Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Standard Fire Insurance Company appealed a court of appeals' decision that reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in its favor, and finding respondents Thomas, Debra, and Christopher were entitled to stack underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage despite an exclusion in Standard Fire's policy purporting to limit an insured's ability to stack such coverage when the vehicles insured under the subject policy were not involved in the accident. After review of the trial and appellate court records, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Carter v. Standard Fire Insurance" on Justia Law

Hard Hat Workforce Solutions, LLC (Hard Hat) appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Great American Insurance Company (GAI). Hard Hat argued it was entitled to make a claim against a payment bond GAI issued on a construction project. The threshold issue in this case was whether Hard Hat's bond claim must comply with section 29-5-440's "notice of furnishing" provision. The Supreme Court found it did not: three e-mails Hard Hat sent to a subcontractor, Walker White, created an issue of fact as to whether Hard Hat satisfied section 29-5-440's notice provisions. View "Hard Hat Workforce v. Mechanical HVAC" on Justia Law

The contract between the general contractor and subcontractor provided for arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. When a complaint was filed, the general contractor Appellant Sean Barnes and property owner Appellant Wando E. sought to enforce the construction contract's arbitration clause. The trial court refused to compel arbitration on the basis that the contract did not sufficiently impact interstate commerce. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in finding the parties' transaction had an insufficient nexus to interstate commerce and reversed. View "Cape Romain v. Wando E., LLC" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court erred when it found a commercial general liability (CGL) policy provided coverage when a brick face was damaged by improper cleaning after the insured general contractor completed its installation. After review, the Court concluded the policy did not provide coverage. View "Bennett & Bennett Construction v. Auto Owners Insurance" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was a court of appeals' finding that Wachovia Bank, N.A. committed the unauthorized practice of law in closing a home equity loan in 2001. In 2001, Michael Coffey obtained a home equity line of credit from the Bank, using a Hilton Head Island home as collateral. While the mortgage documents the Bank prepared contained language that Michael owned the home, he was not on the title to the home. It belonged to his wife Ann alone. Ann did not sign the line of credit papers. The money was used to purchase a sailboat, the title of which placed in the name of A&M Partners, a company both Michael and Ann jointly owned. Michael made payments on the boat from a personal checking account. He died in 2005, and Ann continued to make payments from the same personal checking account until she decided to sell the boat through a broker. The Broker checked the status of the Bank's loan. It informed Ann that there was no lien or mortgage on the boat. Believing that the boat was then paid for, she sold the boat in 2006 and stopped making payments. Six months later, the Bank filed a foreclosure action against Michael's estate. Ann moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted her motion for summary judgment, citing the Bank's failure to perform due diligence to see that Michael did not own the property the Bank used as collateral for the loan. Finding that the Bank never held a valid mortgage, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant summary judgment. View "Wachovia Bank v. Coffey" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent Action Concrete Contractors, Inc. in a mechanic's lien foreclosure action. Owners Elvira Chappelear, Craig Chappelear, Premier Southern Homes, LLC, Henry G. Beal, Jr. and First Citizens Bank and Trust Co., Inc. argued on appeal there were material issues of fact and that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. The Supreme Court disagreed after its review of the trial court record and affirmed. View "Action Concrete v. Chappelear" on Justia Law

Petitioner Shannon Hutchinson was the beneficiary of a mortgage life insurance policy. She sued Liberty Life Insurance Company after it denied her benefits under a policy exclusion for injury resulting from the insured's being intoxicated. The insured-decedent was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of his accidental death. The circuit court granted Petitioner summary judgment, finding methamphetamine was not a narcotic under the policy. The appellate court reversed, finding the plain meaning of "narcotic" was enough to qualify as a narcotic. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court; the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding the appellate court ready the policy exclusion to deny coverage for injuries from unlawful use of intoxicating substances: "this reading rewrites rather than interprets the insurance policy's exclusionary clause." View "Hutchinson v. Liberty Life Insurance" on Justia Law

Alea London Limited (insurer) appealed a circuit court's denial of its motion to set aside an order of a special referee that granted Respondent Elisa Narruhn an assignment of rights in supplemental proceedings held in conjunction with another lawsuit. The underlying suit was filed after Respondent was shot while attending a nightclub in Myrtle Beach. A special referee was appointed to conduct supplemental proceedings to determine whether the club had any assets to satisfy Respondent's judgment. The referee granted Respondent an assignment of any and all rights, including any claims, the club might have had against the Insurer (which issued the club a liability insurance policy). Respondent subsequently sued the Insurer seeking damages for failing to pay or defend a claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court modified the circuit court's order, but affirmed. View "Narruhn v. Alea London Limited" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the interplay between the Subcontractors' and Suppliers' Payment Protection Act (SPPA), the Tort Claims Act (TCA), and the Court's opinion in "Sloan Construction Co. v. Southco Grassing, Inc. (Sloan I)," (659 S.E.2d 158 (2008)). When subcontractors Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. and Tindall Corporation (collectively Respondents) did not receive full payment from the general contractor Gilbert Group, LLC for their work on a public construction project for the City of Union, they filed suit, asserting the City failed to comply with the statutory bond requirements pertaining to contractors working with subcontractors on public projects found in the SPPA. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision, and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Furthermore, the Court clarified "Sloan I" and held that a governmental entity may be liable to a subcontractor only for breach of contract for failing to comply with the SPPA bonding requirements. View "Shirley's Iron Works v. City of Union" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision affirming the circuit court's order that upheld an arbitration award. The underlying dispute arose from a construction contract whereby general contractor respondent C-Sculptures, LLC agreed to build a home for Petitioners Gregory and Kerry Brown. The contract price was in excess of $800,000. However, Respondent only possessed what is referred to as a Group II license, limiting Respondent to construction projects that did not exceed $100,000. A dispute arose between the parties, and Respondent filed an action in circuit court seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien against Petitioners. Upon Petitioners' motion and pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties' contract, the circuit court matter was stayed pending arbitration. Petitioners sought to have the matter dismissed after they learned Respondent held only a Group II license. The arbitrator was apprised of the applicable law, but nevertheless denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss "after due consideration of all the evidence and authorities presented by the parties in this Arbitration." Respondent prevailed at arbitration, receiving an award of damages and an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. section 29-5-10(b) (Supp. 2012). Petitioners challenged the arbitration award, contending the arbitrator's denial of their motion to dismiss amounted to a manifest disregard of the law. Following adverse decisions in the circuit court and the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. Petitioners argue the court of appeals erred in refusing to find the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in declining to dismiss the action. Upon review, the Court agreed, and reversed the appellate court and directed that judgment be entered for Petitioners. View "C-Sculptures v. Brown" on Justia Law