Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was withdrawing money from an ATM when Tortfeasor struck her with his car. Tortfeasor was insured under a policy written by Insurer to a limit of $100,000 for bodily injury to one person. Plaintiff and several of her family members brought this action against Tortfeasor and his brother, the named insured on the policy, (collectively, Tortfeasor) and Insurer. The district court originally entered judgment ordering Insurer and Tortfeasor to pay one-and-a-half million dollars to Plaintiffs. Insurer paid into court $75,000, the remainder of its policy limit. The district court later amended its judgment, holding Tortfeasor and Insurer liable for six million dollars in damages. Plaintiffs then unsuccessfully sought to compel Insurer to pay postjudgment interest on the full judgment. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the deniial of Plaintiff's request for postjudgment interest, holding that Insurer was responsible for postjudgment interest from the date of entry of the original judgment and the date of the deposit of the policy limit. View "Vazquez-Filippetti v. Cooperativa de Seguros Multiples de P.R." on Justia Law

Doctor, a licensed podiatrist, was driving alone in her husband's vehicle when she was injured in a collision caused by an underinsured motorist. Doctor sought payment from Peerless Indemnity Insurance Co. and Peerless Insurance Co. (collectively, Peerless), who issued business owner's and excess/umbrella policies to Doctor's podiatric practice (Lake Region). Peerless sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court that it had no duty to pay for Doctor's injuries or damages. The district court granted summary judgment for Peerless. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Maine's uninsured/underinsured motorist statute did not apply to the Peerless policies issued to Lake Region, thus precluding Doctor's recovery from Peerless. View "Peerless Indem. Ins. Co. v. Frost " on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals comprised two putative class actions brought by skycaps affiliated with two major airlines. After Defendants, the airlines, each introduced a $2 per bag fee for curbside service for departing passengers at airports that did not inure to the benefit of the skycaps, Plaintiffs sued the airlines for unjust enrichment and tortious interference, among other claims. The district court dismissed the unjust enrichment and tortious interference claims as preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA). Plaintiffs appealed, contending that the ADA does not preempt common-law claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed after an analysis of statutory language, congressional intent, and case law, holding that the ADA preempted Plaintiffs' common-law claims. View "Brown v. United Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Pruco Life Insurance Company sought rescission of a life insurance policy, owned by the Paul E. L'Archevesque Special Revocable Trust on the life of Paul L'Archevesque, after it discovered that the policy application contained material misrepresentations about the health of Paul. Pruco tendered to Wilmington Trust Company, a co-trustee of the trust, a check in the amount of the policy premiums paid along with a letter stating Pruco was rescinding the policy. Wilmington cashed the check. Pruco subsequently filed a complaint seeking a rescission of the policy and a declaration that the policy was void ab initio. The district court granted summary judgment to Pruco, concluding that, under the circumstances, a mutual rescission had taken place as a matter of law. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the district court properly interpreted Rhode Island law regarding the standard for mutual rescission; (2) there were no genuine issues of material fact concerning whether Pruco made material misrepresentations in its rescission letter that could have prevented summary judgment; and (3) the district court did not err in finding that the issue of whether Pruco acted in bad faith was irrelevant to the rescission analysis. View "Pruco Life Ins. Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co." on Justia Law

In a prior suit, Appellees obtained a state court judgment against Appellant, Boston Property Exchange Transfer Company (BPE), for Defendant's financial misconduct. At the time of that judgment, BPE was about to begin arbitration of claims against PaineWebber, which it claimed was responsible for its financial troubles. Appellees successfully sought to compel assignment of BPE's legal claims to them to help satisfy their judgment against BPE. In this federal action, BPE claimed damages from the appellee assignees and their lawyers for allegedly mishandling the PaineWebber arbitration. The district court dismissed all of BPE's claims. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) summary judgment for Appellees was proper on BPE's tort claims because BPE failed to prove that Appellees cause it to suffer damages; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted for Appellees on their breach of contract claim, as the assignment order in this case was not a contract. View "Boston Prop. Exch. Transfer Co. v. Iantosca" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with Employer, ostensibly for his failure to properly investigate, document, and ameliorate the misconduct of an employee under his supervision. The termination occurred just months before Plaintiff was to receive a $60,000 bonus. Plaintiff filed an action against Employer to recover the bonus on the grounds that he was terminated without good cause. The U.S. district court granted summary judgment to Employer on Plaintiff's Massachusetts Wage Act claim and allowed Defendant's breach of contract claim to go to the jury. The jury found for Plaintiff. