Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Roy Allen died in 2005. After a drawn-out legal struggle, the orphans' court approved an account of his estate in 2009. Before the personal representative (Appellee) would make the distribution under that account, she required that Allen's children sign a document releasing her from liability related to her duties as personal representative. Allen's sons (Appellants) refused to sign and return the document. The orphans' court ordered Appellants to sign, but they again refused. The court of special appeals affirmed the order of the orphans' court. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 9-111 entitles a personal representative to obtain a release when she requests one; and (2) an orphans' court may order heirs and legatees to sign such releases when requested.

Defendant-Appellant, The Siebel Living Trust Dated 7/27/93 (Trust), appealed a district court’s order denying the Trust’s motion to recover its attorney fees and costs pursuant to a real estate sales contract with Plaintiff-Appellee Michael J. Ward (Ward). In addressing the question of whether the Trust or Ward was the "prevailing party" (and thereby entitled to recover reasonable fees and costs under the contract), the Tenth Circuit followed Colorado law to review the competing claims of the parties to the contract. Although Ward recovered the commission he sought, he did not recover against the Trust. The Trust was successful defending itself from Ward's claims brought against it and, therefore, as between Ward and the Trust, the Trust prevailed. The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Kenneth Jakeman appealed a trial court's dismissal of his claims against Defendants Alderwoods, Inc., Lawrence Group Management Company, LLC, Montgomery Memorial Cemetery, Inc. and Judy Jones. Plaintiff's father purchased a "family plot" in the cemetery in 1967 containing ten burial spaces. Pursuant to the terms of the purchase agreement for the family plot, burial was limited to members of the Jakeman family. The cemetery mistakenly conveyed two spaces in the Jakeman family plot to James Jones and his wife, Defendant Judy Jones. Mr. Jones died and was buried in one of the Jakeman spaces. Plaintiff learned of the mistake in 2006, and notified the the cemetery and Mrs. Jones. Mr. Jones was reinterred in another space, however, still within the Jakeman spaces. When Plaintiff's father died in 2008, Mr. Jones was still interred in one of the Jakeman spaces. Despite an offer to exchange burial spaces, and based on a purported refusal to again exhume Mr. Jones, Plaintiff filed suit alleging breach of contract, trespass, negligence, willfulness and/or wantonness, outrage and conversion. Mrs. Jones cross-claimed against Alderwoods, Lawrence and the cemetery based on their alleged error in conveying to her spaces already owned by the Jakemans. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case: "Despite representations in [Plaintiff's] notice of appeal that the underlying matter has been disposed of in its entirety, we hold that, because Judy's cross-claim remains pending below, this appeal is from a nonfinal judgment, and we do not have subject-matter jurisdiction." Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

This appeal arose from the settlement of a class action where defendant paid substantial sums for res judicata protection from the claims of persons assertedly injured by the toxic emissions of an industrial plant. The monies were allocated among three subclasses, one of which was to receive medical monitoring. Upon the monitoring program's completion, substantial sums remained unused. The district court denied the settlement administrator's request to distribute the unused medical-monitoring funds to another subclass of persons suffering serious injuries. Instead, the district court repaired to the doctrine of cy pres and ordered that the money be given to three charities suggested by defendant and one selected by the district court. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a cy pres distribution in the teeth of the bargained-for-terms of the settlement agreement, which required residual funds to be distributed within the class. The court reversed the district court's order distributing the unused medical-monitoring funds to third-party charities and remanded with instructions that the district court order that the funds be distributed to the subclass comprising the most seriously injured class members.

Two brothers had a dispute over an alleged oral agreement relating to the care of their mother by which one brother agreed to give up part of his inheritance if the other brother would care for their mother. The trial court found that a valid agreement between the brothers had been reached. The court of appeals reversed on an issue that had not been raised at the trial court but which the court reached as part of its overall examination of the validity of the agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals cannot reverse the judgment of the trial court on an issue that was not specifically raised at the trial court, but (2) the court of appeals nevertheless reached the correct result because the parties' agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, and thus, no action on it could be maintained.

