Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Roger Sundsbak, George Bitz and Northern Livestock Auction appealed a district court judgment granting Craig Anderson's motion for summary judgment and denying Northern Livestock's motion to amend their counterclaim. Anderson was First Western Bank & Trust's assignee. Northern Livestock argued the district court erred as a matter of law by entering summary judgment in favor of Anderson, by failing to enter summary judgment in favor of Northern Livestock's counterclaim for specific performance and by failing to provide sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to allow judicial review of its decision denying Northern Livestock's cross-motion for summary judgment. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Anderson v. Zimbelman" on Justia Law

Downing, Thorpe & James Design, Inc. (DTJ) was an architectural firm incorporated in Colorado. Thomas Thrope, one of DTJ’s three founding principals, was allowed to practice individually as a foreign architect in Nevada, but DTJ was not allowed to practice as a foreign corporation in Nevada. In 2004, DTJ contracted with a Nevada developer to provide architectural services for a Las Vegas subdivision owned by Prima Condominiums, LLC (Prima). Prima obtained a loan from First Republic Bank in exchange for a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on one of the subdivision’s units. After Prima defaulted on its payments, DTJ recorded a notice of mechanic’s lien against the property for unpaid services. First Republic then foreclosed and purchased the property. DTJ subsequently brought an action against First Republic for lien priority and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment for First Republic. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because DTJ had failed to comply with Nevada’s statutory registration and filing provisions, it was barred from maintaining an action in Nevada for compensation for its architectural services; and (2) Thorpe’s individual status had no bearing on whether DTJ could bring or maintain an action for compensation for its services. View "DTJ Design, Inc. v. First Republic Bank" on Justia Law

In 2006, Joseph and Mary Romero signed a mortgage contract with the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS) as nominee for Equity One, Inc. They pledged their home as collateral for the loan. The Romeros alleged that Equity One urged them to refinance their home for access to the home's equity. The terms of the new loan were not an improvement over their then-current loan: the interest rate was higher and the loan amount due was higher. Despite that, the Romeros would receive a net cash payout they planned to use to pay other debts. The Romeros later became delinquent on their increased loan payments. A third party, Bank of New York (BONY), identified itself as a trustee for Popular Financial Services Mortgage, filed suit to foreclose on the Romeros' home. BONY claimed to hold the Romeros' note and mortgage with the right of enforcement. The Romeros defended by arguing that BONY lacked standing to foreclose because nothing in the complaint established how BONY held their note and mortgage, and that the contracts they signed were with Equity One. The district court found that BONY had established itself as holder of the Romeros' mortgage, and that the bank had standing to foreclose. That decision was appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in finding BONY's evidence demonstrated that it had standing to foreclose. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bank of New York v. Romero" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the grant of a summary judgment that dismissed his claim seeking to enforce a vendee’s lien in real property. Because the appellant only addressed on appeal one of two possible grounds upon which the district court granted summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Cuevas v. Barraza" on Justia Law

In 2007, Steven and Valerie Hruza sought to obtain a loan from Clearwater Mortgage (Clearwater). Clearwater requested Defendant-Respondent Wade Massey to perform an appraisal of their real property located in Caldwell. Massey owned co-defendant Capitol West Appraisals and is a professional appraiser licensed to practice in Idaho. Massey performed the appraisal and sent a Summary Appraisal Report to Clearwater indicating that market value of the property was $1,150,000. Clearwater decided to deny the Hruzas' loan application before considering the appraisal. Massey admitted that both he and Clearwater were aware that the appraisal contained errors. Clearwater's president and Massey agreed that Massey would not fix the errors and Clearwater would not pay Massey for the appraisal. The Hruzas submitted a subsequent loan application to Idahy Federal Credit Union (now known as Icon). Icon approved the loan, secured by a deed of trust on the Hruzas' property. Icon sent a check to Capitol, and Capitol accepted payment. Plaintiff-Appellant CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. was the fidelity bond insurer for Icon. It paid Icon as a result of the Hruzas' default on their loan. As Icon's subrogee, CUMIS filed suit against Massey and Capitol, alleging professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract based on Massey's conduct in preparing the appraisal. A central point of dispute between the parties was how Icon obtained the appraisal. CUMIS alleged that the Hruzas included the appraisal with their loan application, thus prompting Icon to pay Capitol for the appraisal. Massey suggested that Icon improperly obtained the appraisal, pointing to Icon's admission that it did not know how it obtained it and that Icon did not request a letter of assignment from Clearwater to use or rely on the appraisal. The district court concluded that CUMIS could not establish that Massey owed a legal duty to Icon, that Idaho does not recognize a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation against appraisers, and that CUMIS had no breach of contract claim. Therefore, the district court granted Massey’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims asserted by CUMIS, with prejudice. Finding that there remained issues of material fact, the Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment dismissing CUMIS's complaint. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "CUMIS Insurance Society, Inc. v. Massey" on Justia Law

