Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Illinois

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Fee-sharing provisions in otherwise valid retainer agreements between clients and two separate law firms are not unenforceable simply because the primary service performed by one firm is the referral of the clients to the other and the agreements fail to specifically notify clients that each firm has assumed joint financial responsibility for the representation. In 2007-2010, Plaintiff, a Gurnee law firm, was retained by 10 clients for representation under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Plaintiff contracted with attorney Esposito for assistance in representing the clients before the Workers’ Compensation Commission. A letter of understanding was drafted by defendant, confirming that the cases had been referred to defendant by plaintiff, outlining the parties’ respective responsibilities regarding representation of the clients, and specifying that the attorney fees obtained in each case would be split between Plaintiff and Esposito. The agreements did not specifically notify the clients that the lawyers in each firm had assumed joint financial responsibility for the representation. Plaintiff’s breach of contract suit against Esposito was dismissed. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s reversal, rejecting an argument that the agreements’ lack of an express statement that the attorneys assumed joint financial responsibility violated Rule 1.5(e) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and thereby rendered the agreements invalid. View "Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito" on Justia Law

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The 2009 Video Gaming Act (230 ILCS 40/1)) legalized the use of video gaming terminals in licensed establishments, including bars, veterans’ organizations, and truck stops, and authorizes the Illinois Gaming Board to supervise all video gaming operations governed by the Act. A video gaming terminal may be placed in a licensed establishment only if the establishment has entered into a written use agreement with the licensed terminal operator. A use agreement may be assigned only from one licensed terminal operator to another. Action, an unlicensed terminal operator, executed “Exclusive Location and Video Gaming Terminal Agreements” with each of 10 establishments, stating that Action and the establishments would obtain licenses. In 2012 the parties amended their agreements by adding clauses, purportedly “necessary in order for the Agreement to comply with the [Act] and the rules and regulations," including clauses providing that Action could assign its rights and acknowledging that the agreement and the amendment “are subject to and contingent upon the [Gaming Board’s] review.” In 2012, the Board denied Action’s license application based on findings that Acton employees were associated with individuals who had been convicted of illegal gambling. Action assigned its rights under the agreements to J&J, a licensed operator. The establishments were not yet licensed. Subsequently, each of the establishments signed separate location agreements with Accel, a licensed operator. J&J and Action sued; the circuit courts ruled that the location agreements were not use agreements, but were valid contracts, and enjoined Accel from operating terminals at the establishments. The appellate court and the Illinois Supreme court held that the circuit courts lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the Board has exclusive authority over contracts for the placement of video gaming terminals. The comprehensive statutory scheme vests jurisdiction over video gaming operations with the Board; the agreements purport to control placement and operation of video gaming terminals. View "J&J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc." on Justia Law

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In 2005, Masterklad built a house in Glenview, including a brick patio that extended off the rear of the house. Because the ground underneath the patio sloped down, dirt and gravel were placed underneath it to support the bricks and make them level with the house's rear entrance. A retaining wall was built to contain the fill. In 2007, the house was sold by Masterklad to a Lubeck for $1,710,000. In the contract Lubeck “knowingly, voluntarily, fully and forever,” waived the implied warranty of habitability in exchange for an express warranty provided by Masterklad, with a one-year term. In 2010, Lubeck sold the house to Fattah, for $1,050,000, with a document stating that the house was being sold “as is” and that the seller made no representations or warranty regarding its condition. In 2011, parts of the retaining wall around the rear patio gave way and part of the patio collapsed. The owner sued. The circuit court found that the patio wall had given way due to latent defects in its construction, but that plaintiff could not recover because Masterklad had executed a valid, enforceable waiver of the implied warranty of habitability with Lubeck. The appellate court reversed. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed. The implied warranty of habitability may not be extended to a second purchaser of a house when a valid, bargained-for waiver of the warranty has been executed between the builder-vendor and the first purchaser. View "Fattah v. Bim" on Justia Law

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After the 2004 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the Unions and the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) expired, the retiree health care benefits were the subject of an interest arbitration award. That award, which modified the retiree health care benefits, was accepted by the CTA and the Unions. Current and retired employees who had begun work with the CTA before 2001 challenged that award in a putative class action, asserting breach of contract, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duty, and that the arbitration award was unenforceable under article XIII, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution, the “pension protection clause.” The circuit court ruled that the retired CTA employees had standing to challenge the modifications to their retiree health care benefits, but current CTA employees lacked standing, then dismissed for failure to state a claim. The appellate court agreed that current employees lacked standing but held that the retirees had a vested right to receive the health care benefits that were provided in the prior CBA and had stated claims for breach of that contract and for promissory estoppel. The Illinois Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who retired before the effective date of the 2007 CBA had standing; other retirees and current employees lacked standing. Dismissal of the claim for promissory estoppel against the CTA was proper; the complaint stated claims for breach of contract and under the pension protection clause. View "Matthews v. Chicago Transit Auth." on Justia Law