Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Two brothers had a dispute over an alleged oral agreement relating to the care of their mother by which one brother agreed to give up part of his inheritance if the other brother would care for their mother. The trial court found that a valid agreement between the brothers had been reached. The court of appeals reversed on an issue that had not been raised at the trial court but which the court reached as part of its overall examination of the validity of the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals cannot reverse the judgment of the trial court on an issue that was not specifically raised at the trial court, but (2) the court of appeals nevertheless reached the correct result because the parties' agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, and thus, no action on it could be maintained.

In two similar cases, Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Joseph Schlanger Trust (Schlanger) and PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust (Dawe), an insurer sought a judicial declaration that a life insurance policy was void as an illegal contract wagering human life that accordingly lacked an insurable interest. The district court denied both motions to dismiss and certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Delaware concerning the incontestability provision under 18 Del. C. 2908 and the insurable interest requirement under 18 Del. C. 2704. The certified question, shared by both Dawe and Schlanger, concerned whether an insurer could claim that a life insurance policy never came into existence, on the basis of a lack of insurable interest, where the challenge occurred after the insurance contract's mandatory contestability period expired. The court answered in the affirmative and held that a life insurance policy lacking an insurable interest was void as against public policy and thus never came into force, making the incontestability provision inapplicable. The second certified question concerned whether the statutory insurable interest requirement was violated where the insured procured a life insurance policy with the intent to immediately transfer the benefit to an individual or entity lacking an insurable interest. The court answered in the negative, so long as the insured procured or effected the policy and the policy was not a mere cover for a wager. The third certified question concerned whether the relevant statutory provisions conferred upon a trustee an insurable interest in the life of the individual insured who established the trust if the insured intended to transfer the beneficial interest in the trust to a third-party investor with no insurable interest. The court answered in the affirmative, as long as the individual insured actually established the trust. If, however, the insured did not create and fund the trust then the relationship contemplated under section 2704(c)(5) was not satisfied.

In two similar cases, Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Joseph Schlanger Trust (Schlanger) and PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust (Dawe), an insurer sought a judicial declaration that a life insurance policy was void as an illegal contract wagering human life that accordingly lacked an insurable interest. The district court denied both motions to dismiss and certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Delaware concerning the incontestability provision under 18 Del. C. 2908 and the insurable interest requirement under 18 Del. C. 2704. The certified question, shared by both Dawe and Schlanger, concerned whether an insurer could claim that a life insurance policy never came into existence, on the basis of a lack of insurable interest, where the challenge occurred after the insurance contract's mandatory contestability period expired. The court answered in the affirmative and held that a life insurance policy lacking an insurable interest was void as against public policy and thus never came into force, making the incontestability provision inapplicable.

A limited liability company (MIC) was formed for the purpose of building and operating a hotel. The original members of MIC were a revocable trust (the Trust), trustee Michael Siska, and Thomas, Jane, and Jason Dowdy. Later, Thomas and Jane Dowdy transferred, without the Trust's involvement, MIC's assets to Milestone Development, the Dowdy's family company. The Trust filed an amended complaint derivatively on behalf of MIC against Defendants, Milestone and the Dowdys. In its amended complaint, the Trust claimed that the transfer of assets to Milestone was not in the best interests of MIC or its members and alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unlawful distribution, and conversion, and seeking to recover damages. The Trust, however, did not join MIC as a party to the derivative action. The circuit court dismissed the Trust's amended complaint, holding that the Trust lacked standing to maintain the derivative action on behalf of MIC because the Trust could not fairly represent the interests of the Defendant shareholders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it would not entertain the appeal on the merits because MIC was a necessary party to the proceeding and had not been joined. Remanded.

Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P. ("Brigham"), appealed a partial judgment that dismissed its action against Lario Oil & Gas Company ("Lario") and Murex Petroleum Corporation ("Murex") which sought oil and gas production payments based on a claimed leasehold interest in certain mineral acres in Mountrail County. The Triple T, Inc. ("Triple"), and Christine Thompson, as sole trustee of the Navarro 2009 Living Trust Agreement, appealed an order denying their motions to intervene and to vacate the judgment. The land that contained the oil and mineral rights at issue in this case were probated in 2008 and became a part of the Navarro Trust. Late that year, the Trust executed an agreement which purported to resolve an issue over ownership of the mineral rights. In 2009, Brigham commenced this action against Lario and Murex alleging that it was entitled to a percentage of the production from the oil and mineral interests from the 2008 agreement. Brigham argued the district court erred in determining that Lario had the controlling interest in the 2008 agreement and that Brigham had no interest in the oil and gas leasehold estate in the subject property. Upon review of the lengthy trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment and order.

