Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellants Thomas and Vera Gladden appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Respondent Palmetto Home Inspection Services, alleging the limit of liability provision in a home inspection contract was unenforceable as violative of public policy and as unconscionable under the facts of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that contractual limitation of a home inspector's liability did not violate South Carolina public policy as expressed by the General Assembly and, as a matter of law, was not so oppressive that no reasonable person would make it and no fair and honest person would accept it. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the inspector. View "Gladden v. Palmetto Home Inspections" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the scope of an arbitration clause under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Respondent Christopher Landers served as Appellant Atlantic Bank & Trust's executive vice president pursuant to an employment contract. The contract contained a broad arbitration provision. Respondent alleged five causes of action, namely that he was constructively terminated from his employment as a result of Appellant Neal Arnold's tortious conduct towards him. Appellants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the employment contract. The trial court found that only Respondent's breach of contract claim was subject to the arbitration provision, while his other four causes of action comprised of several tort and corporate claims were not within the scope of the arbitration clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed: "Landers' pleadings provide a clear nexus between his claims and the employment contract sufficient to establish a significant relationship to the employment agreement. We find the claims are within the scope of the agreement's broad arbitration provision." The Court reversed the trial court's order and held that all of Respondent's causes of action must be arbitrated. View "Landers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

From 2002 through 2004, George Harper and his law firm at that time, Jackson Lewis, represented EnerSys Delaware, Inc. in a variety of employment and labor law matters. Harper served as EnerSys' attorney of record in at least five employment-related lawsuits during this time. The relationship between Jackson Lewis and EnerSys deteriorated in 2004 when EnerSys brought a malpractice claim against the firm based on some labor-related legal advice that it claimed resulted in fraudulent testimony. In 2011, EnerSys filed this suit against a former EnerSys employee, Tammy Hopkins, alleging six causes of action including breach of contract based on violations of the confidentiality agreement and various computer use policies and agreements, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. When EnerSys learned that Hopkins had retained Harper to represent her, it moved to have him disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Harper's previous assistance in developing EnerSys' litigation strategy was insufficient grounds upon which to disqualify him due to the dissimilarities of his previous representations and the current suit. EnerSys then filed this appeal. This case presented the question of whether the denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court held it was not and dismissed the case as interlocutory. View "EnerSys Delaware v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

A group of retired firefighters and police officers who worked for the City of Columbia all elected to have group health insurance provided to them by the city. Prior to July 2009, the City paid all costs to fund the group health insurance for employees and retirees. The retirees received newsletters stating that their health insurance was free and were told by the City's human resources department that retiree health insurance would be at no cost to the retiree. In planning the 2009-2010 budget, the City considered a number of cost-saving measures including shifting part of rising health care costs to participants in the group health plan. The retirees sued under claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the retirees' causes of action. Seven of the thirteen retirees appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly granted summary judgment against the retirees on their contract and estoppels claims to the extent that those claims were based on an employee handbook and benefits booklet each received when they were hired. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against the retirees on their estoppel claims based upon representations made by their supervisors and the City's human resources personnel. View "Bishop v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

Andrew Ballard worked for years crafting a plan for a marina through Warpath Development, Inc., the business he had incorporated for this purpose. He eventually sought the investment and involvement of Tim Roberson, Rick Thoennes, Rick Thoennes, III (collectively, Appellants) to help realize the idea. When the marina did not develop the way the Appellants had hoped, they began to exclude Ballard from involvement with Warpath, leading Ballard to file suit against the individual Appellants and Warpath. The circuit court found Appellants had acted oppressively to Ballard as a minority shareholder and ordered the purchase of Ballard's stock at fair market value. The court also ordered the individual Appellants to place 60,000 shares of Warpath stock in escrow. On appeal, Appellants argued that the facts do not support the court's holdings. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ballard v. Roberson" on Justia Law

