Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Warwick Wings, LLC, a Rhode Island limited liability company operating as Hooters of Warwick, faced significant damage to its building due to snow and ice in 2015. Odeh Engineers, Inc. evaluated the damage and concluded that the roof trusses needed a full rebuild. Nadeau Corporation estimated the repair costs at $1,250,000. Warwick Wings contracted Americo Mallozzi to provide architectural plans for the repairs, agreeing to pay 11% of the final construction cost, initially estimated at $137,500. Mallozzi completed several phases of the project, but Warwick Wings only paid $46,848.55 and later claimed to have terminated the contract.Warwick Wings filed a lawsuit against its insurer, Liberty Mutual, over the scope of necessary repairs. The case was settled for $785,000, but Warwick Wings did not make further payments to Mallozzi. Mallozzi then sued Warwick Wings in Providence County Superior Court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking the remaining amount due under the contract. The Superior Court found in favor of Mallozzi, awarding him $63,151.45 in damages and $74,777.74 in attorneys' fees.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the contract was unambiguous and called for a lump-sum payment based on the initial estimated construction cost. The trial justice's findings that Mallozzi completed 80% of the contract and that Warwick Wings breached the contract were upheld. The Court also found no error in the trial justice's award of attorneys' fees, concluding that there was a complete absence of a justiciable issue raised by Warwick Wings. View "Americo Mallozzi v. Warwick Wings, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2012, the City of Providence suspended cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) pension benefits for retired police and fire department members. The retirees challenged this suspension, leading to a series of legal actions. Most retirees settled, agreeing to a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefits, but some plaintiffs opted out and pursued further legal action, claiming breach of contract and constitutional violations.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, ruled against the plaintiffs on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews I found that the 2012 ordinance violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to override prior consent judgments and judicial decisions. The case was remanded, and the Superior Court reinstated the plaintiffs' COLAs and awarded accrued benefits but did not address prejudgment interest.The plaintiffs then sought prejudgment interest on the past-due COLA payments, which the Superior Court denied, reasoning that the damages were not contractual in nature but were awarded based on constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the plaintiffs' recovery of past-due COLAs was based on the enforcement of final judgments, not on a breach of contract. Since the award was rooted in constitutional law rather than contract law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest under the relevant statute, which applies strictly to tort and contract claims. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC (NEPSG), appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, NGM Insurance Company (NGM). NEPSG had been assigned the insurance claim benefits by the policyholders, Stephen and Betty Callahan, for storm-related damage to their residence. NGM initially covered some damages but denied others, leading to a series of inspections and disagreements over the loss amount. Eventually, an appraisal process was conducted, resulting in an award that NEPSG found unsatisfactory due to updated labor costs published after the award was signed.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to NGM, finding that NEPSG was not entitled to a modification of the appraisal award or a second appraisal. The court also found that NEPSG failed to establish its claims for breach of contract, bad faith, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with contractual relations. NEPSG argued that the award should be modified due to a miscalculation of labor costs and that NGM acted in bad faith by using unlicensed appraisers, among other claims.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the appraisal award was akin to an arbitration award and thus subject to limited judicial review. NEPSG's request for modification based on post-award labor cost updates was not supported by admissible evidence. The court also found no basis for a second appraisal or for NEPSG's claims of breach of contract and bad faith, as NGM had fulfilled its contractual obligations and there was no evidence of bad faith. Additionally, the court rejected NEPSG's claims of unjust enrichment and tortious interference, finding no inequitable benefit retained by NGM and no evidence of intentional harm to NEPSG's contract with the policyholders. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. NGM Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a real estate transaction between Francesco Scotti and Matthew Mimiaga concerning a property at 300 Benefit Street in Providence, Rhode Island. In 2015, Scotti sold the property to Mimiaga, who financed the purchase through a promissory note. As part of the transaction, Scotti was granted an option to repurchase the property within five years for $900,000. Scotti claimed he exercised this option by mailing a handwritten letter to Mimiaga on June 1, 2020, but Mimiaga denied receiving it. Scotti also alleged that Mimiaga requested extensions to stay on the property due to COVID-19 and other issues, which he granted.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Mimiaga, ruling that the option agreement lacked separate consideration, Scotti did not properly exercise the option, and there was no express or implied waiver of the option's terms. The court found no evidence that Mimiaga received the June 1, 2020 letter and concluded that Scotti did not act timely to repurchase the property.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the option agreement was supported by consideration as stated in the written document. It also found that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Mimiaga received the June 1, 2020 letter, invoking the presumption that mailed notices are received. Additionally, the court determined that whether time was of the essence and whether there was an implied waiver of the option's terms were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Scotti v. Mimiaga" on Justia Law

