Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the court of appeals that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 37.001-.011, can be used to establish an insurance carrier's liability for benefits under an underinsured motorist (UIM) policy, holding that a declaratory judgment action can be used for this purpose.On appeal, the Insurer argued that Insured's use of the UDJA to determine Insured's contract rights and to seek attorney's fees in the UIM case impermissibly dodged the Supreme Court's decision in Brainard v. Trinity Universal Insurance Co., 216 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. 2006). The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed as well, holding (1) a declaratory judgment in the instant case was the proper remedy for resolving this contractual dispute; and (2) attorney's fees may be recovered under the UDJA under the circumstances. View "Allstate Insurance Co. v. Irwin" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to issue mandamus relief to compel Commissioner George P. Bush, head of the General Land Office, to refer the City of Galveston's claim that that the Land Office owed reimbursement to the City, holding that the City was not entitled to mandamus relief.The dispute in this case arose from a block grant contract that required the City to administer federal disaster relief funds. The City hired a private contractor to do some of the work, and the private contractor later sued the City for alleged amounts owed under the parties' contract. After the City settled with the private contractor it filed a claim for reimbursement from the Land Office for the settlement amount paid by the City. Bush refused to refer the City's claim to the State Office of Administrative Hearings for an administrative law judge to hear it. The City brought this action asking that the Supreme Court exercise its original mandamus jurisdiction over state officials to compel Bush to refer the claim. The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that where, as part of the settlement, the City agreed not to sue Bush in any "related proceeding," mandamus relief was precluded. View "In re City of Galveston, Texas" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court denied a writ of mandamus compelling the trial court to render judgment in favor of Insurer on the jury's verdict, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to render judgment on the verdict.Insured sought underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits from Insurer. Insurer in this case declined to participate in a jury trial to establish the at-fault motorist's liability and demanded a separate trial on its liability under the UIM policy. Before trial on the UIM claim, the court commenced a jury trial on Insured's negligence claim against the at-fault motorist. The parties settled and the claim was dismissed without rendition of judgment on the jury's verdict. Insurer then argued that a separate trial on the UIM claim was no longer necessary because of the jury's findings and the settlement payment. The trial court denied Insurer's motion for judgment based on the jury verdict from the negligence trial. Insurer sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding (1) collateral estoppel did not bind Insured to a verdict that was not reduced to judgment; and (2) Insurer's post-dismissal consent to be bound by the negligence suit's outcome did not make the negligence verdict enforceable against Insured in the contract suit. View "In re USAA General Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals denying Defendants' motion to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 27.001-.011, as untimely, holding that because Plaintiff's amended petition in this case asserted new legal claims, Defendants' motion to dismiss those claims was timely.In his original petition, Plaintiff asserted claims for deceptive trade practice, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended petition reasserting the same claims, adding new claims for fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud, fraudulent concealment, and breach of contract, and alleging the same essential facts alleged in the original petition and requesting the same relief. The trial court denied Defendants' TCPA dismissal motion, concluding that the motion was untimely. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in holding that Defendant's motion to dismiss the new claims was untimely because the amended petition asserted new legal actions and thus triggered new sixty-day period for Defendants to file a motion to dismiss those new claims. View "Monteglongo v. Abrea" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting a motion to reconsider the court's denial of a motion to seal brought under Tex. R. Civ. P. 76a, holding that the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act (TUTSA), Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 134A.006a, does not provide an independent, self-contained pathway for sealing court records.Plaintiff sued Defendant for breach of contract, and Defendant asserted counterclaims, including misappropriation of trade secrets. The jury found in favor of Defendant. Defendant subsequently filed a Rule 76a motion to seal thirty trial exhibits. The trial court denied the motion to seal but then granted Defendant's motion to reconsider that relied exclusively on section 134A.006a of TUTSA. The Supreme Court remanded this case to the trial court to exercise its discretion under the applicable provisions of both TUTSA and Rule 76a, holding that the trial court erred by failing to apply the non-displaced provisions of Rule 76a in ruling on the motion to reconsider. View "HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief in these actions challenging rulings on a Rule 91a motion to