Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

After Mary Lou Fox died, Plaintiff, Mary Lou's daughter and the administratrix of Mary Lou's estate, sued Mary Lou's former husband, Robert Fox. Plaintiff alleged that Mary Lou jointly owned 960 acres of farmland with Robert, that Robert deprived Mary Lou of her ownership interest in the land, and that Plaintiff was thereby deprived of an inheritance from Mary Lou. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Robert, concluding that Mary Lou had no ownership interest in the 960 acres. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that each cause of action brought by Plaintiff failed because Mary Lou had no claim to a right of ownership in the 960 acres and Plaintiff had no authority supporting her claims. View "Niesche v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether defects in load-bearing walls were a result of "any defect" due to noncompliance with the buildings standards subject to a one year peremptive period, or whether they constituted a "major structural defect" subject to a peremptive period of five years. This case stemmed from damages caused by a home flooding. The District Court found the defects in the four exterior load-bearing walls constituted a major structural defect under the Act to which the five-year warranty period applied and awarded plaintiff Barbara Shaw damages. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the plaintiff's claim was for a defect in workmanship subject to a one year peremptive period. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the record supported the failure of the load-bearing walls affected the "load-bearing functions to the extent the home becomes unsafe, unsanitary, or is otherwise unlivable," as provided by La. Rev. Stat. 9:3143. Thus, it constituted a major structural defect and the five-year warranty applied. View "Shaw v. Acadian Builders & Contractors, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants on plaintiff's claims arising out of the threatened foreclosure on two residential investment properties he owned. The court concluded that the district court correctly determined that Deutsche Bank was a mortgagee and could proceed with the foreclosure action; as a non-party mortgagor, and without any evidence showing plaintiff to be an intended third-party beneficiary, the court concluded that plaintiff lacked the requisite standing to bring suit to enforce the terms of the Pooling & Services Agreement that governed the assignment of the mortgagor's notes; and the requirement in Tex. Prop. Code 51.0001(3) that the current mortgagee provide the notice required the court also to consider defendants' argument that quasi-estoppel under Texas law precluded plaintiff from challenging GMAC's status as mortgage servicer. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Farkas v. GMAC Mortgage, L.L.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellants Norman and Robin Riley appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of respondents Spiral Butte Development, LLC and Jim Horkley. Plaintiffs alleged breach of contract against Spiral Butte and sought specific performance of the parties' Lease Option Agreement. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Riley v. Spiral Butte Development, LLC" on Justia Law

Utah resident Elham Neilsen wanted to purchase a residence close to the city of Tyler in Smith County, Texas. He contacted Plaintiff-Appellant Holli Telford because he had heard that she knew how to acquire properties through tax or other distress sales and had contacts for obtaining financing for prospective buyers. Mr. Neilsen entered into an agreement with Plaintiff that she would bid on the property and sell it to him after she had obtained the warranty deed. Plaintiff submitted a bid, but did not obtain title to the property because, according to her, it was wrongfully redeemed by the prior owners after she had spent money improving it. She sought specific performance of the alleged contract with Smith County, Texas, or damages for breach of the alleged contract. Defendants moved to dismiss this case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice as to them and without prejudice as to the other defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, but vacated the dismissal with prejudice and remanded the for entry of a judgment dismissing the complaint without prejudice. View "Telford v. Smith County" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between a condominium association (the Council) and one of its co-owners (Ballard) regarding the need to replace and who should bear the cost of replacement of a two-story wall of windows in Ballard's condominium. Ballard filed suit against the Council seeking damages for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims. The Council, meanwhile, replaced the wall of windows and filed a lien statement and lis pendens to serve as notice that it was asserting a lien against Ballard's condominium. The Council counterclaimed. Ballard amended her complaint to assert, inter alia, a slander of title claim. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded judgment to Ballard and ordered the Council to release its lis pendens notice and statement of lien from Ballard's condominium. