Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a dispute between Ghana and Balkan Energy Company where Balkan contracted with Ghana to refurbish and recommission a 125 megawatt power barge. Ghana filed an application for discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1782, seeking documents exchanged in a separate lawsuit between the current defendants. The district court granted Ghana's application and ordered the Missouri companies (collectively ProEnergy) to produce documents. ProEnergy produced some documents and discovery materials from its lawsuit with Balkan, but it refused other documents related to the settlement of that lawsuit. Because ProEnergy had already produced most of the documents, depositions, and interrogatory answers from its lawsuit with Balkan, and because ProEnergy was not party to the foreign litigation, the court was not persuaded that any fundamental unfairness was caused by the district court declining to compel production of the settlement documents. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision.

Mortenson brought this action to compel arbitration with Saunders concerning a dispute arising out of a wind turbine project. The district court granted the motion and Saunders appealed. The court affirmed, concluding that section 21.2 of the subcontract between the parties was a separate provision containing a specific agreement to arbitrate and was not unconscionable.

Debtor appealed an order of the Bankruptcy Court directing that a third party receive a portion of a check made payable jointly to the third party and debtor for rent of debtor's property. At issue was whether the third party had a right to funds for rent of debtor's property when the rent check was made payable jointly to debtor and the third party. The court held that the third party had an interest in the funds by virtue of a contract between the parties and, therefore, the third party was entitled to the portions of the funds that the bankruptcy court required debtor to remit to him.

Plaintiffs sought to establish a nationwide class of thousands of borrowers who allegedly paid inflated appraisal fees in connection with real estate transactions financed by Wells Fargo. Plaintiffs subsequently appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims contending that the appraisal practice of Wells Fargo and Rels unjustly enriched Rels and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq.; the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq.; and Arizona's anti-racketeering statute (AZRAC), Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-2314.04. Because plaintiffs did not plausibly allege a concrete financial loss caused by a RICO violation, the district court did not err in concluding that they lacked standing under RICO and AZRAC. In regards to the UCL claims, the court agreed with the district court that the complaint did not allege "lost money or property" where plaintiffs admitted that Wells Fargo charged them market rates for appraisal services as disclosed on the settlement. The court also rejected plaintiffs' claims under RESPA Section 8(a) and (b), as well as plaintiffs' assertion that the district court erred in dismissing their claims with prejudice rather than sua sponte allowing them leave to amend the complaint for the third time.

This case arose when Alltel sued a former senior vice president in the Eastern District of Arkansas, alleging that the vice president breached the terms of a Separation Agreement by, inter alia, assisting the Oglala Sioux Tribe in a tribal court lawsuit to enjoin Alltel from a proposed sale of assets that provided telecommunications services on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. At issue was whether tribal immunity barred enforcement of the subpoenas at issue. The court agreed with the Tribe that a third-party subpoena in private civil litigation was a "suit" for purposes of the Tribe's common law sovereign immunity. As that immunity had not been waived or abrogated, the court reversed.

Lowell Burris and his wife commenced a product liability action against Menard, Versa, and Versa's affiliate in Minnesota state court. After Menard removed the action to federal court, which had diversity jurisdiction, Gulf commenced this action seeking a judgment declaring "that the policy issued by Gulf to [the named insureds] does not afford coverage to them or Menard, Inc. for any claim made by [Burris] under the terms of the Gulf Policy." The district court granted Gulf's motion for a summary declaratory judgment on the ground that Versa' dissolution after expiration of the policy meant that the insured "cannot meet its obligations under the SIR" (Self-Insured Retention endorsement), a material breach that terminated Gulf's obligations under the policy. Burris appealed. The court concluded that summary judgment for Gulf was factually unwarranted and the declaratory judgment action was dismissed with prejudice.

This case concerns the payment for architectural services provided by SHA to Ladco in conjunction with a large office building project. In its breach of contract claim, SHA contended that it was not paid for the services it completed under the project. The district court denied Ladco's motion for summary judgment and ultimately, the jury found in favor of SHA. Ladco subsequently appealed the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law and remanded the case for entry of judgment for SHA and against Ladco, but only for unpaid invoices, rather than the amount awarded by the jury. The court agreed with the district court that the parties' contract was ambiguous and there was no sufficient evidence as to who drafted the Statement of Intent. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give a contra preferentem instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Continental sold its food and beverage metal can and can-end technology to Crown via a stock purchase agreement (SPA) in March 1990. The parties disputed the extent of each other's resultant liabilities, as defined by the indemnity provision in the SPA in concurrent binding arbitration and judicial proceedings. Continental subsequently appealed the grant of summary judgment and the district court's denial of its motion to reconsider or alter or amend its judgment. The court found that Continental failed to meet its burden of proving it was not afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the meaning of the indemnity provision. Therefore, the district court correctly determined that Continental was precluded from further litigating the provision's meaning, properly granted summary judgment in favor of Crown, and did not abuse its discretion in denying Continental's motion to reconsider.

This declaratory judgment action was brought by Secura, an insurer for Horizon, a subcontractor on a troubled construction project. Horizon's two other insurers, State Auto and Federated later joined. Their dispute with Weitz arose out of a construction project in which Weitz was the general contractor for Metropolitan. After Weitz and Metropolitan brought breach of contract claims against each other, both filed third party complaints against Horizon for defective plumbing. Horizon's insurers defended and settled all claims against it and reimbursed Weitz for its defense of claims against Horizon. Weitz then contended that since it was an "additional insured" on Horizon's policies, the insurers should pay for attorney fees and costs it incurred in defending against Metropolitan's entire counterclaim. The insurers filed this action seeking a final judgment that they not be required to pay the attorney fees and costs. Applying Missouri law, the court rejected Weitz's argument that Metropolitan's counterclaim asserted potentially covered losses under the policies. Therefore, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurers because Metropolitan's counterclaim did not state an "occurrence" giving rise to a possibility of coverage under the policies.

MoBev appealed the district court's order denying its motion for partial summary judgment and granting Shelton's motion for summary judgment on MoBev's claims for violation of Missouri franchise law. Because the plain language of the Missouri franchise statue at issue unambiguously required that the general definition of "franchise" applied to liquor supplier-wholesaler relationships and the relationship between MoBev and Shelton did not satisfy this definition, the court affirmed the judgment.