Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellants Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, Uni-Health Post-Acute Care - Tanglewood, LLC (Tanglewood), and UHS-Pruitt Corporation (collectively, Appellants) ask this Court to reverse the circuit court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration in this wrongful death and survival action involving Appellants' allegedly negligent nursing home care. Tanglewood is a skilled nursing facility located in Ridgeway, owned and controlled by Appellants. In January 2007, Tanglewood and Respondent Darlene Dean entered into a nursing home residency agreement in which Tanglewood assumed responsibility for the care of Respondent's mother, Louise Porter (the patient). The same day, Respondent signed a separate, voluntary arbitration agreement. The patient did not sign either the residency agreement or the Agreement on her own behalf, although she was competent at the time of her admission to Tanglewood. Moreover, Respondent did not have a health care power of attorney empowering her to sign on the patient's behalf. In 2009, the patient fell three separate times within a ten day period, fracturing her hip in the third fall. Over the next two months, the patient underwent two hip surgeries; however, due to complications following the surgeries, the patient died on September 30, 2009. In late 2011, Respondent (acting in her capacity as personal representative of her mother's estate) filed a Notice of Intent (NOI) to file a medical malpractice suit against Appellants, as well as an expert affidavit in support of her NOI. Respondent also alleged claims for survival and wrongful death. In lieu of filing an answer to the complaint, Appellants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), SCRCP, or, in the alternative, a motion to compel arbitration and stay the litigation. Relying on "Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc.," (678 S.E.2d 435 (2009)), the circuit court invalidated the Agreement in its entirety and refused to compel arbitration between the parties. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit court denied. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Respondent's argument that Appellants' waived their right to enforce the Agreement was without merit. On remand, the Supreme Court mandated that the circuit court consider her remaining arguments (concerning Respondent's authority to sign the Agreement and whether there was a meeting of the minds between the parties) prior to deciding whether to compel arbitration between the parties. View "Dean v. Heritage Healthcare" on Justia Law

Petitioner was injured in a car accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by a co-employee. The liability limits of the at-fault driver were tendered, and there was no underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage on the vehicle in which he was riding. Therefore, Petitioner submitted a claim for UIM benefits under a Progressive insurance policy, issued to Sarah Severn. At the time of the accident, Petitioner resided with Severn and their child. He described Severn as "his on again off again fiancé." Both Petitioner's and Severn's names appear on the Declarations Page of the Policy under the heading "Drivers and household residents." Under the heading "Additional information," Severn is listed as the "Named insured." Progressive denied UIM coverage to Petitioner under Part III of the Policy. According to the affidavit filed by Progressive's Claims Injury Operations Manager, "[t]he claim was denied because [Petitioner] did not fall within the terms, provisions and conditions of [the Policy] to qualify for benefits under the [UIM] provisions," as Petitioner "was only listed as a 'driver' on the policy and not a named insured, nor was he a resident relative of the named insured." The Supreme Court granted Bell's petition for review of the court of appeals' decision affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Progressive Direct Insurance Company. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bell v. Progressive Direct Insurance" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court started from an agreement between Respondents, the University of South Carolina and the University Gamecock Club, and Appellant George M. Lee, III. In exchange for Appellant purchasing a $100,000 life insurance policy and naming the University the sole, irrevocable beneficiary of the policy, Appellant was given the "opportunity to purchase tickets" for his lifetime to University football and basketball games. Years later, the University instituted a program that required all Gamecock Club members, including Appellant, to pay a seat license fee as a prerequisite for purchasing season tickets. Believing that the University could not require him to pay additional consideration for the opportunity to purchase tickets without violating the agreement, Appellant brought a declaratory judgment action. The trial court entered judgment for the University and the Gamecock Club, finding that Appellant was not deprived of the opportunity to purchase season tickets when the University instituted the seat license fees. The Supreme Court reversed: the Agreement unambiguously prohibited the University from requiring Lee to pay the seat license fee as a prerequisite for the opportunity to purchase tickets pursuant to the Agreement. View "Lee v. University of South Carolina" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether a subcontract for the maintenance of aircraft required a contractor to turn to a subcontractor for all maintenance the contractor needs to fulfill a contract with the United States Army. The contractor, DynCorp International, LLC, contended the contract did not create an exclusive relationship between the parties and it could send aircraft to other maintenance providers. The subcontractor, Stevens Aviation, contended the contract was a requirements contract under which DynCorp had to send all aircraft requiring maintenance to Stevens. Stevens moved for a partial summary judgment on the issue, the trial court granted the motion, and the court of appeals reversed and granted partial summary judgment to DynCorp. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision in part and affirmed in part, holding the contract was a requirements contract for certain aircraft. View "Stevens Aviation v. DynCorp International" on Justia Law

In anticipation of the opening of the University of South Carolina's new basketball arena, the University of South Carolina and the University of South Carolina Gamecock Club distributed a brochure to high-level Gamecock Club members. The brochure offered the opportunity to purchase premium seating including a number of amenities for basketball games and other events held at the arena. The brochure offered members the opportunity to purchase these tickets over a "five year term." Members were to pay $5,000 per seat in the first year and $1,500 per seat each year in years two through five. Appellants claimed that Athletic Department employees promised Appellants that, after year five, they would only have to maintain their Gamecock Club membership and pay the face value of season tickets to retain these premium seats. Appellants accepted the University's offer and made the required payments for years one through five. After the fifth year, the University contacted Appellants and requested a $1,500 payment per seat for the sixth year of premium seating. Appellants brought an action against the University alleging breach of contract and seeking specific performance. After discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial judge denied Appellants' motion and granted the University's motion, finding that due to the absence of a written contract the statute of frauds barred Appellants' claims. The Supreme Court concluded the statute of frauds applied in the first instance, but that a question of fact existed concerning the question of equitable estoppel, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. View "Springob v. University of South Carolina " on Justia Law