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Ballard's slander of title claim was properly submitted to the jury; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the Council did not have a fiduciary duty to Ballard, and therefore, the fiduciary claim should have been dismissed rather than a new trial ordered. Remanded. View "Ballard v. 1400 Willow Council of Co-Owners, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between two developers over the payment of property assessments allegedly due under certain restrictive covenants. The plaintiff-below, The Reserves Management, LLC appealed two Superior Court rulings that granted summary judgment to defendants R.T. Properties, LLC, Mountain Range, LLC, Fountain, LLC, Waterscape, LLC, and Wind Chop, LLC. In April 2005, Reserves Development LLC, together with The Reserves Development Corporation, entered into a contract to sell seventeen lots to R.T. Properties, LLC. The Sale Agreement recited that R.T. Properties was “acquiring the Property in order to construct homes thereon for sale to the general public.” In November 2005, R.T. Properties transferred all seventeen lots to four affiliated entities—Mountain Range, LLC, Fountain, LLC, Waterscape, LLC, and Wind Chop, LLC. Three years later, the declaration of the sales contract was amended that obligated each lot owner to pay approximately $4,000 to Reserves. In September 2010, Reserves filed an action in the Superior Court against R.T. Properties to enforce the payment of the assessments allegedly due. R.T. Properties moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that under the Sale Agreement, the payment of assessments for each lot was to be deferred until the lot was transferred to a third party homebuyer and a certificate of occupancy was issued. The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss, but ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of R.T. Properties with respect to all claimed assessments, except for a sewer connection assessments. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of R.T. Properties on a forbearance agreement defense, because material facts were in dispute. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "The Reserves Management Corporation, et al. v. R.T. Properties, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Steve and Karen Donatelli hired D.R. Strong Consulting Engineers Inc. to help the Donatellis develop their real property. Before development could be completed, the Donatellis suffered substantial financial losses and lost the property in foreclosure. The Donatellis sued D.R. Strong for breach of contract, violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. D.R. Strong moved for partial summary judgment on the CPA and negligence claims. D.R. Strong argued that the negligence claims should have been dismissed under the economic loss rule because the relationship between the parties was governed by contract and the damages claimed by the Donatellis were purely economic. The trial court and Court of Appeals held that as a matter of law, the Donatellis' negligence claims were not barred. Finding no error in that analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng'rs, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Sandpointe Apartments obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust to real property. Stacy Yahraus-Lewis personally guaranteed the loan. After Sandpointe defaulted on the loan, the interest in the loan and guarantee was transferred to CML-NV Sandpointe, LLC. In 2011, CML-NV pursued its rights under the deed of trust's power of sale provision and purchased the property securing the loan at a trustee's sale. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which limits the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by persons who acquired the right to obtain the judgment from someone else who held that right. Subsequently, CML-NV filed a complaint against Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis for deficiency and breach of guaranty. Yahraus-Lewis moved for partial summary judgment, requesting that the district court apply the limitation contained in section 40.459(1)(c) to CML-NV's action. The district court concluded that the statute applies only to loans entered into after June 10, 2011. Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that the statute may not apply retroactively, and therefore, the statute's limitations did not apply in this case. View "Sandpointe Apartments, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Burcalow Family, LLC purchased property that sat adjacent to The Corral Bar, Inc. property. Burcalow and The Corral signed a license agreement whereby The Corral agreed to pay Burcalow for the use of Burcalow's property for its drain field and well. After the license agreement expired, Burcalow filed suit against The Corral, alleging claims for trespass and a declaratory judgment. The Corral counterclaimed for, inter alia, prescriptive easement, detrimental reliance, and mistake. The district court (1) determined that The Corral possessed a prescriptive easement over and across Burcalow's property, and (2) rescinded the license agreement, ordering Burcalow to refund the fees The Corral had paid under the license agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) The Corral failed to demonstrate the elements required to establish a prescriptive easement; and (2) Burcalow's counsel did not make fraudulent representations entitling The Corral to rescind the parties' license agreement, and therefore, Burcalow did not have to return The Corral's payments made pursuant to the agreement. Remanded. View "Burcalow Family, LLC v. The Corral Bar, Inc." on Justia Law