Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Neil Maune and Marcus Raichle formed a general partnership known as the Maune Raichle Law Firm, which later took out life insurance policies for each partner, naming the partnership as beneficiary. In 2011, Maune, Raichle, and three others established a new law firm, MRHFM, governed by an operating agreement containing an arbitration clause and a delegation provision referencing the American Arbitration Association rules. MRHFM took over premium payments for the life insurance policies, but only Raichle’s policy was amended to name MRHFM as beneficiary. After Maune’s death, the death benefit from his policy was paid to the original partnership, not MRHFM. The Estate of Neil Maune sued Raichle and the partnership, alleging wrongful retention of the insurance proceeds, tortious interference, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary duty.The Circuit Court of St. Louis County denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, reasoning that the partnership was not a party to the operating agreement and thus could not enforce its arbitration provision. The Estate argued that Maune and Raichle signed the agreement only as members and managers of MRHFM, not as partners of the original partnership, and that the claims did not fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case de novo and held that, under Missouri’s aggregate theory of partnerships, the partnership has no legal existence separate from its partners. Because Maune and Raichle were the only partners and signed the operating agreement in their individual capacities, they bound themselves and the partnership to the arbitration agreement. The Court further held that, due to the delegation provision, questions about the scope of the arbitration agreement must be decided by the arbitrator. The Supreme Court of Missouri vacated the circuit court’s order and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration. View "Maune vs. Raichle" on Justia Law

A woman and her long-term partner jointly purchased a duplex in Florida, signing both a promissory note and a mortgage as joint obligors and joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The note required monthly payments and a $100,000 balloon payment. After making all monthly payments, they failed to pay the balloon payment when due. The partner died shortly thereafter, and the woman became the sole owner of the property. The lender sent a default notice, and the woman entered into a forbearance agreement but did not pay the balloon payment. The lender filed a creditor’s claim against the deceased partner’s estate, which was rejected, leading the lender to sue the estate for the unpaid amount.The District Court of Fremont County, Wyoming, found the estate liable for the full balloon payment and associated costs, and also found the woman jointly liable as a co-obligor. The estate then sought contribution from the woman, arguing she should pay her share of the debt. After a bench trial, the district court determined that both the woman and the estate were each responsible for 50% of the balloon payment and related fees, applying Florida’s doctrine of equitable contribution. The court rejected the woman’s arguments that she should not be liable due to alleged inequitable conduct by the estate or because the deceased partner had intended to pay the balloon payment himself.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s application of Florida law and its equitable determinations. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the woman was jointly liable for 50% of the balloon payment and associated costs. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the doctrine of equitable contribution, its rejection of the unclean hands defense, or its allocation of attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Hutton v. Dykes" on Justia Law

A resident of a memory-care facility in Massachusetts alleged that the facility’s court-appointed receiver, KCP Advisory Group, LLC, conspired with others to unlawfully evict residents, including herself, by falsely claiming that the local fire department had ordered an emergency evacuation. The resident, after being transferred to another facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting several state-law claims against KCP and other defendants. The complaint alleged that KCP’s actions violated statutory and contractual notice requirements and were carried out in bad faith.KCP moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that as a court-appointed receiver, it was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that while quasi-judicial immunity barred claims based on negligent performance of receivership duties, it did not bar claims alleging that KCP acted without jurisdiction, contrary to law and contract, or in bad faith. The court thus denied KCP’s motion to dismiss several counts, including those for violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. KCP appealed the denial of immunity as to these counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of absolute quasi-judicial immunity de novo. The appellate court held that KCP’s alleged acts—removing residents from the facility—were judicial in nature and within the scope of its authority as receiver. Because KCP did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction, the court concluded that quasi-judicial immunity barred all of the resident’s claims against KCP. The First Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s denial of KCP’s motion to dismiss the specified counts. View "Suny v. KCP Advisory Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Sidney and Julian Helvik, who have lived on their family ranch since 1947, sold a portion of their ranch to Wesley and Karen Tuscano in 2018. In 2020, the Helviks agreed to sell the remainder of the ranch to the Tuscanos under an agreement that included a promissory note and provisions for the Tuscanos to assist the elderly Helviks with end-of-life issues. The Helviks signed a quitclaim deed, but the Tuscanos later had them sign a gift deed, which transferred the ranch without consideration. The Tuscanos never made any payments under the agreement and used the gift deed to obtain a mortgage on the ranch.The Helviks filed a complaint in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Sweet Grass County, seeking to void the agreement and the gift deed, alleging undue influence and fraud. The Tuscanos counterclaimed and filed a third-party complaint against Jacqueline Conner, alleging tortious interference and abuse of process. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Conner on the tortious interference claim and excluded evidence of an Adult Protective Services investigation and an oral agreement to transfer land.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court's decision to rescind the agreement based on its equitable powers, noting the unique fiduciary duty in grantor-support agreements. The court found no abuse of discretion in excluding evidence of the APS investigation and the oral agreement. The court also held that the Tuscanos waived their argument regarding jury instructions on undue influence by not objecting at trial. The summary judgment in favor of Conner was upheld due to the lack of evidence of damages. The court declined to award attorney fees to Conner under M. R. App. P. 19(5). The District Court's orders and judgments were affirmed. View "Helvik v. Tuscano" on Justia Law