In 2005, Winyah Bay Holdings, LLC held an event aimed at selling marsh-front lots located in South Island Plantation, an affluent, unbuilt housing development. Winyah conducted the sale by lottery, and geared the event toward on-the-spot sales. Winyah had Wachovia Bank and two unrelated realty and marketing companies (the Realtors) set up booths to promote financing the lot sales. Respondents alleged that Winyah, the Realtors, and Wachovia further enticed potential buyers by promising that "day docks, roads, infrastructure, pool [sic], marsh walks, and other amenities would be in place within 18 months of the lottery." Respondents William and Judith Blackburn claimed these promises got them to participate in the lottery. Over six months later, Respondent William Blackburn delivered a promissory note to Wachovia in the amount of $463,967 to finance the purchase of one of the lots. The note was secured by a mortgage and unconditional personal guaranties executed by Tammy Winner, Watson Felder, and Respondents. Sometime in 2008, Respondents failed to make payments on the note. Wachovia then filed a foreclosure action. Respondents answered, asserting counterclaims against Wachovia, cross-claims against the South Island Plantation Association, Incorporated (the HOA), and a third-party complaint against the Seller and the Realtors. At issue here were the counterclaims against Wachovia, which included claims for negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, breach of contract/breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud/fraud in the inducement, breach of contract/negligence, breach of contract, civil conspiracy, illegality of contract, and violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (the SCUTPA). Wachovia appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the circuit court's determination that Respondents' counterclaims were within the scope of a jury trial waiver in the property sales documents. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the appellate courts' judgment finding that the waivers were executed knowingly and voluntarily; however, the Court reversed the portion finding that the outrageous and unforeseeable torts exception to arbitration applies in the jury trial waiver context, and found instead that Respondents waived their right to a jury trial on all of their counterclaims. View "Wachovia Bank v. Blackburn" on Justia Law

White Oak Manor, Inc. owns and operates a nursing home in York. After sustaining injuries from the improper replacement of a feeding tube, a White Oak resident filed a lawsuit against the nursing home. White Oak ultimately settled the lawsuit without the involvement of its insurer, Lexington Insurance Company. White Oak subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action against Lexington to determine coverage for the malpractice claim. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court concerned the validity of a service-of-suit clause in an insurance policy in light of Section 15-9-270 of the South Carolina Code (2005) which provides for service of process on an insurer through the Director of the Department of Insurance. The circuit court upheld the service-of-suit clause and refused to relieve the insurer from default judgment. The court of appeals reversed, holding section 15-9-270 provided the exclusive method for serving an insurance company. In its review, the Supreme Court disagreed that section 15-9-270 provided the exclusive means of service on an insurer and held that insurance policy provisions creating alternative methods of service are valid and binding on insurers. Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision was reversed. View "White Oak Manor v. Lexington Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In 2006, DLI Properties, LLC (DLI), hired Allen Tate, a real estate brokerage firm, and Faile, Allen Tate's licensee, to serve as its agents in connection with the sale of certain real property in Lancaster, South Carolina. Petitioners, using Sharon Davis of Davis Integrity Realty, Inc. as their broker, offered to purchase the property. Petitioners sued Respondents alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (the SCUTPA) based on DLI's acceptance of an offer on the property and Faile's representation that DLI would accept Petitioner's offer. Petitioners claimed Respondents made misrepresentations concerning the validity and effectiveness of their agreement to purchase the property. Petitioners asserted Respondents had a duty of care to communicate truthful information to Petitioners, and breached that duty by failing to disclose the ultimately successful offer, and the fact that DLI had not signed Petitioners' offer. Petitioners further alleged Respondents demonstrated a pattern of behavior sufficient to establish a SCUTPA violation. Petitioners appealed the circuit court's decision that granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondents. After careful consideration of the circumstances of the deal, the Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the appellate court erred only by not addressing the merits of Petitioners' appeal. On the merits, the Court affirmed the circuit court as modified. View "Woodson v. DLI Properties" on Justia Law

The Standard Fire Insurance Company appealed a court of appeals' decision that reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in its favor, and finding respondents Thomas, Debra, and Christopher were entitled to stack underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage despite an exclusion in Standard Fire's policy purporting to limit an insured's ability to stack such coverage when the vehicles insured under the subject policy were not involved in the accident. After review of the trial and appellate court records, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Carter v. Standard Fire Insurance" on Justia Law

Hard Hat Workforce Solutions, LLC (Hard Hat) appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Great American Insurance Company (GAI). Hard Hat argued it was entitled to make a claim against a payment bond GAI issued on a construction project. The threshold issue in this case was whether Hard Hat's bond claim must comply with section 29-5-440's "notice of furnishing" provision. The Supreme Court found it did not: three e-mails Hard Hat sent to a subcontractor, Walker White, created an issue of fact as to whether Hard Hat satisfied section 29-5-440's notice provisions. View "Hard Hat Workforce v. Mechanical HVAC" on Justia Law