Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellant was in the business of extending high-risk loans to customers with poor credit ratings and operated primarily in Louisiana. Appellees, who resided in Arkansas, obtained four loans from Appellant at its location in Louisiana. After Appellees failed to make payments on the loans, Appellant filed in an Arkansas circuit court a notice of default and intention to sell Appellees' home. Appellees asserted the defenses of usury, unconscionability, esoppel, unclean hands, predatory lending practices, and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The circuit court found that the loans constituted predatory lending by a foreign corporation not authorized to do business in Arkansas and that the contract between the parties was unconscionable and could not be given full faith and credit. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court's findings of unconscionability and predatory lending practices were not clearly erroneous; and (2) court did not err in refusing to enforce the mortgage, as to do so would contravene the public policy of the State of Arkansas. View "Gulfco of La. Inc. v. Brantley" on Justia Law

Defendant Ricardo Maldonado owned a business purchasing homes from financially distressed owners, negotiating with lenders, and repairing and selling the homes. Anthony D'Agostino saw an advertisement for Maldonado's company and contacted Maldonado in 2008, at which time the estimated fair market value of plaintiffs' property was $480,000. The parties verbally agreed that plaintiffs would pay Maldonado, and he would repair the property and bring the mortgage current using rental payments. The documents Maldonado prepared and plaintiffs signed created a trust naming Maldonado the sole trustee. An option allowed plaintiffs to recover title by paying Maldonado $400,000 within one year. In March 2008, plaintiffs executed a quitclaim deed transferring full interest in the property to Maldonado. The deed stated that Maldonado paid $360,000 for the interest, though he actually paid nothing. Over the following months, Maldonado spent his own money on mortgage payments, outstanding taxes, and repairs. Anthony D'Agostino later offered $40,000 to regain title. Maldonado declined, informing plaintiffs they could repurchase the property for $400,000. Plaintiffs filed a complaint, alleging a violation of the CFA. The trial court found that plaintiffs had sustained their burden with respect to the CFA violation since the transaction was based on misleading documents that gave rise to an "unconscionable commercial practice." The trial court voided the conveyance to Maldonado, restored title to plaintiffs, awarded treble damages and attorneys' fees. The parties appealed, and the Appellate Division remanded only for a recalculation of plaintiffs' damages. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly found Maldonado's execution of the transactions at issue gave rise to an unconscionable commercial practice, and that that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its calculation and subsequent awarding of damages. View "D'Agostino v. Maldonado" on Justia Law