Anna Dewdney, a children's book author, created a revocable trust in 2011, designating her daughters, Berol and Cordelia Dewdney, and her romantic partner, Ralph Duncan, IV, as beneficiaries. Initially, the trust allocated 40% of the income to each daughter and 20% to Duncan. Anna amended the trust several times, ultimately increasing Duncan's share to 50% and reducing each daughter's share to 25%. Anna passed away in 2016, and Duncan became the sole trustee. Plaintiffs allege Duncan pressured Anna to increase his share and entered into an oral agreement to make them his sole heirs in exchange for the increased distribution.The Superior Court, Windham Unit, Civil Division, granted summary judgment to Duncan on all claims brought by the plaintiffs, including intentional interference with expectation of inheritance (IIEI), breach of contract, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, and constructive fraud. The court ruled that plaintiffs needed to seek a remedy in probate court for their IIEI claim, failed to establish breach of contract due to anticipatory repudiation, could not show detrimental reliance for promissory estoppel, were receiving benefits from the trust for unjust enrichment, and did not meet the legal requirements for constructive fraud.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. It recognized the tort of IIEI but held that plaintiffs must first seek a remedy in probate court due to the exclusive jurisdiction over trust administration. The court found no anticipatory breach of contract as Duncan's statement did not constitute a positive and unequivocal refusal to perform. It ruled promissory estoppel inapplicable due to the existence of a contract and lack of detrimental reliance. The unjust enrichment claim was barred as it involved trust administration, and the constructive fraud claim failed for similar jurisdictional reasons. View "Dewdney v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Joy Goodwin Adams sued Tiffany Rudd Atkinson, Katherine M. Rudd, Goodwin Capital Partners, Ltd., and KATISAM, Inc., seeking reimbursement for attorneys' fees she paid to a third party. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed her suit with prejudice, leading Joy to appeal. The central issue was whether the terms "hold harmless" and "indemnify" are synonymous when used independently in a contract. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that they are synonymous.The case involves three trusts and two agreements. Joy's parents created two trusts in 1986 and 1987 for Joy and her daughters, Tiffany and Kate. Joy created a third trust in 1989. Joy executed a 2011 release-and-indemnification agreement with BB&T, a co-trustee, and a 2013 settlement agreement with the defendants after Tiffany and Kate sued her for alleged breaches of fiduciary duties. The 2013 agreement included a "hold harmless" provision requiring the defendants to protect Joy against claims for attorneys' fees by corporate trustees successfully defending against suits initiated by Tiffany and Kate.In prior litigation, Tiffany and Kate sued BB&T for negligence, and BB&T filed a third-party claim against Joy for attorneys' fees. The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of BB&T on the negligence claim and denied Joy's motion on the indemnification claim. Joy settled BB&T's claim for $614,791.62 and then demanded reimbursement from the defendants, who refused.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo and concluded that "hold harmless" and "indemnify" are synonymous, meaning the defendants agreed to reimburse Joy for the attorneys' fees she paid to BB&T. The court reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Adams v. Atkinson" on Justia Law

Richard Edward Paul died intestate on October 3, 2022, leaving behind four daughters: Richann L. Ray, Dawn M. Paul Charron, Shelbi L. Paul, and Danita J. Paul. Richann was appointed as the Personal Representative of the Estate with the consent of her sisters. The Estate's significant asset was a cabin in Lincoln, Montana. The heirs could not agree on the disposition of the cabin, leading to conflict. Shelbi filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, alleging that Richann intended to sell the cabin contrary to their parents' wishes. The District Court denied the motion and ordered mediation for any disputed issues.The heirs continued to discuss the cabin's disposition, and Shelbi filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement based on email communications, which the District Court denied, finding no valid settlement agreement. The heirs proceeded to mediation, resulting in a General Release and Mediated Settlement Agreement, which outlined a procedure for selling the cabin to one or more heirs within 30 days of an appraisal. The cabin was appraised at $234,000, but none of the heirs submitted a bid within the 30-day period. Richann listed the cabin for sale and later filed a motion to approve its sale for $106,100, considering the estimated repair costs. Shelbi opposed the motion, arguing the cabin was not fairly marketed.The Montana Eighth Judicial District Court approved the sale, finding the Agreement resolved all issues and the sale price was reasonable and in the best interest of the Estate. Shelbi filed motions to reconsider, which the District Court denied. Shelbi appealed the order approving the sale.The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court's decision, concluding that the Agreement did not address the situation where no heir qualified to purchase the cabin within the specified time. The Court found that Richann, as Personal Representative, had the statutory authority to sell the cabin and that the sale was reasonable and in the best interest of the Estate. View "In re Estate of Paul" on Justia Law

