Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Sherri Light, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Steven Light, appealed a judgment entered after a bench trial determining GRB Financial Corporation held a valid and enforceable security interest in a ring purchased from Royal Jewelers, Inc., and authorizing GRB Financial to foreclose its security interest in the ring. Royal Jewelers was a jewelry store in Fargo operated by three brothers, Richard, Brent and Gregory Olson. The brothers also owned a separate corporation, GRB Financial, which operated as an indirect lender taking assignments of loans from retailers, including Royal Jewelers. Steven Light was a customer of Royal Jewelers for several years. In September 2009, Steven owed about $40,000 on an open credit account with Royal Jewelers. Steven Light purchased a wedding ring for Sherri on his open credit account (for over $50,000). At some point, Steven issued a $25,500 check to Royal Jewelers, which was applied to the oldest purchases on his account. That check was returned for insufficient funds. Royal Jewelers' monthly statements reflected Steven thereafter paid about $65,000 on his account from October 2009 through December 2010. Sherri stated Steven's payments were applied to the invoice number on the charge receipt for the ring and the ring was paid for by December 2010. In December 2010, Royal Jewelers, with Steven's consent, assigned Steven Light's debt with Royal Jewelers and the security for that debt to GRB Financial. Steven Light and GRB Financial executed a note modification agreement changing repayment terms, extending the maturity date of a prior note modification agreement between the parties and pledging nine additional items as security for modification. The exhibit describing the items was not separately signed by Steven Light, but included the ring on a list of nine items. Steven died in February 2012. Royal Jewelers and GRB Financial sued Sherri, individually and as personal representative of Steven Light's estate, for a determination that GRB Financial had a valid security interest in the ring. After a bench trial, the district court found no stated preference or agreement existed between the Lights and Royal Jewelers that Steven's payments would be first applied to the ring. The court found even if an agreement existed, it was unenforceable under the statute of frauds because it was not in writing. The court determined that in the absence of any agreement or designation about how payments would be applied to Steven's debt, Royal Jewelers was entitled to apply his payments to first reduce the amount owed on his oldest purchases. The court also determined the evidence did not establish the Lights detrimentally relied on Royal Jewelers' monthly account statements about application of payments to Steven Light's account. The court further concluded Steven's gift of the ring to Sherri was subject to Royal Jewelers' security interest in the ring and GRB Financial, as an assignee of Royal Jewelers, had a valid and enforceable security interest in the ring. Sherri Light argued on appeal that the district court clearly erred in determining the Lights did not manifest an intent or desire under N.D.C.C. 9-12-07(1) that Steven's payments on his account would be applied first to pay for the ring. She argued her testimony about Steven's assurances that he made arrangements with Royal Jewelers for application of his payments to the ring and about witnessing Steven's manifestation of that intent when the ring was purchased on October 2, 2009, was corroborated by Royal Jewelers' monthly account statements, indicating Steven's payments were applied to pay for the ring and not for his prior purchases. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding the Lights did not manifest an intent that payments on an open credit account with Royal Jewelers would be applied first to the purchase price of the ring and in finding the Lights did not detrimentally rely on Royal Jewelers' monthly account statements. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court did not err in determining GRB Financial had a valid and enforceable security interest in the ring. View "Royal Jewelers, Inc. v. Light" on Justia Law

Sister and Brother were co-trustees of a family Trust established by the siblings' parents. Before their mother died, she entered into a contract for deed with Brother for the sale of 480 acres of trust farmland. After the mother died, the siblings stipulated for court supervision of the Trust. Within the Trust action, Sister sued Brother and his wife for undue influence on his contract for deed with their mother. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Brother, concluding that Sister’s claim of undue influence was barred by the statute of limitations and that any oral agreement associated with the contract for deed was barred by the statute of frauds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because Sister did not timely bring her claim for undue influence, the circuit court correctly ruled that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) because Sister sought to enforce her asserted interest in the sale of real estate, the circuit court correctly ruled that any oral agreement regarding the real estate was barred by the statute of frauds. View "In re Matheny Family Trust" on Justia Law

The McTaggarts filed suit against the former trustee and trust advisor of their family trust, alleging improper handling of their trust funds. The former trustee and trust advisor moved to dismiss the case or have the case stayed pending arbitration, based on an arbitration provision in a wealth-management agreement between the former trustee and trust advisor. The trial court found that, because the McTaggarts did not sign the agreement containing the arbitration provision and because the agreement specifically excluded nonsignatories, including third-party beneficiaries, the arbitration provision was not binding on the McTaggarts. The former trustee and trust advisor appealed. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pinnacle Trust Company, L.L.C., EFP Advisors, Inc. v. McTaggart" on Justia Law

Beginning in 1983, Defendant law firm represented Alice Lawrence and her three children in litigation arising from the death of her husband and their father, a real estate developer. For over three decades, Lawrence and Seymour Cohn, the decedent’s brother and business partner, litigated issues surrounding the sale of the decedent’s properties and the distribution of the proceeds. After Cohn and Lawrence settled the matter, this dispute followed between Lawrence and Defendant with respect to the law firm’s fee and the validity of gifts made by Lawrence to three law firm partners. Lawrence died in 2008. Thereafter, the Lawrence estate argued that a revised retainer agreement between the parties was void procedurally and substantively and made claims for refund of the gifts. The Court of Appeals held (1) the revised retainer agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable and was therefore enforceable; and (2) the Lawrence estate’s claim for return of the gifts was time-barred.View "Matter of Lawrence" on Justia Law

