Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Grupo Famsa, S.A. de C.V. (Grupo), a Mexican company, agreed to guarantee a commercial lease entered into between Famsa, Inc. (Famsa) and Uno LLC (Uno). When Famsa failed to comply with the terms of the lease, Uno filed a complaint against Famsa and Grupo for breach of the commercial lease and guaranty. Uno served Grupo through the procedures outlined in the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention). The Mexican Central Authority issued a certificate of proof of international service of process upon Grupo. Grupo filed a motion to quash service of process, arguing that service of process was constitutionally deficient. The district court denied Grupo’s motion to quash. Grupo subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the district court from exercising jurisdiction over Grupo. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding (1) service of process on a foreign company pursuant to the Hague Convention does not satisfy constitutional due process when service depends solely upon a certificate of compliance issued by the foreign nation’s central authority; and (2) the district court failed to conduct the necessary fact-finding to determine whether service was constitutionally sufficient in this case. View "Grupo Famsa, S.A. de C.V. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Respondent, a contractor, and Appellant, a homeowner, entered into a contract under which Respondent agreed to install automation, sound, surveillance, and landscaping systems in Appellant’s residence. Respondent did not have an electrical contractor’s license when it bid the contract and began the work but did receive a license before it completed the work. When the parties disagreed on the performance of the contract, Appellant refused to tender further payment to Respondent, and Respondent filed a notice of lien against Appellant’s residence. Respondent filed a complaint alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, foreclosure of notice of lien, and declaratory relief, alleging that an electrical license was not required for the work performed on Appellant’s residence and that its lien was proper and perfected. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether Respondent’s work on Appellant’s residence required a license and whether Respondent completed the contract in a workmanlike manner, thereby possibly negating Appellant’s obligation to make final payment under the contract. Remanded. View "Tom v. Innovative Home Sys." on Justia Law

MB America, Inc. (MBA) and Alaska Pacific Leasing Company entered into an agreement whereby Alaska Pacific agreed to become a dealer for MBA’s line of products. A dispute later arose between the parties, and MBA sued Alaska Pacific in the district court. Alaska Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that MBA had prematurely filed its complaint because it had not complied with a prelitigation mediation provision in the agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alaska Pacific. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the prelitigation provision in the parties’ contract was a condition precedent to litigation; (2) MBA did not initiate mediation as required under the agreement; and (3) therefore, the district court correctly granted Alaska Pacific’s motion for summary judgment and did not err in granting attorney fees to Alaska Pacific. View "MB America, Inc. v. Alaska Pacific Leasing Co." on Justia Law

Real parties in interest (collectively, Seaver) filed a complaint against Petitioners (collectively, the Helfsteins) and against Uninet Imaging, Inc., alleging claims arising out of agreements between the Helfsteins and Seaver following Uninet’s purchase of the Helfsteins’ companies. The Helfsteisn settled with Seaver, and Seaver voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Helfsteins. Seaver later filed a notice of rescission, alleging that the Helfsteisn fraudulently induced them to settle. Meanwhile, the district court resolved the claims between Seaver and Uninet. Seaver later filed a Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the settlement agreement and voluntary dismissal, seeking to proceed on their claims against the Helfsteins. The Helfsteisn filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over them and that the Rule 60(b) motion was procedurally improper. The district court denied the motion. The Helfsteins then filed this original writ petition asking the Supreme Court to consider whether Rule 60(b) can be used to set aside a voluntary dismissal or a settlement agreement. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that even if Rule 60(b) applied in this case, the motion was time-barred. View "Helfstein v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

High Noon at Arlington Ranch Homeowners Association filed a complaint against D.R. Horton, Inc. alleging breach of implied warranties of workmanlike quality and habitability, breach of contract, breach of express warranties, and breach of fiduciary duty. High Noon moved, ex parte, for a stay and enlargement of time for service of the complaint until the Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 40 prelitigation process for constructional defect cases was complete. The district court granted High Noon’s motion. The Chapter 40 process was still not complete more than eight years later. In these original petitions for extraordinary relief, D.R. Horton argued that the district court erred when it initially granted the ex parte stay and further erred when it denied a motion to dismiss the underlying complaint pursuant to the five-year rule in Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) when the Chapter 40 process was still not complete. The Supreme Court denied both of these petitions for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, concluding (1) the district court’s order granting a stay was not in error; and (2) the five-year period was tolled under the Boren exception to Rule 41(d). View "D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law