Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Michael Hirsch, Robyn Hirsch, and Hirsch, LLP, claimed that they lost money invested in securities that were part of a "Ponzi" scheme. In 2002, plaintiffs' accountant, EisnerAmper LLP, referred them to Marc Scudillo, a financial advisor employed by Amper Financial Services, LLC (AFS), for investment planning. Scudillo also served as a representative for Securities America, Inc. (SAI), a separate corporation that served as a broker-dealer handling securities transactions. Plaintiffs hired Scudillo and invested in a portfolio with a conservative investment strategy. Their relationship was not reduced to a written contract. On Scudillo's recommendation, plaintiffs purchased securitized notes from Medical Provider Financial Corporation (Med Cap) totaling $550,000. Plaintiffs signed two applications with SAI for the purchase of the Med Cap notes. Each SAI application contained an arbitration clause requiring disputes to be arbitrated by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal was whether it was proper to compel arbitration between a non-signatory and a signatory to a contract containing an arbitration clause on the basis that the parties and claims were sufficiently intertwined to warrant application of equitable estoppel. The Supreme Court held that although traditional contract principles may in certain cases warrant compelling arbitration absent an arbitration clause, the relationship of the parties in this case and the claims in dispute here, viewed alone, was insufficient to warrant application of equitable estoppel to compel arbitration. View "Hirsch v. Amper Financial Services, LLC" on Justia Law

PFG and Acuvest had an agreement (later terminated) under which guaranteed Acuvest’s customers that Acuvest would conform its conduct to CEA mandates. Acuvest advised Prestwick with respect to an investment on which it suffered a substantial loss. Prestwick sued PFG, Acuvest, and two of Acuvest’s principals, alleging violations of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. 1, a breach of fiduciary duty against the Acuvest defendants, and a guarantor liability claim against PFG. Prestwick argued that termination of PFG’s guarantee of Acuvest’s obligations under the CEA did not terminate protection “for existing accounts opened during the term of the guarantee.” The district court awarded summary judgment to PFG and dismissed the remaining defendants with prejudice so that Prestwick could appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that contracts between the parties were definitive and rejecting Prestwick’s assertion public policy and estoppel to overcome a decision that the guarantee agreement was properly terminated. View "Prestwick Capital Mgmt., Ltd. v. Peregrine Fin. Grp., Inc." on Justia Law

The Attorney General (AG) sued two of the former officers of American International Group, Inc. (AIG), alleging that Defendants violated the Martin Act and committed common law fraud. Specifically, the AG claimed that Defendants helped cause AIG to enter into a sham transaction with General Reinsurance Corporation (GenRe) in which AIG purported to reinsure GenRe on certain insurance contracts. The AG withdrew his claims for damages and now sought only equitable relief. The Appellate Division denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence of Defendants' knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the transaction was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact; and (2) the AG was not barred as a matter of law from obtaining equitable relief. View "People v. Greenberg" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) notified Bear Stearns & Co. and Bear Stearns Securities Corp. of its intention to charge Bear Stearns with violations of federal securities laws. Bear Stearns agreed to pay $160 million as a disgorgement and $90 million as a civil penalty. Bear Stearns then sought indemnification from its insurers (Insurers), requesting indemnity for the $160 million SEC disgorgement payment. Insurers denied coverage. Bear Stearns subsequently brought this breach of contract and declaratory judgment action against Insurers. Insurers unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that, as a matter of public policy, Bear Stearns could not seek coverage under its policies for any of the SEC disgorgement payment. Bear Stearns appealed, arguing that, while it was reasonable to preclude an insured from obtaining indemnity for the disgorgement of its own illegal gains, Bear Stearns was not unjustly enriched by at least $140 million of the disgorgement payment, the sum attributable to the profits of its customers. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Insurers did not meet their burden of establishing, as a matter of law, that Bear Stearns was barred from pursuing insurance coverage under its policies. View "J.P. Morgan Sec. Inc. v. Vigilant Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Republican Valley Biofuels (RVBF) issued a confidential private placement memorandum seeking investors in a biodiesel production facility. DMK Biodiesel (DMK) and Lanoha RVBF (Lanoha) invested $600,000 and $400,000 respectively in RVBF, which was being promoted by four individuals (Promoters). Renewable Fuels Technology (Renewable Fuels) was the manager of RVBF. DMK and Lanoha entered into and executed separate subscription agreements with RVBF. DMK and Lanoha later filed a complaint against Renewable Fuels and Promoters, alleging that Defendants fraudulently induced them to invest funds in RVBF. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to take judicial notice, requesting the district court to take judicial notice of the confidential private placement memorandum for RVBF and the subscription agreements executed between RVBF and DMK and Lanoha. The district court granted the motions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the private placement memorandum and the subscription agreements were properly considered matters outside the pleading, an evidentiary hearing was required. Remanded. View "DMK Biodiesel, LLC v. McCoy" on Justia Law

