Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, prospective luxury home buyers, alleged that Toll Brothers, a real estate development company, unlawfully refused to return deposits when plaintiffs could not obtain mortgage financing. The district court denied Toll Brothers' motion to dismiss or stay the suit pending arbitration, finding that the Agreement of Sale's arbitration provision lacked mutuality of consideration under Maryland law because it required only the buyer - but not the seller - to submit disputes to arbitration. The court held that the appeal was properly before it under 9 U.S.C. 16(a), and that the Agreement of Sale's arbitration provision was unenforceable for lack of mutual consideration under Maryland law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Noohi v. Toll Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

Carilion initiated an arbitration proceeding against UBS and Citi under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) Rule 12200, which required FINRA members to arbitrate disputes with a customer at the customer's request. UBS and Citi commenced this action to enjoin the arbitration proceedings, contending that Carilion was not a "customer" as that term was used in FINRA Rule 12200 and that, in any event, Carilion waived any right to arbitrate by agreeing to the forum selection clause contained in written agreements with UBS and Citi. The court concluded that Carilion, by purchasing UBS and Citi's services, was indeed a "customer" entitled to arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 and that the forum selection clause did not have the effect of superseding or waiving Carilion's right to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of UBS and Citi's motion for injunctive relief. View "UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and violation of the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court was persuaded that the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 24, 484(A), and federal regulations preempted the CLEC, and that plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract. The court held that the district court erred in deeming plaintiff's CLEC claim against Capital One preempted by federal law and regulations where Capital One was subject to the terms of the CLEC in loans it acquired through assignment. The court also held that a breach of contract claim had been adequately pleaded and therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the claim. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Decohen v. Capital One N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Juno under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA), 15 U.S.C. 1701, seeking rescission of their purchase agreement in a lot at Creighton Farms, claiming that Juno misrepresented its involvement with the Ritz-Carlton in regards to the Creighton Farms development. The court held, among other things, that plaintiffs established that they merit equitable rescission and that the district court properly determined that the equitable remedy was to return the property title to Juno and return the purchase price, plus interest, to plaintiffs. The court held, however, that the district court abused its discretion when it denied plaintiffs pre-judgment interest on the debt portion of their purchase funds. Therefore, the court reversed the district court and awarded plaintiffs prejudgment interest on the funds at issue at 7 percent. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's judgment granting Chase's motion to dismiss her putative class action claim brought pursuant to the Maryland Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions (CLEC), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-1001 et seq. The district court concluded that federal regulations preempted relevant portions of the CLEC and that the retail sales installment contract signed by plaintiff and Chase's predecessor in interest did not mandate that Chase comply with the CLEC. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that the CLEC was preempted by the National Bank Act (NBA), 12 U.S.C. 1 et seq., or the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulations. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's breach of contract claim and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, Jeremy Mayfield, a professional race car driver, appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint against NASCAR for conduct arising out of a positive drug test. Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, asserting claims for defamation, violation of North Carolina's disability statute, unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, and negligence, when one of the defendants, Brian France, held a press conference where he indicated that plaintiff had been suspended because he took a "performance enhancing" or "recreational" drug. The court found that the district court properly dismissed the case and there was no abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff's motions to reconsider and to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This appeal arose from a dispute between incumbent local exchange carriers that provide service in rural areas of North Carolina (RLECs) and commercial mobile radio service providers (CMRS Providers) in North Carolina. The CMRS Providers filed a complaint in the district court against the RLECs and the Commissioners of the NCUC in their official capacities, seeking review of several determinations made by the NCUC and, ultimately, the approval of portions of the interconnection agreements (ICA). The district court subsequently denied the CMRS Providers' motion for summary judgment and granted the RLECs' and the NCUC's motions for summary judgment. The district court also affirmed the NCUC's Filing of Composite Agreements (FAO) and approval order. Because the court ultimately agreed with the arguments advanced by the RLECs and the NCUC, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

BP appealed a district court order granting summary judgment in favor of Charles V. Stanley, Jr., and his business (defendants), in BP's action seeking to enforce a restrictive covenant in a deed. BP also appealed the district court's award of attorneys' fees and costs. The court held that the district court erred in finding the Petroleum Restriction (PR), in the Special Warranty Deed that was attached to the Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) at issue, was overbroad and unenforceable where the PR did not prohibit Stanley from operating a non-BP-branded vehicle repair business on his property so long as the business did not also sell non-BP-branded gasoline. The court also concluded that the PR's prohibition of the sale of certain enumerated items was too inconsequential to invalidate the entire PR. Therefore, the PR on the whole "afford[s] a fair protection" to BP's interest without being "so large as to interfere with the interests of the public." Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants, vacated the fee and cost award, remanding for further proceedings.

This case arose out of a contract entered into by Iraq's Ministry of Defense (IMOD) and Wye Oak for the refurbishment and disposal of Iraqi military equipment. At issue was whether, for purposes of analyzing subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1602-11, a foreign state and its armed forces were separate legal persons. The court concluded that, for jurisdictional purposes, they were not. Therefore, the court held that Wye Oak's claim against Iraq alleging breach of contract entered into by IMOD fell within the FSIA's commercial activities exception. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Iraq's motion to dismiss Wye Oak's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In this appeal, accounting firm Bryan Brothers sought coverage under a professional liability insurance policy issued by Continental Casualty Company for liability arising from illegal acts of a former Bryan Brother's employee. Under the policy, it was a condition precedent to coverage that no insured had knowledge, prior to the inception of the policy, of an act that was reasonably likely to become the basis for a claim. The court held that because Bryan Brothers had such knowledge, the claims at issue were not covered. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Continental Casualty Company.