Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Republican Valley Biofuels (RVBF) issued a confidential private placement memorandum seeking investors in a biodiesel production facility. DMK Biodiesel (DMK) and Lanoha RVBF (Lanoha) invested $600,000 and $400,000 respectively in RVBF, which was being promoted by four individuals (Promoters). Renewable Fuels Technology (Renewable Fuels) was the manager of RVBF. DMK and Lanoha entered into and executed separate subscription agreements with RVBF. DMK and Lanoha later filed a complaint against Renewable Fuels and Promoters, alleging that Defendants fraudulently induced them to invest funds in RVBF. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to take judicial notice, requesting the district court to take judicial notice of the confidential private placement memorandum for RVBF and the subscription agreements executed between RVBF and DMK and Lanoha. The district court granted the motions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the private placement memorandum and the subscription agreements were properly considered matters outside the pleading, an evidentiary hearing was required. Remanded. View "DMK Biodiesel, LLC v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors of Fluvanna County filed a complaint against Davenport & Company asserting that Davenport, which served as the financial advisor to the Board, knowingly made false representations and used its fiduciary position to persuade the Board to hire Davenport as an advisor regarding the financing of the construction of a new high school. Davenport filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the circuit court granted on the basis that the separation of powers doctrine prevented the court from resolving the controversy because the court would have to inquire into the motives of the Board's legislative decision making. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board effectively waived its common law legislative immunity from civil liability and the burden of litigation, and therefore the circuit court erred in sustaining Davenport's demurrer on these grounds. View "Bd. of Supervisors of Fluvanna County v. Davenport & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

Pagliara, a licensed securities broker for more than 25 years, maintained a spotless record with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) except for this case. Under a 2002 licensing agreement, Pagliara served both Capital Trust and NBC until 2008. During that time, Butler followed Pagliara’s recommendation to invest $100,000 in bank stocks that later lost value. Butler’s attorney threatened to sue NBC and Pagliara. NBC retained JBPR for defense. Unbeknownst to NBC and JBPR, Pagliara offered to settle the claim for $14,900, $100 below FINRA’s mandatory reporting threshold. Butler refused. Pagliara then informed NBC of his intent to defend the claim in FINRA Arbitration and objected to any settlement of the “frivolous claim.” NBC insisted that Pagliara not have any contact with Butler, based on the License Agreement signed by the parties, which stated that: “NBCS, at its sole option and without the prior approval of either [Capital Trust] or the applicable Representative, may settle or compromise any claim at any time.” JBPR finalized a $30,000 settlement without obtaining a release for Pagliara. Pagliara sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and intentional infliction of harm. The district court rejected the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Pagliara v. Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose, LLP" on Justia Law

Carilion initiated an arbitration proceeding against UBS and Citi under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) Rule 12200, which required FINRA members to arbitrate disputes with a customer at the customer's request. UBS and Citi commenced this action to enjoin the arbitration proceedings, contending that Carilion was not a "customer" as that term was used in FINRA Rule 12200 and that, in any event, Carilion waived any right to arbitrate by agreeing to the forum selection clause contained in written agreements with UBS and Citi. The court concluded that Carilion, by purchasing UBS and Citi's services, was indeed a "customer" entitled to arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 and that the forum selection clause did not have the effect of superseding or waiving Carilion's right to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of UBS and Citi's motion for injunctive relief. View "UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. and Regions Bank (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Regions") appealed an order of the Baldwin Circuit Court which granted in part and denied in part their motions to compel arbitration in an action filed against them by Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC ("BCSS"). In 2001 BCSS began discussing with AmSouth Bank ("AmSouth"), the predecessor-in-interest to Regions Bank, options to finance its existing debt. AmSouth recommended that BCSS finance its debt through variable-rate demand notes ("VRDNs").1 In its complaint, BCSS alleged that in late 2008 it received a notice of a substantial increase in the variable interest rates on its 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007 VRDNs, which constituted BCSS's first notice that the interest-rate-swap agreements recommended by Regions did not fix the interest rate on the VRDNs but, instead, exposed BCSS to "an entirely new increased level of market risk in the highly complex derivative market." BCSS sued Regions Bank and Morgan Keegan asserting that Regions falsely represented to BCSS that swap agreements fixed BCSS's interest rates on all the BCSS debt that had been financed through the VRDNs. Following a hearing on the motions to compel arbitration, the trial court entered an order in which it granted the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the credit agreements but denied the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the failure of the swap transactions to provide a fixed interest rate. The trial court reasoned that the "Jurisdiction" clause in a master agreement, in combination with its merger clause, "prevent[ed] any argument that the VRDN arbitration agreement applies to disputes concerning the swap agreements" and that those clauses demonstrated that it was "the parties' intention, as it relates to the interest-swap agreement and any transaction related to that agreement, that the parties would not arbitrate but instead [any dispute] would be resolved by proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Regions presented evidence of the existence of a contract requiring arbitration of the disputes at issue. The Court reversed the order of the trial court denying the motions to compel arbitration of BCSS's claims concerning the master agreement and the swap agreement and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Regions Bank v. Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC " on Justia Law

