Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

After Defendant failed to repay a loan Plaintiff made to him in the amount of $8,500, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging breach of contract and breach of an implied-in-fact contract. Plaintiff later amended his complaint to include a claim for failure to repay based on book account. After a jury, the trial justice ordered Defendant to pay damages to Plaintiff in the amount of $8,500. Defendant appealed, contending that the trial justice erred in finding that Plaintiff was a credible witness and in failing to find that the transaction was void because Plaintiff had allegedly advanced the money to Defendant with the knowledge that it would be used for gambling. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Court had no choice but to uphold the lower court's findings because the Court was not provided with a transcript of the trial below and therefore was unable to properly engage in a review of the trial justice's factual findings. View "Vogel v. Catala" on Justia Law

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, as nominee for two lenders (collectively, Plaintiffs), held mortgages on Lot 456. For the property owner's failure to pay his water bill, the Pawtucket Water Supply Board (PWSB) auctioned the lot. PWSB issued a deed conveying the title in the property to Amy Realty. Amy Realty subsequently discovered that the property PWSB had intended to auction had been mistakenly listed as Lot 486 on the tax sale notices and deed. Amy Realty then obtained a corrective deed from the PWSB conveying title to Lot 456. Amy Realty subsequently filed a petition to foreclose on Plaintiffs' rights of redemption in Lot 456. Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to vacate the final decree of disclosure, alleging that the corrective deed changing the lot number from 486 to 456 was invalid and this infirmity rendered the foreclosure decree void. The superior court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the corrective deed obtained in this case was null and void because it was not recorded within sixty days of the tax sale; and (2) the final foreclosure decree may be vacated because the tax sale was invalid. View "Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. DePina" on Justia Law

Plaintiff borrowed $249,900 from Lehman Brothers Bank to finance the purchase of a home, and he signed an adjustable rate note that evidenced the debt. Plaintiff and his wife (Plaintiffs) then executed a mortgage on the property that secured the loan. Even though the note was made payable to the lender, the mortgage was granted to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for the lender and the lender's subject and assigns. Plaintiffs subsequently defaulted on the note, and MERS initiated foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiffs subsequently commenced an action seeking to prevent MERS from exercising the power of sale contained in the mortgage, arguing that only a mortgagee was permitted to exercise the power of sale and that MERS was merely a nominee-mortgagee without the authority to foreclose. The superior court denied Plaintiffs' request and entered judgment on behalf of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that MERS had both contractual and statutory authority to foreclose and exercise the power of sale. View "Bucci v. Lehman Bros. Bank, FSB" on Justia Law

Pearl Archambault died while in the care of Haven Health Center of Greenville (Haven Health) after a nurse mistakenly administered a lethal overdose of morphine. The administratrix of her estate, Plaintiff, filed a medical malpractice action against Haven Health. Health Haven subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Thereafter, Plaintiff amended her complaint to add Columbia Casualty Company, the professional liability insurer of Health Haven, as a defendant and asserted two counts against Columbia directly based on R.I. Gen. Laws 27-7-2.4, which permits an injured party to proceed against an insurer when the insured has filed for bankruptcy. The superior court entered default judgment against Haven Health. The court then granted summary judgment in favor of Columbia. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment against Columbia, holding that the superior court erred in interpreting Rhode Island law and that the insurance contract between Columbia and Health Haven should be construed in Plaintiff's favor. View "Peloquin v. Haven Health Ctr. of Greenville, LLC" on Justia Law

Dean Pepper, the owner and sole shareholder of D.F. Pepper Construction (DFP) was driving one of his trucks home in the early winter morning. An icy road caused the truck to slide into Pepper's house and crash through the foundation and west wall. The house was later condemned and demolished as a result of the damage. The house was insured by Nationwide Casualty Insurance Company. Nationwide paid the loss. As subrogee of Pepper, Nationwide then sued DFP, the registered owner of the truck, alleging vicarious liability for the negligence of its employee, Pepper. The superior court issued judgment in favor of Nationwide, finding that Pepper had been negligent and that the antisubrogation rule did not apply in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. D.F. Pepper Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

