Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Capson filed suit against MMIC seeking a declaration that MMIC was the primary professional liability insurer for Karl J. Hasik, M.D., and that Capson was the excess insurer. MMIC counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against Dr. Hasik and others, seeking rescission of its insurance policy or, in the alternative, a declaration that MMIC had no obligation to defend or indemnify Dr. Hasik for two medical negligence cases that had been filed against him. The district court granted MMIC’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Dr. Hasik’s and the hospital’s nondisclosure of the Wilson lawsuit (a medical malpractice suit filed by a patient against Dr. Hasik) was the equivalent of a false assertion. Therefore, the court held that the elements of equitable rescission were satisfied in this case. Dr. Hasik’s and the hospital’s nondisclosure of the Wilson lawsuit was the equivalent of a material representation that was false. MMIC was entitled to rescind the prior-acts coverage it had agreed to provide. The court further held that Iowa law does not preclude a judgment of rescission in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Capson Physicians Ins. Co. v. MMIC Ins. Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Nucor after sustaining injuries while working at Nucor's steel mill. The district court granted summary judgment to Nucor, finding that the third-party waiver's (TPW) language and the circumstances of its execution met the standard for enforcement of exculpatory contracts under Arkansas law and that the agreement was not unconscionable. The court agreed with the district court that the TPW was enforceable where the parties stipulated that plaintiff had the opportunity to read the TPW, that he did not ask the trainer any questions concerning the meaning of the TPW, and that he had the ability to read and understand the contract. The court also concluded that the contract provision at issue is not unconscionable where there is no evidence rebutting Nucor's affidavit showing the availability of other work in the region at that time, plaintiff had the opportunity to read and understand the TPW, and there is no evidence of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or any other inequitable conduct on the part of Vesuvius or Nucor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Stewart, Jr. v. Nucor Corp." on Justia Law

After Ozark was sold to Mobilex, Mobilex filed suit against defendant to enforce the non-compete and confidentiality agreements defendants had signed with Ozark. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the basis that a personal services contract cannot be assigned to a subsequent employer under Missouri law without the employee’s contemporaneous consent. The court adopted the majority rule and held that covenants not to compete can be assigned to a successor employer without contemporaneous consent. In this case, the non-compete agreements precluded only working in the field of medical diagnostics or soliciting business from certain clients within a specified geographical area. A reasonable jury, looking at the facts in the record, could find that defendants did not agree to the non-compete and confidentiality agreements because of Ozark’s unique characteristics. Because the court found that the non-compete and confidentiality agreements at issue here were not personal services contracts and could be assigned without the consent of defendants, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Symphony Diagnostic Serv. v. Greenbaum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking interest and attorney's fees after General American notified plaintiff that the treasury warrant in the amount of his annuity transfer had never cleared. General American reversed the transaction. The court found that, under the terms of plaintiff's annuity, General American promised to make periodic payments to plaintiff at agreed upon dates; plaintiff does not allege that General American failed to make payments or otherwise failed to fulfill an obligation under the terms of the annuity; nor does this action arise from a declaratory judgment action or an effort by General American to cancel or lapse the policy. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff did not suffer a “loss” covered by Ark. Code Ann. Sections 23-79-208 and 23-79-209, and the district court was correct that neither a 12% penalty nor attorney’s fees are owing by American General under these sections. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in finding plaintiff was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 16-22-308. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney’s fees in this case. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cooper v. General American Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

CCDC filed suit against Affinity to enforce a memorandum of understanding that was signed after a mediation. The district court concluded that no contract existed as a matter of law and granted summary judgment for Affinity. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of fact concerning whether board approval is a condition precedent that must be satisfied before the parties can enforce the memorandum of understanding. Whether board approval is a condition precedent thus cannot be resolved as a matter of law, and the case must be remanded for further proceedings. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Clarke Cnty. Dev. Corp. v. Affinity Gaming" on Justia Law

