Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, individually and purportedly on behalf of others similarly situated, filed suit against GameStop for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, money had and received, and violation of Minnesota’s Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), Minn. Stat. 325F.68, et seq. Plaintiff alleged that GameStop's disclosure of personally identifiable information (PII) to a third party (Facebook) violated an express agreement not to do so. The district court granted GameStop's motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's lack of standing. The court concluded that plaintiff provided sufficient facts alleging that he is party to a binding contract with GameStop, and GameStop does not dispute this contractual relationship; GameStop has violated that policy; and plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of GameStop's breach. The court also concluded that plaintiff has standing to bring his breach-of-contract claim and to bring his other claims. The court concluded, however, that the privacy policy unambiguously does not include those pieces of information among the protected PII. Therefore, the protection plaintiff argues GameStop failed to provide was not among the protections for which he bargained by agreeing to the terms of service, and GameStop thus could not have breached its contract with plaintiff. Plaintiff's Minnesota CFA claims fail for similar reasons. Finally, plaintiff has not alleged a claim for unjust enrichment or the related claim of money had and received. View "Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Principia, alleging claims arising from events that occurred during plaintiff's time as a student at Principia. The district court granted Principia's motion to dismiss. The court held that plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract because none of the policies and provisions that she identifies in her Third Amended Complaint create obligations that Principia owed to plaintiff; the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claim where the allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint detail, at most, insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities to which liability for IIED clearly does not extend; and the district court properly dismissed the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim (NIED) where, under Missouri law, plaintiff failed to allege that her emotional distress or mental injury is medically diagnosable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Gillis v. The Principia Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was insured under a group long-term disability policy the county obtained from Hartford. After Hartford denied plaintiff's claim for disability benefits, she filed suit in Minnesota state court for breach of contract. Hartford timely removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction. The district court then granted Hartford summary judgment. Under the plain meaning of the statute, the court concluded that plaintiff's suit was time-barred. The court also concluded that the legislative distinction between individual and group policies does not violate the principles of equal protection under the United States and Minnesota constitutions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's suit was untimely. View "Walker v. Hartford Life and Accident Ins." on Justia Law

After plaintiff attempted to unilaterally rescind his resignation and resume his teaching role, and the District refused to reinstate him, plaintiff filed suit for breach of his employment contract. The district court granted summary judgment for the District. The court rejected plaintiff's duress claim, concluding that no evidence supports the allegation that the District made an unlawful threat. Even if plaintiff could demonstrate that the District unlawfully threatened him, the threat was cured by applying the factors set forth in St. Louis Park Inv. Co. v. R.L. Johnson Inv. Co. In the absence of duress, plaintiff's resignation was valid when accepted. Plaintiff's attempted rescission of that resignation merely constitutes an offer and requires that the District provide its consent. In this case, the district did not provide consent, and plaintiff cannot unilaterally rescind his resignation. Finally, the court concluded that there is no evidence that the District made material misrepresentations to plaintiff. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Olmsted v. Saint Paul Pub. Sch." on Justia Law

Barkley filed suit against Gabriel Brothers, alleging breach of a master services agreement. In the alternative, Barkley alleged that Gabriel Brothers breached a subsequent agreement to pay "actual costs" and Gabriel Brothers was unjustly enriched. The court concluded that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Gabriel Brothers on Barkley’s breach-of-the-agreement claim because the alleged February 21, 2013, draft 2013 statement of work was not part of a written contract and the document did not contain the agreement’s incorporation clause. The court also concluded that Barkley’s damages claim was liquidated and that the district court should have awarded prejudgment interest; assuming that the district court’s statement constituted a sua sponte summary judgment on the actual-costs contract claim, the court concluded that Gabriel Brothers was given adequate notice and that the district court therefore did not err in granting partial summary judgment in Barkley's favor on that claim; the court rejected Gabriel Brothers's evidentiary challenges; the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Gabriel Brothers's motion for judgment as a matter of law where a reasonable jury could find from the evidence that the parties had formed a contract for Gabriel Brothers to pay Barkley's actual costs; a jury could reasonably find that Barkley was entitled to $138,223.52; and, in regard to attorney's fees, the court agreed with the district court that neither party was the prevailing party. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of an award of prejudgment interest. View "Barkley, Inc. v. Gabriel Brothers, Inc." on Justia Law