DWS Properties (DWS) owned rental property. The sole member of DWS was Dustin Shore. After a pipe burst at the property causing substantial damage, Shore executed contracts with Performance Adjusting Public Insurance Adjusters (Performance) and Multi-State Restoration (Multi-State), in which Performance agreed to provide public adjusting service relative to the loss, and Multi-State agreed to perform emergency clean-up work at the property. Performance and Multi-State (Plaintiffs) were never paid for the services they provided, and after Shore filed for personal bankruptcy, Shore's debts to Plaintiffs were discharged. Plaintiffs subsequently filed suit against DWS, seeking damages for book account, breach of contract, quasi-contract, and unjust enrichment. DWS filed a motion to dismiss, which the hearing justice converted into a motion for summary judgment and granted, reasoning that Shore had signed the contracts in an individual capacity without making any reference to DWS. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the superior court and remanded, holding (1) summary judgment was inappropriate on Plaintiffs' contract claims; and (2) the fact that DWS was not explicitly named on the contracts did not entitle it to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs' equitable claims. View "Multi-State Restoration, Inc. v. DWS Props., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Massachusetts corporation when it entered into a contract with Defendants. The contract was to be performed entirely in Rhode Island. Defendants subsequently commenced a civil action against Plaintiff. At the time, Plaintiff had a certificate of authority from the secretary of state, but after Plaintiff filed this action, the corporation's certificate of authority was revoked. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, determining that Plaintiff did not have a certificate of authority to transact business in Rhode Island, and therefore, it lacked the capacity to sue in the state. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a certificate was not required in this instance, but Plaintiff must obtain a certificate before proceeding to final judgment. View "Custom Metals Sys., Ltd. v. Tocci Building Corp." on Justia Law

Jared Crook was driving a Cadillac leased for him by his father, Calvin Crook, when he collided with Jessica Ahlquist's vehicle. Ahlquist sustained severe personal injuries as a result of the accident. The Cadillac was insured by Calvin through a policy issued by Allstate Insurance Company. Allstate paid the policy limits, and Ahlquist sought to recover additional compensation through another Allstate policy issued to Cheryl, Calvin's former wife. The policy was issued for Cheryl's vehicle. Allstate filed a declaratory judgment action arguing that Cheryl's insurance policy did not apply to the accident. The trial justice granted summary judgment in Allstate's favor. Ahlquist appealed, contending that the trial justice erred in granting summary judgment because Calvin, who was a named driver under Cheryl's insurance policy, provided the Cadillac to Jared. Ahlquist also argued that there was an ambiguity as to whether the policy covered the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its judgment. View "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ahlquist" on Justia Law

A general contractor (Carlisle) for a construction project contracted with Plaintiff to perform carpentry work for the project. A bond was issued for the project. Carlisle was the principal on the bond, and International Fidelity Insurance Company (IFIC) was the surety. Plaintiff later filed suit against Carlisle and IFIC seeking to recover payment for the work it performed. The arbitrator issued two amended awards. Plaintiff moved the superior court to confirm the second amended awarded concerning Carlisle's liability and to modify it as to IFIC. The trial justice remanded the matter back to the arbitrator for a determination as to IFIC's liability. The arbitrator on remand found that both Carlisle and IFIC were liable to Plaintiff for $43,543. The trial justice confirmed the post-remand arbitration award. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the second amended award should have been vacated under R.I. Stat. 37-16-18(2), and the trial justice was authorized, under section 37-16-19, to remand the case to the same arbitrator for a hearing; and (2) because the remand in this case accomplished the same result that could have been accomplished under section 37-16-18 and 37-16-19, the judgment was affirmed. View "Drago Custom Interiors, LLC v. Carlisle Bldg. Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Bowen's Wharf was a tourist destination including a marina and a variety of retailers, restaurants, and art galleries. In this appeal, the Supreme Court was called upon to decide a question that would clarify the rights and obligations of two adjacent landholders whose combined property comprised the entirety of Bowen's Wharf. The question presented for review was whether the trial justice erred in finding that a right of first refusal granted to Defendant, Bowen's Wharf Company, Inc., by Plaintiff, Ronald Fatulli, in 1969 had expired by expiration of law. The trial justice found the parties' right of first refusal agreement expired in 1979, and accordingly, Plaintiff was not obligated to offer a parcel of the property, a wharf, and a business to Defendant in the event of a bona fide third party's offer. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in finding that, on these facts, a wharf or dock may properly be characterized as real property; and (2) Defendant's right of first refusal expired by operation of R.I. Gen. Laws 34-4-26, which governs the expiration of recorded rights affecting real estate. View "Fatulli v. Bowen's Wharf Co." on Justia Law