dismiss, holding that the the trial court abused its discretion in denying Insurer's motion to dismiss Insured's claim for negligent failure to settle.A liability insurer (Insurer) settled claims against its insured (Insured) within policy limits but obtained a release that was contingent on Insured paying a portion of the settlement. Insured paid and then brought this action seeking reimbursement, alleging claims for negligent failure to settle and for breach of contract. Insurer filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. Insurer sought mandamus relief. The court of appeals granted relief as to the breach of contract claim but concluded that the trial court properly refused to dismiss the claim for negligent failure to settle. Both parties sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief to both parties, holding (1) the trial court abused its discretion in denying Insurer's motion to dismiss Insured's Stowers claim for negligent failure to settle; and (2) the court of appeals erred in ordering the trial court to dismiss Insured's claim for breach of the contractual obligation to indemnify. View "In re Farmers Texas County Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals with respect to Plaintiff's constitutional claims, holding that a state university's dismissal of a student for poor academic performance does not implicate a liberty or property interest protected by the Texas Constitution's guarantee of due course of law.Plaintiff was dismissed from Texas Southern University's Thurgood Marshall School of Law after one year due to his failure to maintain the required grade point average. Plaintiff brought this suit against the School, alleging breach of contract and deprivation of his property and liberty without due course of law. The trial court granted the School's plea to the jurisdiction invoking sovereign immunity. The court of appeals reversed in part, concluding that Plaintiff's procedural and substantive due course of law claims were viable. The Supreme Court reversed in part and rendered judgment dismissing the case, holding that an academic dismissal from higher education does not implicate a protected liberty interest. View "Texas Southern University v. Villarreal" on Justia Law

In this contract dispute involving the correct interpretation of a mineral lease's "continuous drilling program" provision the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in reversing partial summary judgment for the lessee on the contract-construction issue.Lessor and Lessee were the successors-in-interest to an oil-and-gas top lease covering a 30,450-acre parcel of land. At the end of the primary term, Lessee was required to reassign to Lessor all of Lessee's operating rights in each tract of the lease not then held by production unless Lessee was engaged in a "continuous drilling program." Notwithstanding Lessee's continued drilling operations, Lessor filed a suit seeking a declaration that the lease had terminated. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Lessor, concluding that the lease had not terminated as to non-producing tracts. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the lease's special definition of drilling operations, activities other than spudding-in a well are sufficient to maintain the lease as to non-producing tracts; and (2) the record conclusively established that Lessee was engaged in a continuous drilling program within the meaning of the lease. View "Sundown Energy LP v. HJSA No. 3" on Justia Law

In these original proceedings arising from suits by holders of underinsured motorist (UIM) insurance seeking recovery against their insurers following traffic accidents the Supreme Court held that insureds who bring only Insurance Code claims seeking policy benefits as damages must also succeed in an initial "car crash" trial in order to lay the predicate for their statutory claims.Following traffic accidents, holders of UIM insurance sought recovery against their insurers. The insureds, however, did not sue for breach of their insurance companies and brought only extracontractual Insurance Code Claims. In both cases, State Farm filed motions for bifurcated trial under Rule 174(b). After the trial courts denied State Farm's motions, State Farm petitioned for mandamus relief. In response, Petitioners argued that because they brought only statutory claims and because there were no breach of contract claims to try first, no bifurcation of trial was required. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding that although Petitioners' claims were not labeled breach of contract Petitioners nevertheless just establish State Farm's liability under their insurance policies as a prerequisite to recovery on their Insurance Code claims. View "In re State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Insurer in this insurance dispute, holding that payment of an appraisal award does not absolve the insurer of statutory liability when an insurer accepts a claim but pays only the part of the amount it owed within the statutory deadline for payment.Homeowner reported a claim to Insurer for damage to his home. Insurer accepted Homeowner's claim and paid part of it before the statutory deadline. Dissatisfied with the amount, Homeowner sued, seeking full payment of the claim plus interest and attorney's fees under the Teas Prompt Payment of Claims Act, Tex. Ins. Code Chapter 542. While the suit was pending but after the statutory deadline had passed, Insurer invoked the policy's appraisal process, and the appraised awarded Homeowner more than Insurer paid. Insurer paid the difference then moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Insurer did not pay the amount that "must be paid" before the statutory deadline, it was not entitled to summary judgment. View "Hinojos v. State Farm Lloyds" on Justia Law