Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
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Carrington appealed the district court's judgment requiring them to pay plaintiff, the indirect purchaser and assignee of a limited prejudgment interest in defendants' fund, damages plus prejudgment interest for breach of the limited partnership agreement. Defendants principally contend that the district court erred in its interpretation of the agreement and should have granted summary judgment in their favor on the issue of liability. Defendants argue that, in any event, permitting plaintiff to withdraw from the fund would have precipitated a sale of fund assets at distressed prices, making it impossible for plaintiff to receive more than a minuscule distribution, if any. The court rejected defendants' challenges to the district court's ruling on the issue of liability. However, the court concluded that there were factual issues to be tried as to the calculation of damages. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Umbach v. Carrington Investment Partners (US)" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs appealed the district court's conclusion that defendant, a licensed bail bond agent, was entitled to retain the bond premium in this case even though bail was denied. The court certified to the Court of Appeals of the State of New York the following question: Whether an entity engaged in the “bail business,” as defined in NYIL 6801(a)(1), may retain its “premium or compensation,” as described in NYIL 6804(a), where a bond posted pursuant to NYCPL 520.20 is denied at a bail-sufficiency hearing conducted pursuant to NYCPL 520.30, and the criminal defendant that is the subject of the bond is never admitted to bail. View "Gevorkyan v. Judelson" on Justia Law

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Process America filed suit against Cynergy for breach of contract and Cynergy counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, that Process America improperly solicited its customers. The district court held that although both parties had breached the contract, Cynergy’s liability was capped by the contract. The district court awarded Cynergy a net total of $8,521,182 in damages. The court concluded that the solicitation of merchants, and transfer of a portion of the Portfolio to a third party, violate the Independent Sales Organization (ISO) Agreement which permits transfer only pursuant to Section 2.6.B of the ISO Agreement, such that Cynergy is entitled to damages based on the increased rate of attrition of merchant accounts in the Portfolio; the court rejected Process America's argument that, even if the solicitation of merchants would ordinarily be a breach of the non‐solicitation clause, it is excused from performing its obligations under that provision as a result of Cynergy’s failure to pay Process America residuals; the court agreed with the district court's finding that the plain language of Section 4.6 limits damages for Cynergy’s breach of contract to $300,818; the court affirmed the district court’s damages calculation to the extent that it attributes 100% of the increased attrition to Process America; but the court agreed with Process America's contention that the damages calculation was erroneous because it improperly included residuals that would have been paid to Process America. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s interim decisions regarding Process America’s liability. The court vacated the district court's calculation of damages and remanded for further proceedings. View "Process America v. Cynergy Holdings" on Justia Law

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The principal issue in this appeal is whether the district court correctly determined the measure of compensation due to Noteholders, represented by BNY Melon, arising from the underpayment to the Noteholders by Chesapeake in connection with Chesapeake's early redemption of the Notes. The court concluded, substantially for the reasons set forth in the district court's thorough opinion, that the district court correctly determined the measure of compensation due to the Noteholders in the circumstances presented. In this case, applying New York law, Section 1.7 of the Supplemental Indenture - a contract Chesapeake does not contend was invalid or unenforceable - dictates the Noteholders’ recovery arising from Chesapeake’s underpayment for its May 13, 2013 redemption. Because Chesapeake completed its redemption on May 13, 2013, it owed the Noteholders the Make‐Whole Price for that redemption, pursuant to Section 1.7(c), and it breached the Supplemental Indenture by paying only the At‐Par Price. The court agreed with the district court that the correct damages award was the difference between the At‐Par Price and the Make‐Whole Price, plus prejudgment interest. To hold otherwise would frustrate the Noteholders’ legitimate expectations regarding their rights under the Supplemental Indenture. Furthermore, Chesapeake was similarly on notice at all relevant times that the district court could require it to pay the Make‐Whole Price for its May 13, 2013 redemption. Finally, the court rejected Chesapeake’s contention that, even if the district court properly awarded breach‐of‐contract damages, it erred by awarding compensation that allowed the Noteholders to recoup in excess of the value of the Notes before the redemption. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Chesapeake Energy v. Bank of New York Mellon Trust" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of participating in a racketeering enterprise and conspiracy, and a narcotics conspiracy. Defendant was also convicted of two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime: one for possession of a firearm in furtherance of the racketeering enterprise and conspiracy and the other for possession of a firearm in furtherance of the narcotics conspiracy. Defendant appealed. The court held in United States v. Anglin, that the existence of a second or subsequent 18 U.S.C. 924(c) conviction is a sentencing factor that need not be determined by a jury. Alleyne v. United States has not altered the court's holding in Anglin. In this case, the court concluded that, given the evidence that defendant possessed multiple firearms on separate occasions, there was an ample basis for the jury to convict him of two separate violations of section 924(c); that there was no jury instruction clarifying that the firearms subject of each section 924(c) charge must have been possessed on separate occasions does not amount to plain error; and it was not plain error for the district court to find implicitly at sentencing that the two section 924(c) convictions were based on separate conduct, thereby subjecting defendant to mandatory minimum, consecutive sentences based on a “second or subsequent” section 924(c) conviction. The court considered defendant's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Boykin" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, citizens of the United States and Haiti, filed suit against the UN, asserting various causes of action sounding in tort and contract, seeking to hold defendants responsible for injuries directly resulting from the cholera epidemic in the Republic of Haiti in 2010. Principally at issue on appeal is whether the UN’s fulfillment of its obligation under Section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations (CPIUN), Apr. 29, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 1418, to “make provisions for appropriate modes of settlement of . . . disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of a private law character to which the [UN] is a party,” as well as “disputes involving any official of the [UN] who by reason of his official position enjoys immunity, if immunity has not been waived by the Secretary‐General,” is a condition precedent to its immunity under Section 2 of the CPIUN, which provides that the UN “shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity.” The court held that the UN’s fulfillment of its Section 29 obligation is not a condition precedent to its Section 2 immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal against named defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Georges v. United Nations" on Justia Law

