Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against North American after the moving company severely damaged or loss some of plaintiff's items. Because plaintiff's claims arose out of the interstate shipment of her possessions, the Carmack Amendment, 29 U.S.C. 14706 et seq., provided the sole and exclusive remedy. The district court granted summary judgment for North America, determining that her claim for damages did not satisfy regulatory requirements. The court concluded that plaintiff's demand letter unequivocally requested that North American remit payment totaling $182,750.00 and constituted a written communication containing facts sufficient to identify the shipment, asserting liability, and making claims for the payment of a specified amount under 49 C.F.R. 1005.2(b). The plain language of the regulation's minimum filing requirements required nothing more. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for North America and remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. N. Amer. Van Lines of Texas, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Thoroughbred Associates drilled a gas well (Well) in Comanche County. Thoroughbred subsequently acquired leases of land near the Well and created a unit called the Thoroughbred-Rietzke Unit (Rietzke Unit). Defendants became successors-in-interest to a lease (OXY Lease) Thoroughbred entered into for oil and gas underlying a tract near the Well. The parties disagreed, however, about whether the Well was draining the Rietzke Unit. Thoroughbred stopped submitting royalty payments to Defendants accruing from the Rietzke Unit. Thoroughbred subsequently filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that it had been mistaken when it included the OXY Lease in the Rietzke Unit. Defendants counterclaimed. The district court concluded (1) Defendants failed to prove that any drainage of the leased lands occurred; and (2) the Lease was properly included in the Rietzke Unit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendants failed to prove their drainage claim; and (2) the court of appeals erroneously granted summary judgment to Defendants on their claim that the Lease should be included in the Rietzke Unit. View "Thoroughbred Assocs., LLC v. Kansas City Royalty Co., LLC " on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Wilk, 14 M.R.S. 6321, attaching documents, including a 2005 mortgage ($459,375) from Wilk in favor of the original lender’s nominee, MERS; a 2008 assignment from MERS to IndyMac; and a 2010 assignment by the FDIC, as the receiver for IndyMac, to Deutsche Bank. Trial evidence included a 2011 assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank, executed approximately two weeks prior to the FDIC conveyance to OneWest Bank, purporting to grant “all interest” OneWest Bank then held in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. On cross-examination, Deutsche Bank’s only witness confirmed that the assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank was prior in time to the assignment from the FDIC to OneWest Bank. Deutsche Bank did not introduce the 2010 mortgage assignment, which it had attached to the complaint and which purported to transfer the mortgage from the FDIC to Deutsche Bank. The court entered a judgment of foreclosure. The Maine Supreme Court vacated, holding that Deutsche Bank failed to prove that it is the assignee of the mortgage. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wilk " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Kellogg owned a house and land in Bethel.  In 1999, he entered into a rent-to-own agreement with William Oren whereby Oren would pay over time for the property, at which point ownership would be transferred to him. Beginning in 2000 and then from 2001 onwards, defendant Cindy Shushereba began to occupy the house with Oren in a romantic relationship. By August 2004, it was contemplated that defendant would co-own the property.  Plaintiff indicated that he wished to come to an agreement to sell the property to defendant and Oren. To that end, defendant liquidated her savings and paid plaintiff for a downpayment on the house.  Plaintiff credited Oren and defendant with the amount Oren had paid in rent.  These two contributions left roughly $98,721 to be paid to reach the purchase price.  The parties agreed orally that the balance would be paid monthly over fifteen years. No written purchase and sale agreement was ever prepared, but the parties intended that Oren and defendant would receive title immediately and give a mortgage secured by a promissory note for the installments. Plaintiff delivered a signed warranty deed to defendant, but defendant never signed the promissory note or the mortgage.  Because defendant could not pay the property transfer tax that would be due on recording, she never recorded the warranty deed.  Plaintiff testified that, at the time, he considered himself the mortgage holder only. Ultimately, the relationship between Oren and defendant dissolved, and, in May 2008, Oren moved out. A couple of months later, plaintiff and defendant became sexually involved.  During this time, plaintiff sought neither rent nor the purchase installments from defendant, and she made no payments. At some point in 2010, plaintiff began seeking rent from defendant, and she did make between two and four monthly rental payments of $650. Plaintiff paid the property taxes on the property throughout the time that defendant lived by herself in the house. Oren then sued plaintiff and defendant, seeking to be declared half-owner of the property along with defendant, from whom he sought a partition and accounting.  In September 2009, the superior court rejected Oren's claims. Defendant counterclaimed, contending that she owned the property or, in the alternative, that plaintiff had been unjustly enriched by defendant’s payments to him.  Prior to trial, the court dismissed as res judicata defendant’s claim that she owned the property, leaving the unjust-enrichment claim in her counterclaim. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff’s claims for back rent and property taxes. However, the trial court ruled in favor of defendant with regard to her unjust enrichment claims for the return of the downpayment on the purchase price and several of her alleged capital and repair contributions. Both parties appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the contract between plaintiff and defendant was a contract for deed; the trial court erred in concluding it was a landlord-tenant relationship. Because the agreement between plaintiff and defendant was a contract for deed, the amount of $833 per month that defendant had agreed to pay plaintiff went entirely toward the purchase price plus interest. When the periodic payments were complete, defendant would become the owner of the property, free and clear of any interest of plaintiff, without a further payment. There was not an agreement to pay rent; the $833 monthly payment was not part of a rental agreement between plaintiff and defendant. View "Kellogg v. Shushereba" on Justia Law