The case involves North Farm Home Owners Association, Inc. (North Farm) and the Bristol County Water Authority (BCWA). North Farm, a multi-building condominium complex in Bristol, Rhode Island, had granted several easements to BCWA, a public utility responsible for providing water to residential and commercial customers in Bristol County. From 1975 to 1995, BCWA measured water service to each condominium unit individually. However, between 1993 and 1995, representatives of the parties discussed converting the individual meter system to a centralized, master meter system. This correspondence is at the heart of the dispute.The Superior Court entered partial summary judgment in favor of BCWA on counts three and four of North Farm's third amended complaint. North Farm appealed, arguing that a valid contract was formed through their 1993–1995 correspondence, that the hearing justice ignored allegations that the 2019 pass-through rate was illegal, and that the hearing justice denied North Farm’s motion to amend without a finding of prejudice.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court found that the 1993–1995 correspondence did not establish the existence of a contract as a matter of law. The court held that the letters did not show the parties’ mutual assent to the material contract terms by means of offer and acceptance. The court also found that North Farm failed to produce sufficient evidence that a valid contract for the material terms existed. Therefore, the hearing justice’s grant of summary judgment on count three of the third amended complaint was proper. The court also affirmed the hearing justice's grant of summary judgment on count four, as North Farm did not properly plead any basis for granting injunctive or compensatory relief due to BCWA’s purported unlawful discrimination. View "North Farm Home Owners Association, Inc. v. Bristol County Water Authority" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over the will of the late Donelson C. Glassie. The plaintiff, Marcia Sallum Glassie, is the testator’s former wife. She appealed from a Superior Court judgment in favor of the defendant, Paul Doucette, in his capacity as Executor of the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie. The Superior Court affirmed an order of the Newport Probate Court denying the plaintiff’s petition for leave to file a claim out of time against the estate. The denied claim would have alleged a breach of contract, based on the plaintiff’s contention that a key provision of the testator’s will violated the terms of the couple’s property-settlement agreement.The plaintiff and the testator were married in 1986, had three children, and were divorced in 1993. According to their property-settlement agreement (PSA), the testator was to execute a will that would not only treat his obligations under the PSA as “a claim against any assets in [his] [e]state” but also “specifically bequest to [plaintiff] an amount equal to said obligations.” A dispute soon unfolded over what the PSA required of the testator’s will.In 2017, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island vacated the Superior Court judgment on multiple grounds. Relevant to the present appeal, the court determined “that the disputed provision in the will is ambiguous” because it “does not clearly specify under what circumstances plaintiff is to receive the sum of $2,000,000 or the circumstances under which she is to receive such other amount necessary to satisfy all of [the testator’s] remaining obligations.” Because “a proper resolution of this matter require[d] factfinding and conclusions of law with respect to [the] testator’s intent,” the court remanded the case to the Superior Court.Back in Superior Court, the plaintiff sought to amend her complaint with a claim for breach of contract. The Superior Court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend her complaint, in part because she did not first submit the claim to the probate court, and also because the applicable statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff thereafter filed a petition in the Newport Probate Court for leave to file a claim out of time and, after the court denied her petition, she appealed that denial to the Superior Court.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to timely present her claim for breach of contract was not due to excusable neglect and, therefore, her claim must be denied. View "Glassie v. Doucette" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute between the University of Rhode Island Board of Trustees and the University of Rhode Island (plaintiffs) and the Hellenic Society Paideia – Rhode Island Chapter (defendant). The dispute arose from a breach-of-contract related to the construction of a Center for Hellenic Studies at the University of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs and defendant had entered into a Ground Lease Agreement that established the parameters for this construction project. The defendant failed to construct the Center for Hellenic Studies within the agreed timeframe, leading to litigation.The Superior Court stayed the litigation pending arbitration, as per the mandate. The arbitration proceedings were held, and the arbitrator issued a decision. The arbitrator found that the defendant had breached the lease agreement by failing to construct the Center for Hellenic Studies within the requisite timeframe, among other failures. The arbitrator also determined that a joint venture did not exist between the parties. The arbitrator directed the defendant to reimburse the plaintiffs for the cost and expenses that they will incur in their efforts to restore the construction site to its prior status.The plaintiffs filed a motion in Superior Court to confirm the arbitration award, which the defendant objected to and cross-moved to vacate. The trial justice granted the plaintiffs' motion to confirm the award and denied the defendant's cross-motion to vacate. The trial justice declined to review the arbitrator’s determination that the plaintiffs properly terminated the lease agreement and rejected the defendant’s objection to the arbitral remedy.