Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The National Treasury Employees' Union (Union) sought review of an adverse ruling by the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority) where the Union filed a grievance alleging that the IRS was processing its members' dues revocation forms without following contractually-mandated procedures. After the parties filed exceptions to the arbitrator's award with the Authority, the Authority denied the parties' exceptions and confirmed the award in its entirety. The Union petitioned the court for review. The court held that because the Authority's decision upholding the arbitrator's award was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, the court had no warrant to disturb the Authority's decision.

A 1997 coal supply contract provided that "[a]ll disputes under" the agreement would be referred to arbitration in Charleston. The parties extended the 1997 Agreement until 2006, but disagree as to whether a series of emails effectuated extension through 2008. In July 2008, buyer and supplier signed a new contract with an increased price, providing for arbitration in Richmond and containing a merger clause. Buyer paid the higher price under protest, claiming that the 1997 agreement remained in effect and filed for arbitration in Charleston; supplier filed for arbitration in Richmond under the 2008 agreement. The Charleston panel found that the parties had extended the 1997 agreement and that the 2008 agreement was "a glaring breach" of the extension. The Richmond panel stayed proceedings. A Virginia district court dismissed supplier's suit. A West Virginia district court granted summary judgment for buyer. The Fourth Circuit upheld the West Virginia award under the Federal Arbitration Act 9 U.S.C. 10(a). The issue of which panel should decide the validity of the 2008 agreement was procedural, not jurisdiction, and did not require a decision in court. The Charleston panel based its jurisdiction on a plausible reading of the 1997 agreement.

Appellants appealed an order revoking their pro hac vice admissions in connection with a putative class action suit where the suit alleged that appellants' clients breached supplemental cancer insurance policies that they had issued. At issue was whether the district court erred in revoking appellants' pro hac vice status where the revocation was based on motions appellants filed in response to plaintiffs' request for class certification, chiefly a motion to recuse the district judge based on his comments during an earlier hearing. The court vacated the revocation order and held that, even though the recusal motion had little merit, the district court erred in revoking appellants' pro hac vice admissions where it did not afford them even rudimentary process.

Plaintiffs, a West Virginia coal sales company, sued Mountain State Carbon, LLC ("Mountain State")and its member companies, on of which was Severstal Wheeling, Inc. ("Severstal Wheeling") in federal district court alleging that Mountain State wrongfully refused to accept coal deliveries in breach of a coal supply agreement with plaintiffs. At issue was whether the district court erred by determining that Severstal Wheeling's principal place of business was in Wheeling, West Virginia for diversity jurisdiction purposes under Hertz Corp. v Friend. The court held that the district court erred by determining that Severstal Wheeling's principal place of business was in Wheeling, West Virginia where the touchstone for determining a corporation's principal place of business for diversity purposes was "the place where the corporation's high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation's activities." Therefore, Dearborn, Michigan was Severstal Wheeling's principal place of business where seven of its eight officers, including its chief executive officer, chief operating officer, and chief financial officer, set corporate policies and oversaw significant corporate decisions out of Dearborn, Michigan.