Terry Willis purchased a tract of property with funds that were apparently the proceeds from illegal drug sales. After Willis failed to make a payment, David Ferterrer contributed approximately half of the late payment. Willis was later sentenced to life imprisonment for drug-related crimes, which left him unable to pay for the property as the contract for deed contemplated. The parties agreed that Ferterrer would be responsible for completing the payments to purchase the property. Ferterrer also removed funds from Willis's checking account to prevent federal authorities from seizing those funds. Armed with a notarized agreement allegedly from Willis to sell the property to Ferterrer (the Deed), Ferterrer obtained a loan to purchase the property. Willis subsequently filed an action challenging Ferterrer's ownership of the property, also alleging that Ferterrer had converted the funds from Willis's bank account. The district court affirmed the validity of the Deed and concluded that Fertterer had not converted any funds belonging to Willis. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's findings of fact; and (2) the district court properly determined that Willis failed to prove that Fertterer had converted funds from Willis's bank account. View "Willis v. Fertterer" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the servicer of his loan (Bank) in a putative class action, asserting that the Bank's requirement that he maintain flood insurance coverage in an amount sufficient to cover the replacement value of his home breached the terms of his mortgage contract. The mortgage was insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Specifically, Defendant contended that the Bank, under a covenant of the mortgage contract, could not require more than the federally mandated minimum flood insurance. The covenant was a standard uniform covenant prescribed by the FHA pursuant to federal law. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed by an equally divided en banc First Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for breach of contract, as (1) the Bank's reading of the contract was correct and Plaintiff's was incorrect; (2) Plaintiff could not avoid dismissal on the grounds that his specific understanding or the actions of the parties created an ambiguity; and (3) the United States' position articulated in its amicus brief, which stated that Plaintiff's interpretation of the contract was incorrect, reinforced the Court's conclusion. View "Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against North American after the moving company severely damaged or loss some of plaintiff's items. Because plaintiff's claims arose out of the interstate shipment of her possessions, the Carmack Amendment, 29 U.S.C. 14706 et seq., provided the sole and exclusive remedy. The district court granted summary judgment for North America, determining that her claim for damages did not satisfy regulatory requirements. The court concluded that plaintiff's demand letter unequivocally requested that North American remit payment totaling $182,750.00 and constituted a written communication containing facts sufficient to identify the shipment, asserting liability, and making claims for the payment of a specified amount under 49 C.F.R. 1005.2(b). The plain language of the regulation's minimum filing requirements required nothing more. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment for North America and remanded for further proceedings. View "Williams v. N. Amer. Van Lines of Texas, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Thoroughbred Associates drilled a gas well (Well) in Comanche County. Thoroughbred subsequently acquired leases of land near the Well and created a unit called the Thoroughbred-Rietzke Unit (Rietzke Unit). Defendants became successors-in-interest to a lease (OXY Lease) Thoroughbred entered into for oil and gas underlying a tract near the Well. The parties disagreed, however, about whether the Well was draining the Rietzke Unit. Thoroughbred stopped submitting royalty payments to Defendants accruing from the Rietzke Unit. Thoroughbred subsequently filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment that it had been mistaken when it included the OXY Lease in the Rietzke Unit. Defendants counterclaimed. The district court concluded (1) Defendants failed to prove that any drainage of the leased lands occurred; and (2) the Lease was properly included in the Rietzke Unit. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Defendants failed to prove their drainage claim; and (2) the court of appeals erroneously granted summary judgment to Defendants on their claim that the Lease should be included in the Rietzke Unit. View "Thoroughbred Assocs., LLC v. Kansas City Royalty Co., LLC " on Justia Law

Deutsche Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure against Wilk, 14 M.R.S. 6321, attaching documents, including a 2005 mortgage ($459,375) from Wilk in favor of the original lender’s nominee, MERS; a 2008 assignment from MERS to IndyMac; and a 2010 assignment by the FDIC, as the receiver for IndyMac, to Deutsche Bank. Trial evidence included a 2011 assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank, executed approximately two weeks prior to the FDIC conveyance to OneWest Bank, purporting to grant “all interest” OneWest Bank then held in the mortgage to Deutsche Bank. On cross-examination, Deutsche Bank’s only witness confirmed that the assignment from OneWest Bank to Deutsche Bank was prior in time to the assignment from the FDIC to OneWest Bank. Deutsche Bank did not introduce the 2010 mortgage assignment, which it had attached to the complaint and which purported to transfer the mortgage from the FDIC to Deutsche Bank. The court entered a judgment of foreclosure. The Maine Supreme Court vacated, holding that Deutsche Bank failed to prove that it is the assignee of the mortgage. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Wilk " on Justia Law