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court concluded that the arbitrator's award drew its essence from the parties' lease agreement and lacked any indication that the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority. The court affirmed the trial justice's order confirming the arbitration award. View "The University of Rhode Island Board of Trustees v. Hellenic Society Paideia-Rhode Island Chapter" on Justia Law

In September 2019, Eleticia Garcia hired Ponagansett 2 LLC, doing business as Peter Bibby Heating & Air, to perform mechanical work on her property. The parties signed two contracts, one for the installation of gas lines, water heaters, and boilers, and another for the installation of baseboards. However, Garcia failed to make the agreed-upon payments, leading Ponagansett to file a mechanics' lien against her property. When Garcia did not respond to the complaint, the Superior Court entered a default judgment in favor of Ponagansett.The Superior Court denied Garcia's subsequent motions to vacate the entry of default, to file a counterclaim out of time, to quash the mechanics' lien, and to file an oral proof of claim. Ponagansett then filed a motion for entry of default judgment against Garcia and a petition for attorneys' fees. The Superior Court granted Ponagansett's request to enforce the mechanics' lien, awarded Ponagansett $20,000 plus interest, and granted attorneys' fees of $12,310.27.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, Garcia argued that the mechanics' lien was unenforceable because Ponagansett failed to provide notice of a possible mechanics' lien as required by law. She also contended that the decisions of the hearing justice to award Ponagansett the full payment of $20,000 and exclude the admission of a mechanical permit were reversible errors. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court, holding that Garcia had waived her enforceability argument by failing to timely respond to Ponagansett's complaint. The court also found no error in the hearing justice's award of damages and exclusion of the mechanical permit. View "Ponagansett 2 LLC v. Eleticia Garcia" on Justia Law

This case concerns a foreclosure proceeding related to a property in Bristol, Rhode Island. The plaintiff, Steven Serenska, obtained a mortgage from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. and defaulted on his payments. Wells Fargo and HSBC Bank USA, National Association as Trustee, initiated foreclosure proceedings. The plaintiff filed a complaint, alleging that there was an ambiguity in the mortgage document and that he had not received proper notice before the foreclosure.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that there was no ambiguity in the mortgage contract. The court found that the notice of default sent to the plaintiff strictly complied with the requirements of the mortgage agreement. The court noted that the plaintiff's alleged prejudice (claiming he would have paid the sum due had he received notice of the deadline for reinstating the mortgage) was irrelevant in this context. The court also found that an issue raised by the plaintiff on appeal (concerning additional language in the notice of default) was not properly presented before the lower court and was therefore waived.The court thus affirmed the order of the Superior Court granting the defendants' motions to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. View "Serenska v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff, Jordan Nissensohn, as the administrator of the Estate of Michael Nissensohn, filed a suit against University Medical Group (UMG), Dr. Alan Epstein, and Dr. Steven Sepe, alleging numerous claims including defamation, breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual relations, conversion, and violations of the Rhode Island Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (RIWPA). The Superior Court entered a judgment in favor of the defendants, granting summary judgment.The plaintiff, Dr. Michael Nissensohn, had been employed as a gastroenterologist by UMG and was supervised by Dr. Epstein. The plaintiff had a series of disagreements and conflicts with Dr. Epstein over teaching responsibilities and alleged discrepancies in teaching compensation. The plaintiff also claimed that Dr. Epstein had disclosed his mental health information to another staff member, and had spread a rumor about his mental health. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that Dr. Epstein interfered with his prospective business relations with patients and his contract, and converted his personal laptop.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. The court held that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that he engaged in protected conduct under the RIWPA because he did not report actual violations of the law. The court also ruled that the plaintiff's defamation claim abated upon his death and therefore did not survive. Regarding the breach of contract claim, the court found that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence of a breach of the written agreement. The court further held that the plaintiff failed to show that Dr. Epstein intended to harm his contract, which was an essential element of his claim for tortious interference. Lastly, the court found that the plaintiff failed to provide any non-hearsay evidence to prove his demand and refusal, thus failing to establish his claim for conversion. View "Nissensohn v. CharterCARE Home Health Services" on Justia Law