In two similar cases, Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Joseph Schlanger Trust (Schlanger) and PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust (Dawe), an insurer sought a judicial declaration that a life insurance policy was void as an illegal contract wagering human life that accordingly lacked an insurable interest. The district court denied both motions to dismiss and certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Delaware concerning the incontestability provision under 18 Del. C. 2908 and the insurable interest requirement under 18 Del. C. 2704. The certified question, shared by both Dawe and Schlanger, concerned whether an insurer could claim that a life insurance policy never came into existence, on the basis of a lack of insurable interest, where the challenge occurred after the insurance contract's mandatory contestability period expired. The court answered in the affirmative and held that a life insurance policy lacking an insurable interest was void as against public policy and thus never came into force, making the incontestability provision inapplicable. The second certified question concerned whether the statutory insurable interest requirement was violated where the insured procured a life insurance policy with the intent to immediately transfer the benefit to an individual or entity lacking an insurable interest. The court answered in the negative, so long as the insured procured or effected the policy and the policy was not a mere cover for a wager. The third certified question concerned whether the relevant statutory provisions conferred upon a trustee an insurable interest in the life of the individual insured who established the trust if the insured intended to transfer the beneficial interest in the trust to a third-party investor with no insurable interest. The court answered in the affirmative, as long as the individual insured actually established the trust. If, however, the insured did not create and fund the trust then the relationship contemplated under section 2704(c)(5) was not satisfied.

In two similar cases, Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Joseph Schlanger Trust (Schlanger) and PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Price Dawe 2006 Insurance Trust (Dawe), an insurer sought a judicial declaration that a life insurance policy was void as an illegal contract wagering human life that accordingly lacked an insurable interest. The district court denied both motions to dismiss and certified three questions to the Supreme Court of Delaware concerning the incontestability provision under 18 Del. C. 2908 and the insurable interest requirement under 18 Del. C. 2704. The certified question, shared by both Dawe and Schlanger, concerned whether an insurer could claim that a life insurance policy never came into existence, on the basis of a lack of insurable interest, where the challenge occurred after the insurance contract's mandatory contestability period expired. The court answered in the affirmative and held that a life insurance policy lacking an insurable interest was void as against public policy and thus never came into force, making the incontestability provision inapplicable.

A limited liability company (MIC) was formed for the purpose of building and operating a hotel. The original members of MIC were a revocable trust (the Trust), trustee Michael Siska, and Thomas, Jane, and Jason Dowdy. Later, Thomas and Jane Dowdy transferred, without the Trust's involvement, MIC's assets to Milestone Development, the Dowdy's family company. The Trust filed an amended complaint derivatively on behalf of MIC against Defendants, Milestone and the Dowdys. In its amended complaint, the Trust claimed that the transfer of assets to Milestone was not in the best interests of MIC or its members and alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, unlawful distribution, and conversion, and seeking to recover damages. The Trust, however, did not join MIC as a party to the derivative action. The circuit court dismissed the Trust's amended complaint, holding that the Trust lacked standing to maintain the derivative action on behalf of MIC because the Trust could not fairly represent the interests of the Defendant shareholders. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that it would not entertain the appeal on the merits because MIC was a necessary party to the proceeding and had not been joined. Remanded.

Brigham Oil and Gas, L.P. ("Brigham"), appealed a partial judgment that dismissed its action against Lario Oil & Gas Company ("Lario") and Murex Petroleum Corporation ("Murex") which sought oil and gas production payments based on a claimed leasehold interest in certain mineral acres in Mountrail County. The Triple T, Inc. ("Triple"), and Christine Thompson, as sole trustee of the Navarro 2009 Living Trust Agreement, appealed an order denying their motions to intervene and to vacate the judgment. The land that contained the oil and mineral rights at issue in this case were probated in 2008 and became a part of the Navarro Trust. Late that year, the Trust executed an agreement which purported to resolve an issue over ownership of the mineral rights. In 2009, Brigham commenced this action against Lario and Murex alleging that it was entitled to a percentage of the production from the oil and mineral interests from the 2008 agreement. Brigham argued the district court erred in determining that Lario had the controlling interest in the 2008 agreement and that Brigham had no interest in the oil and gas leasehold estate in the subject property. Upon review of the lengthy trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment and order.

The Industrial Development Board of the City of Montgomery (IDB) appealed a circuit court's interlocutory order that denied its motion for summary judgment as to a breach-of-contract claim asserted against it by George and Thomas Russell as co-executors and co-trustees of the wills and testamentary trusts of Earnest and Myrtis Russell, Price and Mary McLemore and several others. In 2001, various officials of the State of Alabama, the City of Montgomery, the Montgomery County Commission, Montgomery Chamber of Commerce and the local water works board began making preparations to secure options to purchase property in the Montgomery area in an attempt to persuade Hyundai Motor Company to build an automobile plant in the area. All the trusts owned acres of land in the targeted area. The IDB signed separate options with the Russells, the McLemores and other trusts to purchase the respective properties. Hyundai's plans for its manufacturing plant changed, and subsequently, not all of the options were exercised. The Russells and the McLemores each filed breach-of-contract actions against the IDB and Hyundai alleging that neither adhered to the terms of their respective options. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in denying the IDB's motion for summary judgment. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision.