Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This negligence and breach of contract action arose out of Plaintiff's fall in one of Defendant's stores. Plaintiff Maureen Habershaw appealed from the superior court's grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of Defendant, Michaels Stores. At issue on appeal was whether an allegation that a floor was shiny, standing alone, could withstand a challenge to a claim that a plaintiff was injured as a result of a dangerous condition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court did not err when it granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment because there was no issue of material fact about whether a dangerous condition existed at the time of Plaintiff's fall. To the contrary, the Court held, there was a complete absence of any evidence upon which Defendant's negligence could be established.

This insurance-coverage dispute arose after a driver of a leased vehicle struck and seriously injured a pedestrian. The vehicle, a BMW, was owned by BMW Financial Services. The pedestrian and her family sued the driver and BMW Financial for damages. Citizens Insurance Company provided a personal automobile policy listing the driver as an insured and BMW Financial as an additional insured lessor. A separate business auto insurance policy was issued by Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Companies to BMW Financial. The case settled, with Citizens and Empire paying their policy limits. Citizens reimbursed Empire for a portion of the costs Empire expended in legal expenses defending BMW Financial in the civil action but refused to provide Empire with any further reimbursement. Empire subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a determination that Citizens was liable for reimbursement of all attorneys' fees it incurred. The superior court granted Empire's motion for summary judgment. Citizens appealed, arguing that Empire was entitled only to a pro-rata apportionment of defense costs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that it would be improper to resort to a pro-rata apportionment of liability.

This appeal concerned the 2003 fire that occurred at the Station nightclub, wherein one hundred people died. The nightclub was co-owned by Plaintiffs, Michael and Jeffrey Derderian. A grand jury returned separate criminal indictments against Plaintiffs on charges of involuntary manslaughter. Prior to the fire, Essex Insurance Company had issued an insurance policy to Michael. Plaintiffs demanded, pursuant to R.I. Gen. Laws 12-28-5 and the policy, that Essex afford them a defense against the criminal prosecutions. When Essex refused, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Essex, seeking a declaratory judgment that the grand jury indictments against them constituted a suit as defined in the Essex policy and that, accordingly, Essex had a duty to provide them with a defense in the related criminal proceedings. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Essex. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the policy clearly showed that the parties' intention when entering into the contract was that Essex would provide Plaintiffs with a defense only in civil proceedings in which bodily injury or property damage were alleged, and therefore, Essex had no duty to defend Plaintiffs in their criminal prosecutions.

When Plaintiffs' efforts to act as general contractors on a new home foundered because of faulty work performed by a framing subcontractor, they made a claim on the homeowner's insurance policy issued to them by Defendant, Peerless Insurance Company. After Defendant denied the claim, citing two exclusions in the policy, Plaintiffs filed a declaratory-judgment action against the carrier. A hearing justice determined that the terms of the policy were ambiguous. Consequently, the hearing justice construed the policy against the insurer and entered judgment for the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err when she determined that the policy was ambiguous; and (2) Plaintiffs were entitled to coverage for the repairs that were necessary to bring their home into compliance with the applicable building code.

Plaintiff, an irrevocable trust, filed a complaint against Defendant, a university graduate student, alleging that he breached his lease agreement by painting over expensive historical wallpaper inside Plaintiff's nineteenth century building and by failing to pay the last month's rent. The superior court trial justice found that Defendant breached the lease by painting portions of the premises but ruled that Plaintiff had failed to prove that the trust had incurred damages that exceeded the amount of unpaid rent. The trial justice then awarded Plaintiff $1,600, plus interest, representing one month of unpaid rent. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment with respect to that portion of the trial justice's decision declining to award damages for the repair of Plaintiff's property and for her failure to award attorney's fees, holding (1) the trial justice erred when she determined damages because she applied the wrong standard; and (2) the clear language of the lease agreement provided contractual authorization for the award of attorneys' fees, and the trial justice abused her discretion in failing to do so.

In two civil actions, Plaintiffs in the underlying action alleged that Cheaters, Inc. and Cheaters Holding Corporation negligently and/or recklessly served alcoholic beverages to William Powers, who afterwards drove a vehicle off the premises and collided with other vehicles, resulting in one death and injuries to others. Before the accident, United National Insurance Corporation had issued an insurance policy to Cheaters and the Holding Corporation. Based on the policy's on-premises endorsement and liquor liability exclusion, United National disclaimed any responsibility for the defense and/or indemnification of the Holding Corporation. Plaintiff corporations then filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment as to their rights under the terms of the policy. The superior court hearing justice granted United National's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the on-premises endorsement, which limited coverage to on-premises losses only, applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that coverage was barred by the on-premises endorsement.

Plaintiff, a professional limousine driver, was injured when he was struck by a car while unloading luggage from a limousine at an airport. Plaintiff reached settlements with his employer's insurance company and the driver whose car struck him but remained less-than-fully compensated for his injuries. Plaintiff subsequently filed an underinsured-motorist claim with his Insurer under the terms of his personal automobile policy. Insurer denied the claim, citing two exclusions from the policy's provisions for uninsured-motorist coverage. Plaintiff filed suit, and the superior court ruled that the exclusions were void on grounds of public policy. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court, holding that Insurer's denial of coverage was both lawful and not inconsistent with public policy. Remanded.

Plaintiff and Defendant executed an agreement in which Plaintiff agreed to purchase from Defendant an unimproved parcel of real property. The agreement included a due diligence clause, which provided Plaintiff with a ninety-day due-diligence period in which perform inspections and inquiries. After the due-diligence period had expired and the parties had not closed on the property, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking specific performance of its agreement with Defendant as well as damages. Defendant counterclaimed, seeking declaratory relief that the agreement be declared null and void and asserting a claim for breach of contract. The trial justice granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint and Defendant's counterclaim, finding it had been Plaintiff's burden to contact Defendant to close and that Plaintiff had failed to do so without any explanation for its lack of diligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not err in its judgment where Plaintiff presented no evidence either explaining its silence or supporting its contention that it was, after the due-diligence period, ready, willing, and able to perform under the contract.

Plaintiff, a former police officer, filed an action against Defendants, the Town of Portsmouth, its then chief of police, and a now retired lieutenant, alleging several causes of action arising from an investigation into Plaintiff's conduct during an officer training exercise. The superior court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the trial justice properly granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants on the claims of malicious prosecution and tortious interference with contractual relations; but (2) the trial justice erred by granting Plaintiff's R.I. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the chief of police and lieutenant's counterclaim for defamation arising from an inflammatory letter that Plaintiff submitted to the town council to notify the council of his forthcoming suit in accordance with R.I. Gen. Laws 45-15-5 where (i) absolute privilege did not apply in this instance because the notice required by section 45-15-5 was not part of a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, and (ii) baseless claims and allegations made by parties who must provide notice under section 45-15-5 are not protected by absolute immunity under McDonald v. Smith. Remanded.

Esther Randall, the mother of plaintiff Elton Randall and defendant Deborah Randall, executed a will leaving her residuary estate to her four children. After Esther's death, Deborah, as executrix of her mother's estate, filed in probate court a petition for the sale of real property in the estate. Elton then filed a claim to the property, alleging that his parents had made an agreement with him before their deaths that the premises would pass to him. The probate court granted the petition to sell the property and disallowed Elton's claim to the property. Elton appealed to the superior court. The court dismissed Elton's appeal, finding that Elton failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of the oral contract with his parents and, therefore, Elton's claim to the property was barred by the statute of frauds. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice did not clearly err in concluding that Elton had failed to prove the existence of an oral agreement with his parents.