The Board of Supervisors of Fluvanna County filed a complaint against Davenport & Company asserting that Davenport, which served as the financial advisor to the Board, knowingly made false representations and used its fiduciary position to persuade the Board to hire Davenport as an advisor regarding the financing of the construction of a new high school. Davenport filed a demurrer to the complaint, which the circuit court granted on the basis that the separation of powers doctrine prevented the court from resolving the controversy because the court would have to inquire into the motives of the Board's legislative decision making. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board effectively waived its common law legislative immunity from civil liability and the burden of litigation, and therefore the circuit court erred in sustaining Davenport's demurrer on these grounds. View "Bd. of Supervisors of Fluvanna County v. Davenport & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

Pagliara, a licensed securities broker for more than 25 years, maintained a spotless record with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) except for this case. Under a 2002 licensing agreement, Pagliara served both Capital Trust and NBC until 2008. During that time, Butler followed Pagliara’s recommendation to invest $100,000 in bank stocks that later lost value. Butler’s attorney threatened to sue NBC and Pagliara. NBC retained JBPR for defense. Unbeknownst to NBC and JBPR, Pagliara offered to settle the claim for $14,900, $100 below FINRA’s mandatory reporting threshold. Butler refused. Pagliara then informed NBC of his intent to defend the claim in FINRA Arbitration and objected to any settlement of the “frivolous claim.” NBC insisted that Pagliara not have any contact with Butler, based on the License Agreement signed by the parties, which stated that: “NBCS, at its sole option and without the prior approval of either [Capital Trust] or the applicable Representative, may settle or compromise any claim at any time.” JBPR finalized a $30,000 settlement without obtaining a release for Pagliara. Pagliara sued, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, and intentional infliction of harm. The district court rejected the claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Pagliara v. Johnston Barton Proctor & Rose, LLP" on Justia Law

Carilion initiated an arbitration proceeding against UBS and Citi under the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA) Rule 12200, which required FINRA members to arbitrate disputes with a customer at the customer's request. UBS and Citi commenced this action to enjoin the arbitration proceedings, contending that Carilion was not a "customer" as that term was used in FINRA Rule 12200 and that, in any event, Carilion waived any right to arbitrate by agreeing to the forum selection clause contained in written agreements with UBS and Citi. The court concluded that Carilion, by purchasing UBS and Citi's services, was indeed a "customer" entitled to arbitration under FINRA Rule 12200 and that the forum selection clause did not have the effect of superseding or waiving Carilion's right to arbitrate. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of UBS and Citi's motion for injunctive relief. View "UBS Financial Services, Inc. v. Carilion Clinic" on Justia Law

Morgan Keegan & Company, Inc. and Regions Bank (hereinafter referred to collectively as "Regions") appealed an order of the Baldwin Circuit Court which granted in part and denied in part their motions to compel arbitration in an action filed against them by Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC ("BCSS"). In 2001 BCSS began discussing with AmSouth Bank ("AmSouth"), the predecessor-in-interest to Regions Bank, options to finance its existing debt. AmSouth recommended that BCSS finance its debt through variable-rate demand notes ("VRDNs").1 In its complaint, BCSS alleged that in late 2008 it received a notice of a substantial increase in the variable interest rates on its 2002, 2003, 2005, and 2007 VRDNs, which constituted BCSS's first notice that the interest-rate-swap agreements recommended by Regions did not fix the interest rate on the VRDNs but, instead, exposed BCSS to "an entirely new increased level of market risk in the highly complex derivative market." BCSS sued Regions Bank and Morgan Keegan asserting that Regions falsely represented to BCSS that swap agreements fixed BCSS's interest rates on all the BCSS debt that had been financed through the VRDNs. Following a hearing on the motions to compel arbitration, the trial court entered an order in which it granted the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the credit agreements but denied the motions to compel arbitration as to BCSS's claims concerning the failure of the swap transactions to provide a fixed interest rate. The trial court reasoned that the "Jurisdiction" clause in a master agreement, in combination with its merger clause, "prevent[ed] any argument that the VRDN arbitration agreement applies to disputes concerning the swap agreements" and that those clauses demonstrated that it was "the parties' intention, as it relates to the interest-swap agreement and any transaction related to that agreement, that the parties would not arbitrate but instead [any dispute] would be resolved by proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Regions presented evidence of the existence of a contract requiring arbitration of the disputes at issue. The Court reversed the order of the trial court denying the motions to compel arbitration of BCSS's claims concerning the master agreement and the swap agreement and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Regions Bank v. Baldwin County Sewer Service, LLC " on Justia Law

Central Mortgage and Morgan Stanley entered into a contract concerning the purchase of servicing rights for loans that Morgan Stanley planned to sell to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (the agencies) and private investors. Subsequently, many of the loans for which Morgan Stanley sold the servicing rights began to fall delinquent. The agencies exercised their contract right to put delinquent agency loans back to Central Mortgage. Central Mortgage then filed a complaint against Morgan Stanley for breach of contract. The Chancery Court granted Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the claims were legally sufficient to withstand the motion. Central Mortgage then filed an amended complaint to add new claims for additional agency loans (new loans) that had been put back by the agencies and to challenge the private loans. Morgan Stanley moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The Chancery Court (1) denied the motion to dismiss to the extent that it rehashed theories that the Court and Supreme Court already considered in the context of its original motion to dismiss; but (2) granted the motion to dismiss the claims related to the new loans because those claims were barred by Delaware's statute of limitations. View "Central Mortgage Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortgage Capital Holdings LLC" on Justia Law