Central Mortgage and Morgan Stanley entered into a contract concerning the purchase of servicing rights for loans that Morgan Stanley planned to sell to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the agencies) and private investors. Subsequently, many of the loans for which Morgan Stanley sold the servicing rights began to fall delinquent. The agencies exercised their contract right to put delinquent agency loans back to Central Mortgage. Central Mortgage then filed a complaint against Morgan Stanley for breach of contract. The Chancery Court granted Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the claims were legally sufficient to withstand the motion. Central Mortgage then filed an amended complaint to add new claims for additional agency loans (new loans) that had been put back by the agencies and to challenge the private loans. Morgan Stanley moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The Chancery Court (1) denied the motion to dismiss to the extent that it rehashed theories that the Court and Supreme Court already considered in the context of its original motion to dismiss; but (2) granted the motion to dismiss the claims related to the new loans because those claims were barred by Delaware's statute of limitations. View "Central Mortgage Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC" on Justia Law

During an eight-month period, Plaintiff and Counterclaim-Defendant Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. (“Hemispherx”) hired three different investment brokers to raise capital for it. Hemispherx hired the first two brokers at a time when it was difficult to sell Hemispherx’s stock. Months later, when market forces made Hemispherx’s stock much more attractive, Hemispherx hired a third broker was able very quickly to raise $31 million in capital for Hemispherx through stock sales. All three brokers focused their capital-raising efforts on several of the same prospective investors and, when several of those investors eventually purchased Hemispherx stock, a dispute arose as to which of the three brokers was entitled to a commission on the stock sales. The first investment broker Hemispherx hired, Defendant and Counterclaimant Mid-South Capital, Inc. (“Mid-South”), sought to recover a commission for its efforts in identifying investors and introducing them to Hemispherx. Hemispherx contendsed that Mid-South and its employees, Defendants Robert Rosenstein and Adam Cabibi, tortiously interfered with Hemispherx’s business relationship with its investors and with the third investment broker who ultimately closed the stock deals at issue here. The district court denied each party relief, granting judgment on the pleadings to Hemispherx on Mid-South’s breach-of-contract claim, and summary judgment to Hemispherx on Mid-South’s remaining claims and to Mid-South on Hemispherx’s intentional interference with business relationships claim. After review of the matter, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court in granting summary judgment to Mid-South on the tortious interference claim; reversed the judgment on the pleadings on Mid-South's breach-of-contract claim; and reversed the grant of summary judgment for Hemispherx on Mid-South's promissory estoppel, quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Mid-South Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

Aladdin’s purportedly gross mismanagement allegedly caused plaintiffs to lose their entire $60 million investment in a collateralized debt obligation. A CDO pays investors based on performance of an underlying asset. The CDO at issue was “synthetic” in that its asset was not a traditional asset like a stock or bond, but was a derivative instrument, whose value was determined in reference to still other assets. The derivative instrument was a “credit default swap” between Aladdin CDO and Goldman Sachs based on the debt of approximately 100 corporate entities and sovereign states. The district court held that, because of a contract provision limiting intended third-party beneficiaries to those “specifically provided herein,” plaintiffs could not bring a third-party beneficiary breach of contract claim and could not “recast” their claim in tort. The Second Circuit reversed. Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the parties intended the contract to benefit investors in the CDO directly and create obligations running from Aladdin to the investors; that the relationship between Aladdin and plaintiffs was sufficiently close to create a duty in tort; and that Aladdin acted with gross negligence in managing the investment portfolio, leading to the failure of the investment vehicle and plaintiffs’ losses. View "Bayerische Landesbank, NY v. Aladdin Capital Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff owned a rental center and retained defendants, who provide investment banking services to the equipment rental industry, to help him obtain an investor or buyer. Defendants’ advice culminated in sale of a majority of plaintiff’s stock for about $30 million. Defendants billed plaintiff $758,675. Plaintiff paid without complaint but later sued for return of the entire fee on the ground that defendants lacked a brokerage license required by Wis. Stats. 452.01(2)(a), 452.03. The district court dismissed, finding the parties equally at fault. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, declining to definitively answer whether a license was required under the circumstances that a negotiated sale of assets fell through in favor of a sale of stock. Plaintiff is not entitled to relief even if there was a violation. Referring to the classic Highwayman’s Case, the court rejected claims of in pari delicto and unclean hands; plaintiff was not equally at fault. To bar relief, however, is not punishing a victim. Plaintiff did not incur damages and is not entitled to restitution. Plaintiff sought compensation for spotting a violation and incurring expenses to punish the violator, a bounty-hunter or private attorney general theory, not recognized under Wisconsin law. The voluntary-payment doctrine is inapplicable.

This action involved claims of fraud and breach of fiduciary against an individual defendant, a former investment professional accused of having committed a massive fraud related to a quantitatively-based trading program that he allegedly developed to trade futures contracts. Plaintiffs, as a result of their association with defendant and Paron, the firm they founded with defendant, claimed that they have been stigmatized and thus face dismal prospects of finding employment in the financial services industry. The court found that defendant committed fraud and breached his fiduciary duties to plaintiff and Paron by making false statements of fact about his program, his investment track record, and his personal financial situation. As a result, plaintiffs were entitled to extensive damages against defendant based on their lost future earnings and other costs associated with the formation and operation of Paron. The court also awarded plaintiffs limited injunctive relief requiring defendant to destroy or return copies of Paron's trading program and to stop marketing any versions of that trading program.