Capson filed suit against MMIC seeking a declaration that MMIC was the primary professional liability insurer for Karl J. Hasik, M.D., and that Capson was the excess insurer. MMIC counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against Dr. Hasik and others, seeking rescission of its insurance policy or, in the alternative, a declaration that MMIC had no obligation to defend or indemnify Dr. Hasik for two medical negligence cases that had been filed against him. The district court granted MMIC’s motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that Dr. Hasik’s and the hospital’s nondisclosure of the Wilson lawsuit (a medical malpractice suit filed by a patient against Dr. Hasik) was the equivalent of a false assertion. Therefore, the court held that the elements of equitable rescission were satisfied in this case. Dr. Hasik’s and the hospital’s nondisclosure of the Wilson lawsuit was the equivalent of a material representation that was false. MMIC was entitled to rescind the prior-acts coverage it had agreed to provide. The court further held that Iowa law does not preclude a judgment of rescission in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and dismissed the cross-appeal as moot. View "Capson Physicians Ins. Co. v. MMIC Ins. Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence action against Nucor after sustaining injuries while working at Nucor's steel mill. The district court granted summary judgment to Nucor, finding that the third-party waiver's (TPW) language and the circumstances of its execution met the standard for enforcement of exculpatory contracts under Arkansas law and that the agreement was not unconscionable. The court agreed with the district court that the TPW was enforceable where the parties stipulated that plaintiff had the opportunity to read the TPW, that he did not ask the trainer any questions concerning the meaning of the TPW, and that he had the ability to read and understand the contract. The court also concluded that the contract provision at issue is not unconscionable where there is no evidence rebutting Nucor's affidavit showing the availability of other work in the region at that time, plaintiff had the opportunity to read and understand the TPW, and there is no evidence of fraud, duress, misrepresentation, or any other inequitable conduct on the part of Vesuvius or Nucor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Stewart, Jr. v. Nucor Corp." on Justia Law

After Ozark was sold to Mobilex, Mobilex filed suit against defendant to enforce the non-compete and confidentiality agreements defendants had signed with Ozark. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the basis that a personal services contract cannot be assigned to a subsequent employer under Missouri law without the employee’s contemporaneous consent. The court adopted the majority rule and held that covenants not to compete can be assigned to a successor employer without contemporaneous consent. In this case, the non-compete agreements precluded only working in the field of medical diagnostics or soliciting business from certain clients within a specified geographical area. A reasonable jury, looking at the facts in the record, could find that defendants did not agree to the non-compete and confidentiality agreements because of Ozark’s unique characteristics. Because the court found that the non-compete and confidentiality agreements at issue here were not personal services contracts and could be assigned without the consent of defendants, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Symphony Diagnostic Serv. v. Greenbaum" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit seeking interest and attorney's fees after General American notified plaintiff that the treasury warrant in the amount of his annuity transfer had never cleared. General American reversed the transaction. The court found that, under the terms of plaintiff's annuity, General American promised to make periodic payments to plaintiff at agreed upon dates; plaintiff does not allege that General American failed to make payments or otherwise failed to fulfill an obligation under the terms of the annuity; nor does this action arise from a declaratory judgment action or an effort by General American to cancel or lapse the policy. Accordingly, the court concluded that plaintiff did not suffer a “loss” covered by Ark. Code Ann. Sections 23-79-208 and 23-79-209, and the district court was correct that neither a 12% penalty nor attorney’s fees are owing by American General under these sections. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in finding plaintiff was not entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under section 16-22-308. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney’s fees in this case. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Cooper v. General American Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

CCDC filed suit against Affinity to enforce a memorandum of understanding that was signed after a mediation. The district court concluded that no contract existed as a matter of law and granted summary judgment for Affinity. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of fact concerning whether board approval is a condition precedent that must be satisfied before the parties can enforce the memorandum of understanding. Whether board approval is a condition precedent thus cannot be resolved as a matter of law, and the case must be remanded for further proceedings. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded. View "Clarke Cnty. Dev. Corp. v. Affinity Gaming" on Justia Law