Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Eureka Water Company contended that a 1975 agreement granted it the exclusive license in 60 Oklahoma counties to sell spring water and other products using the "Ozarka" trademark. It sued Nestle Waters North America, Inc., the current owner of the Ozarka trademark, to obtain a declaratory judgment of that right and to obtain monetary relief under several theories, including breach of contract, tortious interference with business relations, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel. A jury found for Eureka on its contract and tortious interference claims, and the district court entered a judgment declaring that the 1975 agreement granted Eureka the exclusive right that it claimed in the Ozarka mark. In a post-verdict ruling, the district court denied as duplicative Eureka's equitable claims based on unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel. Nestle appealed. The Tenth Circuit agreed with most of Nestle's principal arguments. First, the Court reversed the district court's denial of Nestle's motion for JMOL on the contract claim because the 1975 agreement unambiguously did not cover spring water and under Oklahoma contract law. The Court reversed the denial of JMOL on the tortious-interference claim because Eureka failed to show that Nestle's decision to charge Eureka what it charged other vendors for bottled water was not privileged or justified. Third, the Court affirmed the denial of Eureka's unjust enrichment claim because the claim is based on the false premise that Eureka's license to use the Ozarka trademark covers spring water. The Court reversed, however, the denial of Eureka's promissory-estoppel claim, and remanded that claim for further consideration by the district court. View "Eureka Water Company v. Nestle Waters North America" on Justia Law

This case arose when the University told Daniel A. Moore, an artist who painted famous football scenes involving the University since 1979, that he would need permission to depict the University's uniforms because they were trademarks. Moore contended that he did not need permission because the uniforms were being used realistically to portray historic events. The parties could not reach a resolution and the University subsequently sued Moore for breach of contract, trademark infringement, and unfair competition. The court held that, as evidenced by the parties' course of conduct, Moore's depiction of the University's uniforms in his unlicensed paintings, prints, and calendars was not prohibited by the prior licensing agreements. Additionally, the paintings, prints, and calendars did not violate the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a), because these artistically expressive objects were protected by the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment by the district court with respect to the paintings and prints, and reversed with respect to the prints as replicated on calendars. With respect to the licensing agreements' coverage of the mugs and other "mundane products," the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment because disputed issues of fact remained. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

In 2000, a fire destroyed a business location of Stone Flood and Fire Restoration Inc., spurring years of litigation with its insurer, Safeco Insurance Company of America. After Stone Flood and its two shareholders, James and Patrice Stone, sued Safeco in 2007, the district court dismissed all claims against Safeco. The court concluded (1) Stone Flood's claims on the insurance policy were filed three days beyond the applicable statute of limitations and were therefore barred; (2) the Stones were not insureds and lacked standing to bring individual claims under the policy; and (3) the Stones lacked standing to bring a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) because their alleged injuries were merely derivative of the corporation's. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court's calculation of the tolling of the limitations period was incorrect and a correct calculation saved Stone Flood's claims under the insurance policy; and (2) the district court properly concluded the Stones were not insureds and lacked standing to sue under the policy, and their claim of IIED failed for lack of a distinct, non-derivative injury. Remanded.

In 1995, plaintiff, a popular psychic and astrologer, and defendant entered into a contract for production and distribution of materials featuring plaintiff's psychic and astrological services. Plaintiff granted defendant the right to use his trademark, name, and likeness. After a 2006 dispute led to litigation; a jury rejected plaintiff's claim that he had validly terminated the agreement, found that he had violated the agreement, and found that defendant owed him no compensation. In 2009, both parties sought injunctive relief to prevent the other party from using the trademark. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of defendant, finding that plaintiff had assigned the trademark in perpetuity. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction, based on its interpretation of the agreement and application of collateral estoppel, based on the prior litigation.

This appeal stemmed from numerous trademark and unfair competition claims over the name "Patsy's." Patsy's Italian Restaurant appealed, and Patsy's Pizzeria cross-appealed, from a judgment of the district court after a jury trial on claims brought pursuant to trademark and unfair competition law. The court upheld the district court's jury instructions; affirmed the district court's refusal to grant a new trial on the issue of whether Patsy's Pizzeria made fraudulent statements to the Patent and Trademark Office, as well as its refusal to vacate the jury's verdict that Patsy's Italian Restaurant did not fraudulently obtain its trademark registrations; affirmed the district court's refusal to reinstate Patsy's Pizzeria's trademark registrations; and upheld the district court's denial of attorneys' fees and injunctive relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

CollegeSource, Inc. (CollegeSource), a California corporation with its principal place of business in California, sued AcademyOne, Inc. (AcademyOne), a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania, in federal district court for the Southern District of California, alleging that AcademyOne misappropriated material from CollegeSource's websites. AcademyOne moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and the district court granted its motion. The court held that AcademyOne was subject to specific personal jurisdiction, but not general personal jurisdiction, in California with respect to CollegeSource's misappropriation claims. Under the doctrine of pendant personal jurisdiction, AcademyOne was also subject to personal jurisdiction in California with respect to the remainder of CollegeSource's claims. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of CollegeSource's complaint and remanded for further proceedings.

XMH sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief and obtained permission to sell a subsidiary's assets (11 U.S.C. 363), indicating that a contract between the subsidiary and WG would be assigned to purchasers. WG objected, claiming that the contract was a sublicense of a trademark and could not be assigned without permission. The bankruptcy judge agreed with WG, but allowed XMH to renegotiate so that the subsidiary would retain title to the contract but the purchasers would assume all duties and receive all fees. The district court granted a motion substituting the purchasers for XMH and ruled that the order barring assignment was erroneous. First holding that the order was appealable and that it should exercise jurisdiction despite the absence of the bankruptcy trustee as a party, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. If WG had wanted to prevent assignment, it could have identified the contract as a trademark sublicense to trigger a default rule that trademark licenses are assumed to be not assignable. The contract was not simply a sublicense: WG retained control over "all other aspects of the production and sale of the Trademarked Apparel." Such a designation would have been more effective than a clause forbidding assignment because it would have survived bankruptcy.