Elden and Rita Linderkamp appealed a judgment that required Elden Linderkamp to pay Four Season's Healthcare Center, Inc. for nursing home care provided to his parents, invalidating a contract for deed and warranty deed conveying land from the parents to the Linderkamps, authorizing the parents' personal representative to administer the land in the probate of the parents' estates, and allowing the Linderkamps a net claim against the parents' estates. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the district court did not clearly err in finding there was no credible evidence of a claimed oral agreement for Earl Linderkamp to compensate Elden for improvements to the land as part of the consideration for the contract for deed and warranty deed and did not clearly err in finding there was no credible evidence to support Elden's claim he made improvements to the land as part of the consideration for the deeds. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court erred in declining to rule on an issue about all of the children's liability for their parents' nursing home debt under N.D.C.C. 14-09-10. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Four Seasons Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Linderkamp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff borrowed money from Countrywide Financial and secured the loan with a mortgage on real property. The recorded mortgage was assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), which also held the note on Plaintiff's property. When Plaintiff was unable to make payments on the mortgage, BONY instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure, arguing that (1) the description of his property in the mortgage did not satisfy New Hampshire's statute of frauds, and (2) Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property to the copy of the mortgage was an act of fraud that should bar BONY from foreclosing. The district court rejected both of Plaintiff's arguments. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the description of the property, in light of the surrounding circumstances, was not so imprecise as to be unenforceable under the New Hampshire statute of frauds; and (2) because the description of the property attached to the mortgage was correct, Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property was not fraudulent. View "French v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

Brian and Lori Peay purchased a home manufactured by Energy Homes, Division of Southern Energy Homes, Inc. (SEHI). At closing, SEHI offered the Peays certain warranties on the home in exchange for the Peays' agreement that any disputes over the home would be submitted to binding arbitration. Brian Peay accepted the warranties and signed the arbitration agreement. After discovering flaws in the home, the Peays filed suit against SEHI, among other defendants. SEHI moved to enforce the arbitration agreement by ordering the parties to arbitrate the dispute. The circuit court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed the order denying enforcement of the arbitration agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding, contrary to the findings of the court of appeals, (1) the arbitration agreement was not prohibited by the merger and integration clause of the purchase contract; (2) the arbitration agreement was not unconscionable; and (3) Lori Peay was bound to the arbitration agreement even though she did not sign the agreement. Remanded. View "Energy Home, Div. of S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Peay" on Justia Law

Seller and Buyers entered into a contract for a deed. Buyers made payments to Seller for almost three years. Because Seller did not provide Buyers with all information required by Tex. Prop. Code 5(D), Buyers later told Seller they were exercising their statutory right to cancel and rescind the contract for deed. Seller sued Buyers for breach of contract. Buyers counterclaimed for violations under the Property Code, among other statutory violations. Seller, in turn, alleged he was entitled to a setoff in the amount of the fair market rental value of the property for the time Buyers occupied the house. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Buyers, awarding actual damages for cancellation and rescission of the contract for deed, among other damages. The Court reversed the trial court's awards of actual damages for cancellation and rescission, holding (1) subchapter D's cancellation-and-rescission remedy contemplates mutual restitution of benefits among the parties; and (2) thus, Buyers were required to restore to Seller supplemental enrichment in the form of rent for their interim occupation of the property upon cancellation and rescission of the contract for deed. Remanded. View "Morton v. Nguyen" on Justia Law

Respondents were successors-in-interest to 380 acres of land once owned by Baker, now deceased. Petitioners entered into a lease agreement with Baker that contained an option allowing Petitioners to buy the land if Baker decided to sell it. Petitioners and Baker subsequently agreed that Petitioners would purchase the 380 acres for $470,000. Petitioners attempted to exercise their right to buy the property under the agreement, but Respondents brought a declaratory judgment action to void the agreement. The trial court rendered a final judgment for Petitioners. The court of appeals reversed, concluding (1) the agreement was ambiguous as to whether it was a presently binding contract or merely an agreement to agree, and (2) therefore, the agreement's enforceability was a fact issue that should not have been determined by summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agreement contained all material terms and was an enforceable contract as a matter of law. Remanded. View "McCalla v. Baker's Campground, Inc." on Justia Law

Homes built with an exterior insulation and finish system (EIFS) suffer serious water damage that worsens over time. Homebuilder began a remediation program in which it offered to homeowners to remove exterior EIFS from the homes it had built and to replace it with conventional stucco. Almost all the homeowners accepted Homebuilder's offer of remediation. Homebuilder sought indemnification for the costs from its insurers (Insurers). Insurers denied coverage, preferring instead to wait until the homeowners sued. This litigation ensued. Now, only one insurer remained. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of Homebuilder, finding (1) Homebuilder failed to establish its legal liability to the homeowners to trigger Insurer's coverage; and (2) Homebuilder failed to offer evidence of damages covered by the policy. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Homebuilder's settlements with the homeowners established both Insurer's legal liability for the property damages and the basis for determining the amount of loss; and (2) Insurer's policy covered Homebuilder's entire remediation costs for damaged homes. View "Lennar Corp. v. Markel Am. Ins. Co." on Justia Law