Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Ohio
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This case involves a dispute over a lease agreement between Tera, L.L.C., and Rice Drilling D, L.L.C., and Gulfport Energy Corporation. The lease granted Rice Drilling and Gulfport Energy certain mineral rights in the geological formations known as the Marcellus Shale and the Utica Shale beneath Tera’s land. The dispute arose when Tera claimed that the defendants had intentionally drilled six wells into the Point Pleasant formation, which Tera argued was not included in the lease agreement.The trial court awarded summary judgment to Tera, concluding that the lease agreement clearly limited the rights granted to the defendants to the Marcellus and Utica formations and reserved rights to all other formations. The court also found that the defendants had trespassed in bad faith, and a jury awarded Tera over $40 million in damages.The Court of Appeals for Belmont County affirmed the trial court's decision. The court concluded that the lease language was unambiguous and that the phrase "Utica Shale" had a technical stratigraphic meaning that did not include the Point Pleasant formation.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court found that the lease agreement was ambiguous because it did not clearly establish whether the Point Pleasant was or was not to be considered part of the Utica Shale. The court concluded that resolving the meaning of ambiguous terms in a contract is a matter of factual determination for the fact-finder. Therefore, the court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Tera, L.L.C. v. Rice Drilling D, L.L.C." on Justia Law

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Vandercar, L.L.C. entered into a $36 million purchase contract for the Millennium Hotel in Cincinnati and then assigned its interest in the hotel to the Port of Greater Cincinnati Development Authority. The agreement stipulated that the Port would pay Vandercar a $5 million redevelopment fee if the Port issued bonds to redevelop the hotel within a year of its acquisition. The Port acquired the hotel and issued acquisition bonds, but it denied that the bonds were for redevelopment of the hotel, so it refused to pay the redevelopment fee. Vandercar sued the Port for breach of contract for failing to pay the redevelopment fee and also moved for prejudgment interest.The trial court found that Vandercar was entitled to the redevelopment fee and granted Vandercar’s motion for summary judgment on that issue. However, the trial court denied Vandercar’s motion for prejudgment interest, concluding that prejudgment interest could not be imposed on the Port since it was “an arm/instrumentality of the state.” Both parties appealed to the First District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s decisions.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. The court held that the Port, a port authority created under R.C. 4582.22(A), is not exempt from the application of R.C. 1343.03(A), which entitles a creditor to prejudgment interest when the creditor receives a judgment for the payment of money due under a contract. Therefore, the Port may be held liable to pay prejudgment interest. The court remanded the case to the trial court to evaluate Vandercar’s motion for prejudgment interest under the correct standard. View "Vandercar, L.L.C. v. Port of Greater Cincinnati Development Authority" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals in this dispute arising out of environmental-cleanup and remediation work at two Superfund sites in Bronson, Michigan, holding that Restatement (Second) 193 does not govern the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims.Scott Fetzer Company filed this action asserting a breach of contract claim against certain insurance companies, including Travelers Casualty and Surety Company, alleging breaches of certain insurance contracts. Fetzer also asserted a tort claim against each company, arguing that they had acted in bad faith when handling his claims. As to Travelers, an administrative judge concluded that Ohio law applied to a discovery dispute concerning Scott Fetzer's bad faith claim. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Ohio law governed the bad-faith discovery dispute because the cause of action was a tort. In affirming, the court applied the choice-of-law rules set forth in section 145 of the Restatement. Travelers appealed, arguing that section 193 governs the choice-of-law analysis for bad faith claims because they arise out of insurance contracts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly ruled that the choice-of-law analysis applicable to a bad-faith claim as provided by section 145. View "Scott Fetzer Co. v. American Home Assurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that Acuity was not required to provide coverage for the car accident in this case, holding that Acuity must provide coverage for the accident.Ashton Smith, who was insured by Acuity and had borrowed a friend's car, was involved in an accident. The car's owner was insured by Progressive Speciality Insurance Company. Under the Progressive policy, Smith was not an "insured person" when he was driving his friend's car, but he was covered by the plain language of the Acuity policy. The trial court found Acuity responsible for providing liability coverage. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the plain language of the two policies at issue, Acuity was responsible for providing coverage. View "Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Co. v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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In this discretionary appeal brought by Discovery Oil and Gas, LLC to determine whether an express indemnification provision in its contract with Wildcat Drilling, LLC evinced a clear intent by the parties to abrogate the common-law notice requirements for indemnification set forth in Globe Indemnity Co. v. Schmitt, 53 N.E.2d 790 (Ohio 1944), the Supreme Court held that the requirements announced in Globe Indemnity did not apply.