In 2006, Lincoln T. Griswold purchased an $8.4 million life insurance policy. Griswold established a Trust for the sole and exclusive purpose of owning the policy and named Griswold LLP as the Trust’s sole beneficiary. In 2008, the Trust sold its policy to Coventry First LLC. The written purchase agreement contained an arbitration clause. After learning that the policy was sold for an allegedly inflated price that included undisclosed kickbacks to the broker, Griswold sued. Coventry moved to dismiss the case for lack of standing or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, concluding that both Griswold and the LLP had standing and that the arbitration clause was unenforceable as to the plaintiffs, who were non-signatories. Coventry appealed. The Third Circuit (1) concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of Coventry’s motion to dismiss; and (2) affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration against the plaintiffs, as they never consented to the purchase agreement. View "Griswold v. Coventry First LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, Uni-Health Post-Acute Care - Tanglewood, LLC (Tanglewood), and UHS-Pruitt Corporation (collectively, Appellants) ask this Court to reverse the circuit court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration in this wrongful death and survival action involving Appellants' allegedly negligent nursing home care. Tanglewood is a skilled nursing facility located in Ridgeway, owned and controlled by Appellants. In January 2007, Tanglewood and Respondent Darlene Dean entered into a nursing home residency agreement in which Tanglewood assumed responsibility for the care of Respondent's mother, Louise Porter (the patient). The same day, Respondent signed a separate, voluntary arbitration agreement. The patient did not sign either the residency agreement or the Agreement on her own behalf, although she was competent at the time of her admission to Tanglewood. Moreover, Respondent did not have a health care power of attorney empowering her to sign on the patient's behalf. In 2009, the patient fell three separate times within a ten day period, fracturing her hip in the third fall. Over the next two months, the patient underwent two hip surgeries; however, due to complications following the surgeries, the patient died on September 30, 2009. In late 2011, Respondent (acting in her capacity as personal representative of her mother's estate) filed a Notice of Intent (NOI) to file a medical malpractice suit against Appellants, as well as an expert affidavit in support of her NOI. Respondent also alleged claims for survival and wrongful death. In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, a motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation. Relying on "Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc.," (678 S.E.2d 435 (2009)), the circuit court invalidated the Agreement in its entirety and refused to compel arbitration between the parties. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Respondent's argument that Appellants' waived their right to enforce the Agreement was without merit. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated that the circuit court consider her remaining arguments (concerning Respondent's authority to sign the Agreement and whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties) prior to deciding whether to compel arbitration between the parties. View "Dean v. Heritage Healthcare" on Justia Law

In 1991, Husband and Wife were married in Florida. Later that year, the couple signed a postnuptial agreement expressly providing that Florida law would apply. The agreement contained a provision stating that Wife waived all claims against Husband’s estate upon his death, including her elective share. In 2005, the couple moved to Iowa. After Husband died in 2012, Wife claimed her spousal elective share under Iowa law. The agreement was enforceable under Florida law, but Wife argued that the agreement could not be enforced in Iowa because it would violate Iowa’s public policy against postnuptial agreements waiving a spouse’s elective share. The district court denied relief based on the choice of law provision in the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Florida law applied to the enforceability of Wife’s waiver of her spousal elective share contained in the agreement. View "Hussemann v. Hussemann " on Justia Law

Shirley Gregg Dean (Shirley) and Marion Casey Dean (Casey) married in 1978. Shirley died in 1999. At the time, Shirley’s daughters (the sisters) decided not to probate their mother’s estate, basing their decision on their belief that Shirley had an oral contract with Casey for him to provide for them in his will. After Casey died in 2010, the sisters sued Casey’s estate for breach of an oral contract between Casey and Shirley. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the sisters, concluding that they carried their burden of proving that there was an oral agreement between Casey and Shirley to leave one-third of Casey’s estate to Shirley’s children if Shirley predeceased Casey. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court ruling that a contract existed between Shirley and Casey, holding that the record lacked clear and convincing evidence as to the terms of the agreement between Casey and Shirley. View "Dean v. Morris" on Justia Law

In February 2011, two years and four months after Plaintiff learned she had been disinherited by her mother, Plaintiff filed a complaint against financial advisor Bradley Lott for fraud and constructive fraud. A jury found that Lott had committed constructive fraud but that Plaintiff knew or should have known before February 2007 that the fraud occurred. Based on the jury’s findings, the district court dismissed the action, concluding that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding (1) the evidence did not support a finding that Plaintiff could have discovered the fraud sooner, and (2) therefore, the district court erred by dismissing the case based on the statute of limitations. Remanded for a new trial. View "Erdelyi v. Lott" on Justia Law

In 1997, the Courtenay C. Davis Foundation and Amy Davis (together, “Davis Interests”) entered into an agreement with the University of Wyoming Foundation and the Colorado State University Research Foundation (together, “University Foundations”) in which the Davis Interests donated land and other interests to the University Foundations subject to the terms of the agreement. In 2011, the University Foundations decided to sell the gifted property and listed it for sale. In 2012, the Davis Interests filed an action against the University Foundations seeking to enjoin the sale of the property. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that the donation from the Davis Interests to the University Foundations was a gift, that the agreement did not create an implied trust, and that only the attorney general had standing to enforce the terms of a charitable gift. View "Courtenay C. & Lucy Patten Davis Found. v. Colo. State Univ. Research Found." on Justia Law