Sidney and Brian Harchelroad, officers of Harchelroad Motors, Inc. (HMI), obtained loans from Waypoint Bank and Western States Bank, signing promissory notes individually and as officers. Sidney and Brian were accommodation parties, meaning they did not personally benefit from the loan proceeds. Sidney died in 2018, and his wife, Carol, was appointed as personal representative of his estate. Waypoint and Western filed claims in Sidney’s estate for unpaid promissory notes, which were allowed. Brian also filed a contingent claim against Sidney’s estate, stating he would seek contribution if he paid more than his share of the debts. Brian died in 2019, and his wife, Michelle, was appointed as personal representative of his estate.Waypoint and Western filed claims in Brian’s estate. Michelle, individually, paid the banks and took assignments of their rights. She then sought contribution from Sidney’s estate for one-half of the amounts paid. The county court largely granted her request, finding that the notes were not extinguished by her payments or the assignments.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that the notes were not extinguished by the judgments against Brian or by Michelle’s payments, as the agreements with the banks were assignments, not payments in full. The court affirmed the county court’s decision, requiring Sidney’s estate to pay Michelle, individually, $459,559.51 for the Waypoint note and $291,263.20 for the Western note, and $300,000 to Brian’s estate for his payments to Western. The court found that Michelle, as an assignee, had the right to seek contribution from Sidney’s estate, and that the proportionate share was correctly determined as one-half, given the joint and several liability of Sidney and Brian. View "In re Estate of Harchelroad" on Justia Law

Little Hearts Marks Family II L.P. ("Little Hearts") was a member of 305 East 61st Street Group LLC, a company formed to purchase and convert a building into a condominium. 61 Prime LLC ("Prime") was the majority member and manager, and Jason D. Carter was the manager and sole member of Prime. In 2021, the company filed for bankruptcy and sold the building to another company created by Carter. The liquidation plan established a creditor trust with exclusive rights to pursue the debtor’s estate's causes of action. Little Hearts sued Prime and Carter for breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust enrichment, seeking damages for lost capital investment and rights under the Operating Agreement.The bankruptcy court dismissed all claims, ruling that they were derivative and belonged to the debtor’s estate, thus could only be asserted by the creditor trustee. The district court affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty claims, agreeing that these were derivative and could only be pursued by the creditor trustee. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, determining that these were direct claims belonging to Little Hearts and could proceed. The unjust enrichment claim was dismissed as duplicative of the contract claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "In re 305 East 61st Street Group LLC" on Justia Law

Mary Langbehn sued her son, Michael Langbehn, and his company, Langbehn Land and Cattle Co. (LL&C), alleging Michael breached his fiduciary duty as a co-trustee of his deceased father’s trust. Michael filed counterclaims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit related to improvements he claimed to have made to real estate he leased from his father’s trust and Mary’s separate living trust. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Mary on her claims and on Michael’s counterclaims. The court also removed Michael as a co-trustee and awarded Mary $513,796.94 in damages. Michael appealed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Beadle County, South Dakota, found that Michael had engaged in self-dealing and breached his fiduciary duty of loyalty to the credit trust by profiting from subleases. The court concluded that Michael failed to keep Mary reasonably informed and acted in bad faith. The court granted summary judgment on Mary’s claims and Michael’s counterclaims, and removed Michael as a co-trustee.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Michael did not engage in impermissible self-dealing because the trust instrument expressly allowed him to lease the land at below-market rates. However, the court found that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether Michael disclosed the subleases and additional income to Mary. The court reversed the summary judgment on Mary’s breach of fiduciary duty claims and the decision to remove Michael as a co-trustee, remanding for further proceedings. The court affirmed the summary judgment on Michael’s counterclaims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit, as there was no evidence that Mary requested or agreed to pay for the improvements. View "Langbehn V. Langbehn" on Justia Law