. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioners. At issue on appeal was whether Wyo. Stat. 16-6-102(a) required the Commissioners to award the contract to the responsible certified Wyoming resident making the lowest bid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 16-6-102 has no application in the context of two resident contractors; and (2) because no evidence was presented showing where the funds came from to pay for the project, (i) there could be no finding as to what statutory provision, if any, was applicable, and (ii) a judicial determination as to the appropriateness of the bid award was not possible. Remanded. View "W. Wyo. Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

In 2005, the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) hired Plaintiff. In 2007, the DEQ terminated Plaintiff on the ground that he improperly incurred $2,500 in personal charges on a state-issued cell phone. Plaintiff challenged his termination, claiming the ground was pretext, and the Office of Administrative Hearings reinstated Plaintiff to his original position. The DEQ sought review of that position in district court and made an offer to settle, to which Plaintiff did not respond. The DEQ subsequently notified Plaintiff it was accepting his resignation because he had taken a job in Montana. The DEQ then withdrew its petition for review. In 2009, Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court, claiming the DEQ's failure to comply with the conditions of his proffered resignation constituted wrongful termination. The federal court dismissed the lawsuit. Plaintiff then filed suit in district court, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of the purported settlement agreement. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that Plaintiff's claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff's appeal for failure to follow the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. View "Armstrong v. Wyo. Dep't of Envtl. Quality" on Justia Law

The Thornhocks filed an action against the Esterholdts and others seeking to quiet title to certain lands in Lincoln County. The district court granted summary judgment to the Thornocks as to some of the land but denied summary judgment as to a certain strip of property. After a bench trial, the district court quieted title in the disputed strip of land in the Esterholdts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an appurtenant easement was not created by a deed that granted, in addition to tracts of fee title land, also that "right of way to be used in connection with said land"; and (2) an appurtenant easement was not created by a deed that granted a "right-of-way" described as the land now in question. View "Thornock v. Esterholdt" on Justia Law

In 2001, Plaintiff offered to purchase a commercial property. Defendant was the real estate agent who prepared the offer. The sellers accepted the offer to purchase and prepared a property disclosure statement in compliance with the contract requirement. Plaintiff became the sole owner of the property in 2004. Two years later, Plaintiff discovered three inches of water in the building basement that had leaked through the west wall of the foundation of the building. In 2012, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, alleging he was negligent in failing to provide the property disclosure statement. The district court dismissed the action on account of the two-year statute of limitations having expired. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the district court erred in ruling that Defendant had no duty to disclose or provide the property disclosure statement. The Supreme Court dismissed the case due to Plaintiff's failure to challenge the statute of limitations ruling by the district court. The Court also noted that the district court acknowledged that Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to deliver the disclosure statement. View "Ferrell v. Knighten" on Justia Law

Sheridan Fire Fighters Local No. 276 filed suit against the City of Sheridan alleging that the City breached the parties' collective bargaining agreement when it failed to provide pay raises to five firefighters who had qualified for a "step increase" in salary. The City responded that the raises were not required and that, under the terms of the agreement, the City retained discretion in the award of pay raises. The district court granted summary judgment for the City. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Local 276, holding (1) the agreement was ambiguous about whether step increases in salary were mandatory or left to the City's discretion; and (2) because Local 276 presented evidence in support of its summary judgment motion consistent with the union's interpretation that the agreement required the City to give step increases to all eligible firefighters, and the City offered no evidence to the contrary, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and Local 276 showed it was entitled to judgment in its favor. View "Sheridan Fire Fighters Local No. 276 v. City of Sheridan" on Justia Law

Appellants purchased Mom's Malt Shop (Mom's) from Meisinger Investments, which was subsequently dissolved. Six years later, Appellants filed a complaint against Meisinger Investments and one of its owners, Richard Meisinger (Appellees) for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith, alleging that Appellees misrepresented the inventory of the equipment of Mom's, among other things. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that the sale of Mom's was between Appellants and Meisinger Investments and that Appellants had not made any allegations that would justify piercing the corporate veil to hold Richard personally responsible. The district court dismissed Appellants' complaint, finding that the complaint was insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding (1) the district court improperly converted Appellees' motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment; (2) the district court correctly found that Appellants failed to present any allegations that would put Appellees on notice that Appellants were seeking to pierce the corporate veil in an attempt to hold Richard personally liable for the claims against Meisinger Investments; and (3) Appellants did present a proper claim against Meisinger Investments. View "Ridgerunner, LLC v. Meisinger" on Justia Law

While a lawsuit by Appellees David and Elizabeth Speaks was pending against Rosemary and Byron Baker for damages related to poor construction workmanship, the Bakers transferred two parcels of real property to their son, Nathan Baker. The case resulted in a judgment against Byron but a dismissal of the claims against Rosemary. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. Five days later, Nathan transferred the properties to a limited liability company (LLC) he and his family controlled. Appellees subsequently filed this case under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. While the case was pending, the LLC transferred the two pieces of property to trusts controlled by Rosemary Baker. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees permitting execution on the properties, finding that all of the conveyances were fraudulent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the district court correctly found the conveyances to be fraudulent; but (2) Appellees failed to make the required prima facie showing that the properties were subject to execution on a judgment against Byron Baker alone. View "Baker v. Speaks" on Justia Law

Appellant filed suit against a paragliding company and the company's employees, owners, and agents (collectively, Appellees) after he sustained injuries during a paragliding training clinic conducted by Appellees. At the time of the incident, Appellant was a member of the United States Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association (USHPA). Appellees filed a motion to dismiss, seeking to enforce a forum selection clause contained in an assumption of risk agreement that Appellant had signed as a condition of his membership with USHPA. Based upon the forum selection clause, Appellees contended that California was the appropriate forum for the litigation. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the forum selection clause contained in the agreement between Appellant and USHPA was not enforceable as between the parties to the present litigation, as Appellees were not parties to that contract and did not consent in advance to the jurisdiction of the California courts. Remanded. View "Venard v. Jackson Hole Paragliding, LLC" on Justia Law