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (1) reversed the jury verdict, holding that whether Plaintiff was terminated without good cause and thus remained eligible for the bonus was a decision within the ambit of the sole and final decision-making authority of Employer's Employment Benefits Committee under the company's "Commitment to Success Bonus Plan"; and (2) affirmed the summary judgment order in Employer's favor, as Employer was under no obligation to pay the bonus. View "Weiss v. DHL Express, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved an insurance-coverage dispute governed by Massachusetts substantive law. Plaintiffs filed a claim with their insurance company after a storm caused a pile of soil to slide down a hill and into and over a retaining wall, damaging one of the buildings on Plaintiffs' property. The insurance company denied coverage. Plaintiffs sued for breach of the insurance contract and violation of the Massachusetts consumer-protection act. The insurance company counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that the policy did not cover the claimed loss. The magistrate judge granted the insurance company's motion for summary judgment, noting that the policy excluded damages from landslides. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the insurance company acted well within its rights in denying coverage, and the magistrate judge properly granted summary judgment for the insurance company on all claims. View "Stor/Gard, Inc. v. Strathmore Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In an attempt to avert the foreclosure of her home, Plaintiff sought to modify the terms of her mortgage pursuant to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), a federal initiative that incentivizes lenders and loan servicers to offer loan modifications to eligible homeowners. When Plaintiff's efforts did not result in a permanent loan modification, she sued Wells Fargo Bank and American Home Mortgage Servicing, alleging that their conduct during her attempts to modify her mortgage violated Massachusetts law. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeal (1) affirmed the district court's judgment as to the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims of breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress; and (2) vacated the dismissal of Plaintiff's other breach of contract claim, Plaintiff's unfair debt collection practices claim under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, and her derivative claim for equitable relief. Remanded. View "Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were five limited partnerships that owned multifamily housing rental projects in Maine. Plaintiffs entered into housing assistance payments (HAP) contracts with the Maine State Housing Authority (MaineHousing) in order to participate in the Section 8 program. The program is administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in conjunction with state and local public housing agencies. Landlords participating in the program receive partial rent from their tenants and the remainder of the rent from the relevant public housing agency, who is, in turn, reimbursed by HUD. Payments from state and local agencies to the Section 8 landlords are adjusted periodically according to guidelines promulgated by HUD. In 2009, Plaintiffs sued MaineHousing in federal district court for breach of contract, alleging that MaineHousing had wrongfully refused to grant them certain annual increases in their Section 8 payments. MaineHousing impleaded HUD. The district court granted summary judgment for MaineHousing and HUD. The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that each of the housing assistance payments contracts at issue allowed MaineHousing to withhold automatic annual adjustments on contract rents where MaineHousing determines that further adjustments would result in material differences between contract rents and market rates. View "One & Ken Valley Housing Group v. Me. State Housing Auth." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an insurance company, filed an equitable action in the U.S. district court for Rhode Island seeking a declaratory judgment that a life insurance policy was rescinded ab initio due to the fraudulent misrepresentations of Defendant, an irrevocable trust. Plaintiff also sought to retain the premium paid by the trust as an offset against the damages it had suffered in connection with the policy. The district court (1) found that Defendant, by and through its trustee, had made false representations to induce Plaintiff to issue the policy and that this fraud caused Plaintiff damages that would not be fully compensated by rescission alone; and (2) allowed Plaintiff to retain the policy premium paid by Defendant. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err, under Rhode Island law, in allowing Plaintiff to both rescind the policy and retain the premium; (2) did not err in finding that Plaintiff was a victim of a fraudulent insurance scheme; and (3) appropriately exercised its equity powers. View "PHL Variable Ins. Co. v. Bowie 2008 Irrevocable Trust " on Justia Law