The Industrial Development Board of the City of Montgomery (IDB) appealed a circuit court's interlocutory order that denied its motion for summary judgment as to a breach-of-contract claim asserted against it by George and Thomas Russell as co-executors and co-trustees of the wills and testamentary trusts of Earnest and Myrtis Russell, Price and Mary McLemore and several others. In 2001, various officials of the State of Alabama, the City of Montgomery, the Montgomery County Commission, Montgomery Chamber of Commerce and the local water works board began making preparations to secure options to purchase property in the Montgomery area in an attempt to persuade Hyundai Motor Company to build an automobile plant in the area. All the trusts owned acres of land in the targeted area. The IDB signed separate options with the Russells, the McLemores and other trusts to purchase the respective properties. Hyundai's plans for its manufacturing plant changed, and subsequently, not all of the options were exercised. The Russells and the McLemores each filed breach-of-contract actions against the IDB and Hyundai alleging that neither adhered to the terms of their respective options. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in denying the IDB's motion for summary judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.

Defendant and her husband (Duckworths) purchased two automobile policies and one motorcycle insurance policy from plaintiff (State Farm) where all three insurance contracts contained "anti-stacking" provisions that precluded recovery of uninsured motorist benefits under any policy other than that covering the damaged vehicles. The Duckworths subsequently moved to Florida, where the husband was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist while driving the motorcycle covered under the Maryland policy. State Farm consequently brought this action in the district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that it had satisfied its contractual obligations to the husband's estate. At issue before the district court was the applicability of the public policy exception to Florida's choice of law rule in disputes over contract terms. The district court declared that State Farm had satisfied its contractual obligations to the husband's estate and dismissed defendant's counterclaims. Taking into account all of the undisputed facts, and assuming that defendant informed a State Farm representative that the Duckworths' move from Maryland to Florida would be "permanent," the court held that State Farm still did not receive reasonable notice sufficient to trigger the public policy exception. The court held that, even if defendant informed the representative as alleged, her later actions overwhelmingly indicated to State Farm that the Duckworths' move was not necessarily permanent and that, consequently Maryland law would continue to govern the Duckworths' policies. Therefore, the issue of fact upon which defendant's appeal rested was immaterial and, as State Farm was deprived of reasonable notice, judgment as a matter of law was proper.

Esther Randall, the mother of plaintiff Elton Randall and defendant Deborah Randall, executed a will leaving her residuary estate to her four children. After Esther's death, Deborah, as executrix of her mother's estate, filed in probate court a petition for the sale of real property in the estate. Elton then filed a claim to the property, alleging that his parents had made an agreement with him before their deaths that the premises would pass to him. The probate court granted the petition to sell the property and disallowed Elton's claim to the property. Elton appealed to the superior court. The court dismissed Elton's appeal, finding that Elton failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the oral contract with his parents and, therefore, Elton's claim to the property was barred by the statute of frauds. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not clearly err in concluding that Elton had failed to prove the existence of an oral agreement with his parents.

This case stemmed from Reliance Group Holdings, Inc.'s ("RGH") and Reliance Financial Services Corporation's ("RFS") voluntary petitions in Bankruptcy Court seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and the trust that was established as a result. The trust subsequently filed an amended complaint alleging actuarial fraud and accounting fraud against respondents. At issue was whether the trust qualified for the so-called single-entity exemption that the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"), 15 U.S.C. 77p(f)(2)(C); 78bb(f)(5)(D), afforded certain entities. The court held that the trust, established under the bankruptcy reorganization plan of RGH as the debtor's successor, was "one person" within the meaning of the single-entity exemption in SLUSA. As a result, SLUSA did not preclude the Supreme Court from adjudicating the state common law fraud claims that the trust had brought against respondents for the benefit of RGH's and RFS's bondholders. Accordingly, the court reversed and reinstated the order of the Supreme Court.

Kurt R. Ward, Attorney at Law, LLC, appealed the district court's order denying its motion for judgment on the pleadings and granting the Plan Parties' (the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, the Retirement Board of the Plan, and the Bank of New York Mellon Corporation) cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings. Both parties' motions sought a declaration about whether the Plan Parties had to pay the disability benefits of two of the Ward Firm's retired NFL player clients into the firm's client trust account pursuant to state court jurisdiction for unpaid attorney's fees despite a provision in the Plan prohibiting any "benefit under the Plan" from being assigned or reached by creditors through legal process. The court held that its prior panel precedent held that bargained-for provisions barring assignments in ERISA welfare benefits were valid and enforceable and that the Ward Firm had not directed the court's attention to any such intervening en banc or Supreme Court decision. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment and held that the district court did not err in declaring that the spendthrift provision in the Plan prevented the Plan Parties from depositing the disability benefits owned by two retired NFL players into the Ward Firm's trust account.