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Mago appealed from an order in which judgment was entered in favor of LHB after resolution of cross‐motions for summary judgment. Principally at issue is whether Mago complied with terms of a standby letter of credit issued by LHB - specifically whether the submission of unsigned copies of bills of lading complied with the letter’s requirement that Mago provide a photocopy of a bill of lading evidencing shipment of the goods to the applicant. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the unsigned copies did not evidence shipment and thus Mago did not strictly comply. The court considered Mago's remaining arguments and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Mago Int’l, LLC v. LHB AG" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs owned two convertible notes issued by SBAC. After converting the notes into equity and/or cash, plaintiffs filed a breach of contract claim, alleging that SBAC failed to pay the interest owed on the underlying notes following the conversion. Plaintiffs assert two identical causes of action: a breach of contract claim for each set of notes. The district court dismissed the claim with prejudice, holding that there was no reasonable interpretation of the underlying contract that entitled plaintiffs to both the benefits of the conversion and the final interest payment. The court held that SBAC’s refusal to pay plaintiffs the final interest payment did not constitute a failure to perform under the indentures. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Orchard Hill Master Fund v. SBAC Corp." on Justia Law

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This case concerns a lease and a purported joint venture agreement entered into between defendant and his now-deceased father, the former president and majority shareholder of a real estate development corporation. The lease granted defendant control over a multi-million-dollar property for a period of 20 years in exchange for a payment of $20. AHC sought damages for defendant's use and occupancy of the property and a judgment declaring the lease and joint venture agreement void. Defendant counterclaimed. The district court granted AHC’s motion for partial summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claims and denied defendant's requests for additional discovery. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's FRCP 56(d) motion seeking more discovery materials where none of the items defendant specifically requested is germane to the issues before the court; the court applied Pennsylvania law to its analysis of the joint‐venture dispute and New York law to the lease dispute; and the district court correctly concluded that the business judgment rule should not apply to the lease and thus the lease was void as a gift or act of corporate waste. As to the joint venture agreement, the court declined to certify the issue of parol evidence to the state court. The court concluded that the parol evidence rule applies in this case and that the integration clause in the lease retains its preclusive effect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Alphonse Hotel Corp. v. Tran" on Justia Law

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BNY appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Morgan Stanley, arguing that the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that Morgan Stanley was not contractually obliged to repurchase a mortgage loan allegedly issued in breach of a contract representation because (1) the Trustee’s duty to give “notice to cure” within three business days of becoming aware of a material breach was a condition precedent to the seller’s repurchase obligation, and (2) that condition was not performed within the specified three days, but two to four weeks later. The court concluded that the contract at issue did not require notice to cure as a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley remedying breach where the phrase “notice to cure” does not appear in the contract. In this case, the contract contains distinct provisions for giving notice of breach and making request for cure, neither of which is cast in the express language of condition. Therefore, the request for cure is not a condition precedent to Morgan Stanley’s remedy obligations, and the timeliness of a request for cure, as well as of a notice of breach, is properly construed as a promise and reviewed for substantial performance. The court also concluded that the notice of breach and request for cure in this case cannot be held untimely as a matter of law, particularly when reviewed for substantial performance. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York Mellon Trust v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage" on Justia Law