In this contract dispute between the parties, the district court granted summary judgment for GC Services, concluding that Addendum A unambiguously provided that the 2014 Agreement was not a “renewal” of the 2011 Agreement. Here, the term “renewals” was defined in Addendum A. Addendum A - drafted by Gateway - provided that the period in which Gateway would be entitled to receive commissions would be defined in the future “awarded contract,” a contract to which Gateway would not be a party. The court found that this may not have been a wise provision, from Gateway’s perspective, but it is not ambiguous. Because the court agreed with the district court that the relevant contract provisions are not ambiguous, the court may not consider extrinsic evidence, nor does the doctrine of contra proferentum apply. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gateway Customer Solutions v. GC Services L.P." on Justia Law

Following a jury verdict in favor of Lincoln, in this case involving a contract dispute between the parties, Firetrace appealed the denial of its motion for a new trial or remittitur under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. The court concluded that Firetrace made its intent clear by filing its Amended Statement of Issues and Amended Designation of the Record on Appeal and that Lincoln will not be prejudiced. On the merits, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Firetrace’s motion for a new trial because there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Firetrace’s limited repair or replace remedy failed of its essential purpose; the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Firetrace’s motion for a new trial because it found there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Firetrace was on notice that Lincoln’s terms and conditions existed and that Lincoln intended those terms and conditions to be binding on Firetrace; the court rejected Firetrace's claim that it was entitled to a new trial based on several errors regarding jury instructions; and the district court did not err by declining to grant Firetrace's motion for a remittitur or new trial on damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Lincoln Composites, Inc. v. Firetrace USA, LLC" on Justia Law

Gosiger filed suit seeking damages for the diminished value of an aircraft that Elliott damaged. The district court granted summary judgment to Elliott. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the contract did not allow diminution-in-value damages where Gosiger and Elliott never mutually agreed to modify the Specification Agreement to allow for diminution-in-value damages. View "Gosiger, Inc. v. Elliott Aviation, Inc." on Justia Law

FMS and Comco entered into a Management Agreement obligating Comco to broadly indemnify FMS as well as reimburse FMS for reasonable costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees. After Comco refused to indemnify FMS in the underlying lawsuit (the Brill litigation), FMS filed suit for reimbursement of attorneys' fees and other expenses. The court concluded that the district court correctly interpreted the indemnity provision as covering the Brill–FMS Litigation where the record does not support a finding that FMS committed any of the misconduct alleged by Brill. Even under a strict construction of the agreement, the court's decision in Harleysville Ins. Co. v. Physical Distribution Servs., Inc. forecloses Comco's argument where Harleysville held that a broad indemnity provision gave the indemnitor clear notice of an obligation to indemnify the indemnitee for future personal injury claims arising from the indemnitee's negligence. The court also concluded that the district court correctly limited FMS's recovery from Comco to the $87,350 FMS paid out of pocket. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Feed Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. Comco Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Bellingham filed a beach of contract claim against BancInsure after BancInsure denied coverage for loss that BancInsure claimed was not caused by employee-caused loss exclusions, exclusions for theft of confidential information,nor exclusions for mechanical breakdown or deterioration of a computer system. The district court granted summary judgment to Bellingham. The court concluded that no Minnesota case precludes application of the concurrent-causation doctrine to financial institution bonds. The court found that Minnesota courts would adhere to the general rule of treating financial institution bonds as insurance polices and interpreting those bonds in accordance with the principles of insurance law. Furthermore, the court rejected BancInsure’s argument that the Bond imposes a higher standard-of-proof than the concurrent-causation doctrine. Bellingham still had to show that its loss was directly caused by the fraudulent transfer, and the application of the concurrent-causation doctrine did not interfere with that requirement. The court also rejected BancInsure’s argument that the parties successfully drafted around the concurrent-causation doctrine in the Bond. As a matter of law, the Bond’s reference to “indirectly” is not a sufficient invocation of the “anti-concurrent causation” provision, and thus the Bond at issue in this matter does not contain such a provision. Finally, the court agreed with the district court's conclusion that the efficient and proximate cause of the loss was the illegal transfer of the money and not the employees' violations of policies and procedures. In this case, the overriding cause of the loss Bellingham suffered remains the criminal activity of a third party. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "State Bank of Bellingham v. BancInsure, Inc." on Justia Law