Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Petitioners and Respondents executed a land contract whereby Respondents agreed to sell a piece of property to Petitioners. After the land contract had been fully consummated, Respondents refused to tender a deed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed suit, seeking a delivery of a general warranty deed for the property, including all oil and gas rights. Two months later, Respondents tendered a deed to Petitioners reserving oil and gas rights. The deed was recorded on February 17, 2010. Petitioners moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the land contract did not contained any language indicating Respondents' intention to except oil and gas rights, any questions of interpretation should be resolved in favor of the grantees. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, finding that when the deed was recorded, the land contract was merged in the deed and any cause of action based upon the contract was extinguished. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous, and Respondents failed to establish any legally sufficient basis for varying its terms; and (2) therefore, Respondents were obligated to convey their title and interest to the property, including their vested oil and gas rights. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Petitioners. View "Spitznogle v. Durbin" on Justia Law

Gerald Kirchner accidentally shot and killed Robbie Bragg while both men were working for Grimmett Enterprises (Grimmett). Kirchner's mother, Barbara Surbaugh, filed a complaint against Bragg and Grimmett. The parties settled, after which Defendants assigned all claims they might have against their respective insurers for refusing to provide a defense and coverage. Thereafter, Surbaugh filed a declaratory judgment action against Grimmett's insurer, American States. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. At issue was whether an employee exclusion in the policy was ambiguous and whether the exclusion had been brought to the attention of Grimmett. The circuit court denied the motions. After a jury trial, the circuit court concluded that the employee policy exclusion was unenforceable because the exclusionary language had not been brought to the attention of Grimmett. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of American States, as American States established at the summary judgment stage that no material issue of fact was in dispute as to the exclusion being unambiguous and disclosed to Grimmett. Therefore, the exclusion was enforceable. View "Am. States Ins. Co. v. Surbaugh" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a car owner and the purchaser of that car, filed suit against Advance Stores, which supplied a car battery to the original owner. The battery died shortly after the second owner purchased the car, and Advance Stores refused to provide a free replacement under the limited warranty. After the Supreme Court answered a certified question and remanded the case, the trial court allowed Plaintiffs to amend the complaint to add an additional cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (Act). Advance Stores moved to dismiss the third amended complaint. The trial court denied the motion in part and allowed the third amended complaint to go forward on new theories. Thereafter, Advance Stores filed this petition for a writ of prohibition, asserting that the circuit court ignored the mandate of the Supreme Court in McMahon I. The Supreme Court granted the writ and directed the circuit court to grant in full Advance Stores' motion to dismiss the third amended complaint, holding that in failing to present a claim under the Act in McMahon I, Plaintiffs were precluded from amending their complaint to assert the claim under the limited remand. View "State ex rel. Advance Stores Co. v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Quicken Loans, Inc., a Michigan corporation and a large national mortgage lender doing business in West Virginia, appealed an order of the circuit court denying post-trial motions for amendment of the circuit court's findings of fact and/or conclusions of law and for offset following a verdict which found it liable for common law fraud and various claims under the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act in connection with a subprime loan made to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court, holding (1) the elements of fraud were not met with regard to Quicken's misrepresentation of loan discount points, but the other acts of fraud were proven by clear and convincing evidence; (2) the circuit court correctly found that, given the particular facts of this case, the terms of the loan and the loan product were unconscionable; (3) the circuit court incorrectly cancelled Plaintiff's obligation to repay the loan principal; and (4) because the circuit court's order in punitive damages lacked the necessary analysis and findings, the Court was unable to conduct an adequate review of the punitive damages award. Remanded. View "Quicken Loans, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured when their vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by Ida Trayter. Trayter's insurer tendered its liability limits, after which Plaintiffs sought underinsured motorist coverage from their insurer, State Farm. State Farm advised Plaintiffs that its settlement offer would be based on the "net" value of the claim after reduction of the liability limits and medical payments already received by Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed suit against State Farm seeking a declaratory judgment that a non-duplication provision and reimbursement provision in State Farm's underinsured motorist policy violated W. Va. Code 33-6-31(b). The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Plaintiffs, finding both provisions at issue violated the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a non-duplication of benefits provision in an underinsured motorist policy, which permits an insurer to reduce an insured's damages by amounts received under medical payments coverage, does not violate the "no sums payable" language of section 33-6-31(b), and the circuit court erred in holding otherwise; and (2) the circuit court's consideration of and entry of summary judgment on the reimbursement provision was erroneous because the provision was not ripe for adjudication in this matter. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Schatken" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with Stephen Stanton. At the time, Plaintiff was operating a vehicle owned by his employer, Bambardier Aerospace Corporation, and Stanton was driving a vehicle owned by his employer, the City of Elkins. Plaintiff and his wife filed an action against the City and Stanton to recover for injuries. Plaintiffs' personal automobile insurer, Westfield Insurance, filed a crossclaim against the City and Stanton and a third party claim against Bombardier and National Union Fire Insurance. The trial court entered an order finding (1) the City, Stanton, and National were immune from liability; (2) Bombardier and Westfield were subject to a payment of damages of not more than $20,000 each; and (3) Plaintiffs were not entitled to auto medical coverage under the policy covering Bombardier and the policy issued by Westfield. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the circuit court's order to the extent it held the uninsured motorist policies for Bombardier and Westfield were not enforceable above the mandatory limits of uninsured motorist coverage required by W. Va. Code 33-6-31; (2) reversed the court's order to the extent it denied Plaintiffs auto medical payment benefits under Bombardier's policy; and (3) affirmed the remainder of the court's judgment. View "Jenkins v. City of Elkins" on Justia Law