Appellant Jay Warren appealed an order that denied his Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b)(1), SCRCP motions, as well as his independent motion to set aside a judgment sale. On appeal, he contested only the denial of his motion to set aside. Warren is a state bail bondsman, and Respondent Arrow Bonding Company is also in the bond business. Warren agreed to be responsible if a mutual client forfeited a surety bond issued by Respondent. In October 2006, Respondent obtained a $5,120.00 judgment against Warren after the client forfeited. In August 2007, the clerk issued a Judgment Execution, and on September 19, 2007, the sheriff issued an Execution Account Statement. In this statement, he reported receiving a $1,000 payment from Warren, from which he deducted his $52.50 fee, leaving $947.50 to be applied against the debt. After deducting the $947.50 and adding the interest accrued as of September 19, 2007, Warren's judgment debt stood at $4,705.15. In January 2008, Respondent brought an action to foreclose its judgment lien. Warren did not answer, and the clerk granted Respondent's motions, ordering entry of the default against Warren, and referring the matter to the Master-in-Equity. On the sales day, Warren went to the sheriff's office and tendered the amount due under the original judgment, not the amount then due in light of the accumulated interest and other fees. The Master issued a deed to Respondent, who bought all of Warren's properties, which were sold at the sale as a single lot, leaving a deficiency. Warren filed a motion to set aside the default order under Rule 55(c) and/or Rule 60(b), and to set aside the foreclosure deed. The Master denied all relief requested, and denied the request to reconsider his decision. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the Master did not err in refusing to set aside the sale or by selling the properties as a single lot. View "Arrow Bonding Company v. Warren" on Justia Law

Stephen E. Lipscomb ("Appellant"), the manager of SEL Properties, LLC ("SEL") appealed a jury verdict against him for tortious interference with a contract entered into by SEL with Dutch Fork Development Group, II, LLC and Dutch Fork Realty, LLC (collectively "Respondents"). Appellant contended that he could not be held individually liable in tort for a contract that was breached by SEL. Alternatively, Appellant challenged the jury's award of $3,000,000 in actual damages to Respondents on grounds: (1) that the trial judge erred in charging the jury that lost customers and lost goodwill were elements of damages as there was no evidence of such damages; and (2) that the award was improper and should have been reduced as the actual damages for the tort claim were "coextensive" with or subsumed in the jury's award of actual damages to Respondents for the breach of contract claim against SEL. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict as to the claim of tortious interference with a contract. Accordingly, the Court reversed the jury's award of damages. View "Dutch Fork Development v. SEL Properties" on Justia Law

Appellant RFT Management Co., L.L.C. (RFT) brought this action against respondents Tinsley & Adams, L.L.P. and attorney Welborn D. Adams (collectively, Law Firm) based on their legal representation of RFT during the closing of its purchase of two real estate investment properties in Greenwood County. RFT alleged claims for (1) professional negligence (legal malpractice), (2) breach of fiduciary duty, (3) violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act1 (UTPA), and (4) aiding and abetting a securities violation in contravention of the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act of 2005 (SCUSA). The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of Law Firm on RFT's causes of action regarding the UTPA and SCUSA, and it merged RFT's breach of fiduciary claim with its legal malpractice claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Law Firm on RFT's remaining claim for legal malpractice. RFT appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case from the Court of Appeals for its review. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court with respect to all issues brought on appeal. View "RFT Management Co. v. Tinsley & Adams" on Justia Law

Milliken & Company sued Brian Morin after he resigned from the company and started a new venture using Milliken's proprietary information. The primary basis of the suit was that Morin breached the confidentiality and invention assignment agreements he signed when he started working for Milliken. A jury found for Milliken, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the narrow issue of whether these agreements are overbroad as a matter of law. Upon review, the Court held that they were not and affirmed as modified. View "Milliken & Company v. Morin" on Justia Law

South Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. (Farm Bureau) brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether Henry Kennedy was entitled to underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage for an accident. The trial court found Kennedy was entitled to UIM coverage under the terms of the policy because Kennedy was "upon" and thus "occupying" the insured vehicle at the time of the accident. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted Kennedy's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the appellate court's decision. Initially, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's finding of actual physical contact was supported by the evidence. The trial court found Kennedy had left the engine running on his employer's vehicle; that he was in physical contact with the covered vehicle (with his hand on the truck) when the other vehicle careened towards him, forcing him to relinquish his contact in order to attempt to avoid injury; that Kennedy was "upon" and "occupying" the vehicle at the time of the accident; and he was entitled to UIM coverage under the Farm Bureau policy. Moreover, a second, resultant physical contact was established when Kennedy was pinned against the insured vehicle. The Supreme Court concluded that a requirement that an insured remain in physical contact with the insured vehicle in the face of imminent danger was unreasonable and unconscionable. Consequently, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.