Plaintiff Thomas Kellogg owned a house and land in Bethel.  In 1999, he entered into a rent-to-own agreement with William Oren whereby Oren would pay over time for the property, at which point ownership would be transferred to him. Beginning in 2000 and then from 2001 onwards, defendant Cindy Shushereba began to occupy the house with Oren in a romantic relationship. By August 2004, it was contemplated that defendant would co-own the property.  Plaintiff indicated that he wished to come to an agreement to sell the property to defendant and Oren. To that end, defendant liquidated her savings and paid plaintiff for a downpayment on the house.  Plaintiff credited Oren and defendant with the amount Oren had paid in rent.  These two contributions left roughly $98,721 to be paid to reach the purchase price.  The parties agreed orally that the balance would be paid monthly over fifteen years. No written purchase and sale agreement was ever prepared, but the parties intended that Oren and defendant would receive title immediately and give a mortgage secured by a promissory note for the installments. Plaintiff delivered a signed warranty deed to defendant, but defendant never signed the promissory note or the mortgage.  Because defendant could not pay the property transfer tax that would be due on recording, she never recorded the warranty deed.  Plaintiff testified that, at the time, he considered himself the mortgage holder only. Ultimately, the relationship between Oren and defendant dissolved, and, in May 2008, Oren moved out. A couple of months later, plaintiff and defendant became sexually involved.  During this time, plaintiff sought neither rent nor the purchase installments from defendant, and she made no payments. At some point in 2010, plaintiff began seeking rent from defendant, and she did make between two and four monthly rental payments of $650. Plaintiff paid the property taxes on the property throughout the time that defendant lived by herself in the house. Oren then sued plaintiff and defendant, seeking to be declared half-owner of the property along with defendant, from whom he sought a partition and accounting.  In September 2009, the superior court rejected Oren's claims. Defendant counterclaimed, contending that she owned the property or, in the alternative, that plaintiff had been unjustly enriched by defendant’s payments to him.  Prior to trial, the court dismissed as res judicata defendant’s claim that she owned the property, leaving the unjust-enrichment claim in her counterclaim. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff’s claims for back rent and property taxes. However, the trial court ruled in favor of defendant with regard to her unjust enrichment claims for the return of the downpayment on the purchase price and several of her alleged capital and repair contributions. Both parties appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the contract between plaintiff and defendant was a contract for deed; the trial court erred in concluding it was a landlord-tenant relationship. Because the agreement between plaintiff and defendant was a contract for deed, the amount of $833 per month that defendant had agreed to pay plaintiff went entirely toward the purchase price plus interest. When the periodic payments were complete, defendant would become the owner of the property, free and clear of any interest of plaintiff, without a further payment. There was not an agreement to pay rent; the $833 monthly payment was not part of a rental agreement between plaintiff and defendant. View "Kellogg v. Shushereba" on Justia Law

Elden and Rita Linderkamp appealed a judgment that required Elden Linderkamp to pay Four Season's Healthcare Center, Inc. for nursing home care provided to his parents, invalidating a contract for deed and warranty deed conveying land from the parents to the Linderkamps, authorizing the parents' personal representative to administer the land in the probate of the parents' estates, and allowing the Linderkamps a net claim against the parents' estates. Upon review, the Supreme Court held the district court did not clearly err in finding there was no credible evidence of a claimed oral agreement for Earl Linderkamp to compensate Elden for improvements to the land as part of the consideration for the contract for deed and warranty deed and did not clearly err in finding there was no credible evidence to support Elden's claim he made improvements to the land as part of the consideration for the deeds. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court erred in declining to rule on an issue about all of the children's liability for their parents' nursing home debt under N.D.C.C. 14-09-10. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Four Seasons Healthcare Center, Inc. v. Linderkamp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff borrowed money from Countrywide Financial and secured the loan with a mortgage on real property. The recorded mortgage was assigned to the Bank of New York Mellon (BONY), which also held the note on Plaintiff's property. When Plaintiff was unable to make payments on the mortgage, BONY instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff filed suit to enjoin the foreclosure, arguing that (1) the description of his property in the mortgage did not satisfy New Hampshire's statute of frauds, and (2) Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property to the copy of the mortgage was an act of fraud that should bar BONY from foreclosing. The district court rejected both of Plaintiff's arguments. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the description of the property, in light of the surrounding circumstances, was not so imprecise as to be unenforceable under the New Hampshire statute of frauds; and (2) because the description of the property attached to the mortgage was correct, Countrywide's unilateral addition of a more precise description of the property was not fraudulent. View "French v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law