This case was before the Supreme Court upon the appeal of Petitioner from an order of the circuit court granting Respondents' motion for summary judgment and dismissing Petitioner's lawsuit. The court ruled that arbitration clauses in Petitioner's investment contracts were not unconscionable and enforceable. Petitioner alleged the circuit court erred in (1) requiring him to prove the arbitration clauses in the paries' agreements were independently enforceable under federal law rather than applying West Virginia law and finding those agreements unenforceable; (2) failing to find the agreements' arbitration clauses independently unenforceable; (3) refusing to find one respondent's deposition testimony an unresponsive and evasive effort to deprive Petitioner of any opportunity to conduct meaningful discovery; and (4) failing to enforce a respondent's offer to repay Petitioner. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court's order lacked the findings of fact and conclusions of law necessary for the Supreme Court to conduct a meaningful appellate review. View "Grayiel v. Appalachian Energy Partners 2001-D, LLP" on Justia Law

The United States court of appeals certified a question to the West Virginia Supreme Court that concerned two areas of state law: the law of contract formation and the doctrine of unconscionability. The question from the court of appeals arose from a contract that contained an arbitration provision requiring one party to the contract to arbitrate all of their claims but allowed the other party to file a lawsuit for some of its claims. A federal district court previously determined that the arbitration provision was not enforceable because it lacked mutuality of obligation and mutuality of consideration. The Supreme Court concluded (1) West Virginia's law of contract formation only required that a contract as a whole be supported by adequate consideration, and hence, a single clause within a multi-clause contract does not require separate consideration when the contract as a whole is supported by adequate consideration; but (2) under the doctrine of unconscionability, a trial court may decline to enforce a contract clause, such as an arbitration provision, if the obligations or rights created by the clause unfairly lack mutuality. View "Dan Ryan Builders, Inc. v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Petitioner, New Hampshire Insurance Company, appealed an order of the circuit court granting partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent, RRK, Inc., finding that pursuant to the commercial marine property insurance policy issued by New Hampshire, RRK's barge and the barge's contents were covered property under the policy and that a wear-and-tear exclusion in the policy was invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court correctly found that there was no question of fact regarding whether a renewal policy was mailed to and received by RRK; but (2) the circuit court erred by granting partial summary judgment in favor of RRK because there was a question of fact as to whether, under the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the wear-and-tear exclusion present in the policy mailed to RRK was part of the insurance contract. Remanded. View "N.H. Ins. v. RRK., Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the sale of a residence. The buyers, the plaintiffs below, sought compensatory and punitive damages from the sellers regarding water leakage in a basement storage room of the residence the buyers purchased. The leak was disclosed to the buyers after the signing of a purchase agreement and before the closing of the sale. In the complaint, the buyers also asked the circuit court to direct the sellers to proceed with the closing and deliver a deed to the buyers containing covenants of general warranty as specified in the purchase agreement. In granting partial summary judgment to the sellers, the circuit court concluded that the buyers' claims were without merit because they were on notice of the water leak prior to the closing of the sale. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the sellers were not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law based on the purchase agreement; (2) the refusal of the circuit court to allow discovery constituted reversible error; and (3) the circuit court erred in failing to direct the sellers to deliver a deed to the buyers setting forth the language required by the purchase agreement. View "Hinerman v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law