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) when the parties have entered into a contract containing an express indemnification provision, the common-law notice requirements set forth in Globe Indemnity do not apply, and the parties are bound by the terms of their contract because the provision evinces a clear intent by the parties to abrogate the common law; and (2) the language of the contract in this case evicted the parties' clear intent to abrogate the common-law notice requirements for indemnification. View "Wildcat Drilling, LLC v. Discovery Oil & Gas, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in this second lawsuit brought by AJZ's Hauling, LLC against TruNorth Warranty Programs of North American (TruNorth) affirming the decision of the trial court denying TruNorth's motion to stay and compel arbitration, holding that the claims filed by AJZ's Hauling against TruNorth were subject to arbitration.AJZ's Hauling purchased a truck that came with a TruNorth warranty. AJZ's Hauling later sued TruNorth, and the trial court granted TruNorth's motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration. AJZ's then filed a second lawsuit raising the same claims it had alleged against TruNorth in the first lawsuit. TruNorth again filed a motion to stay and to compel arbitration, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that application of the doctrine of res judicata would be unreasonable or unjust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) AJZ's Hauling's claims filed against TruNorth in the second lawsuit were subject to arbitration; and (2) an exception to application of the doctrine of res judicata to avoid unjust results does not apply when the parties had a full opportunity to litigate the issue and chose not to do so. View "AJZ Hauling, LLC v. TruNorth Warranty Program of N. America" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court determining that Plaintiff could not recover under a commercial general-liability (CGL) insurance policy issued by United Specialty Insurance Company, holding that when a CGL insurance policy excludes coverage for injuries arising out of an "assault or battery," the subjective intent of the person who committed the assault or battery is irrelevant.Brown County Care Center, an adult care facility, contracted with United for CGL insurance. The policy excluded coverage for bodily injury arising from "any actual, threatened or alleged assault or battery." Plaintiff was living at the Center when he was attacked by another resident, who was later found by the trial court to be not guilty of felonious assault by reason of insanity. Plaintiff sued, and he and the Center entered into a settlement. Plaintiff later brought a declaratory judgment action against United to collect on the judgment. The trial court determined that Plaintiff could not recover under the policy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the attack on Plaintiff qualified as a civil-law assault; and (2) because the policy excluded coverage for bodily injuries arising for civil assaults the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Krewina v. United Specialty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals concluding that there was not an enforceable settlement agreement between Jack Marchbanks, director of the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT), and Ice House Ventures, LLC, Lion Management Services, LLC, and Smokestack Ventures, LLC (collectively, IHV), holding that there was an enforceable settlement agreement.IHV and ODOT entered into the settlement agreement at issue related to an appropriation proceeding resulting from ODOT's exercise of eminent domain over property owned by IHV. The trial court granted IHV's motion to enforce the agreed judgment entry on the settlement and awarded damages to IHV. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in enforcing the settlement because there was no meeting of the minds on a material term of the settlement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that ODOT did not show by clear and convincing evidence that it was entitled to rescission of the agreement or that any lack of understanding about the term "damages" in the agreement rendered it unenforceable. View "Marchbanks v. Icehouse Ventures, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing a petition for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition to compel Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Cassandra Collier-Williams to carry out a mandate previously issued by the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals correctly dismissed the petition.After the trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants the court of appeals reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings. After remand, the trial court concluded that Plaintiff was not allowed to pursue damages against Defendants and denied him a jury trial. Plaintiff then filed his petition for writs of mandamus and/or prohibition seeking to compel Judge Collier-Williams to give full effect to the appellate court's mandate and to grant him a jury trial. The court of appeals dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not allege facts showing that the judge directly disobeyed the court of appeals' mandate or that he was entitled to an extraordinary writ to compel Judge Collier-Williams to grant him a jury trial. View "State ex rel. Gallagher v. Collier-Williams" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Owners Insurance Co. on EMOI Services, LLC's claim of breach of contract and bad-faith denial of insurance coverage after a ransomware attack on EMOI's computer-software systems, holding that Owners was not responsible for covering the loss at issue.At issue was whether the businessowners insurance policy issued by Appellant to EMOI covered losses suffered by EMOI when it became the target of a ransomware attack. The trial court granted summary judgment to Owners. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Owners did not breach its contract with EMOI because the pertinent insurance policy did not cover the type of loss EMOI experienced. View "EMOI Services LLC v. Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law