HSBC Realty Credit Corporation loaned Brandywine Partners, LLC $15.9 million pursuant to a property-loan agreement for the purchase and development of industrial property in Delaware. J. Brian O’Neill, a principal of Brandywine, signed an absolute personal guaranty for the loan. O’Neill’s liability was capped at $8.1 million. After Brandywine defaulted on its repayment obligations, HSB filed suit on the guaranty agreement. O’Neill filed several defenses and counterclaims essentially asserting that HSBC must first recover any amount owed by Brandywine by proceeding against the Delaware property before turning to O’Neill’s personal guaranty. The district judge struck O’Neill’s defenses and counterclaims, granted HSBC judgment on the pleadings, and denied O’Neill’s request to replead. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court judge did not commit reversible error in granting HSBC judgment on the pleadings or in denying O’Neill leave to replead, as O’Neill did not provide any additional facts which, if repled, would permit him to make out a plausible claim for relief when matched up against the guaranty’s express language. View "HSBC Realty Credit Corp. v. O'Neill" on Justia Law

Desperate to save his home from foreclosure, Lawrence Jametsky sought help securing a loan. Through a series of connections, he was introduced to mortgage broker Matthew Flynn. Flynn made Jametsky an offer for a $100,000 loan that would cover Jametsky's debts, save his house, and allow him to regain financial solvency. Instead of receiving a loan, Jametsky deeded his house to Rodney Olsen for $100,000 and entered into an 18-month lease with a buy-back option. After J ametsky realized what had happened months after the fact, he sought relief under the distressed property conveyances act (DPCA), among other things. His suit was dismissed at summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Jametsky's property was not distressed at the time of the sale because no certificate of delinquency had been issued by King County. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded: a property can be distressed under RCW 61.34.020(2)(a) before a certificate of delinquency is issued and instruct the trial court to consider a variety of factors in making this factual determination. View "Jametsky v. Olsen" on Justia Law

A bank purchased insurance on a commercial property mortgaged to it by a borrower. The policy prohibited an assignment "of this Policy" without the insurer's consent. After the property was damaged, the bank assigned its loss claim to the borrower. The insurer refused to pay the borrower's claim because of the nonassignment provision, and the borrower sued. The district court held that the suit was barred and awarded judgment for the insurer. The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether the nonassignment provision was enforceable. The Court concluded, after review of the provision in question, that the provision did not apply to the assignment of a postloss claim, so the Court did not determine the enforceability of a provision prohibiting such assignments. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "City Center West v. American Modern Home Insurance" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant for specific performance of Plaintiff’s option to purchase a ranch owned by Defendant. Defendant counterclaimed, alleging that Plaintiff owed him rent. After a trial, the circuit court (1) denied Plaintiff’s request for specific performance, concluding that Plaintiff had not performed all the conditions precedent on his part; and (2) concluded that the parties had an implied or express contract requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendant rent. The Supreme Court (1) held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding Plaintiff was the party who was materially at fault for the failure of the conditions and in therefore denying specific performance, but because the record did not reflect that the court considered whether specific performance was appropriate under the exception set forth in S.D. Codified Laws 21-9-5, the case was remanded for reconsideration of specific performance under this exception; and (2) the circuit court erred in concluding that either an express or an implied contract required Plaintiff to pay rent. View "Humble v. Wyant" on Justia Law

This case arose from the collapse of a real estate transaction. The ART entities filed suit alleging that Clapper defrauded them by representing that "there was no title problems," and seeking a declaratory judgment that they "properly terminated" the deal. The Clapper entities countersued, alleging that the ART entities breached the agreement by purporting to terminate the deal. In this appeal, the court held that the ART entities' decision not to cross-appeal the jury's fraud findings in the first district proceeding prevented them from raising the same rejected fraud claims in the second district court proceeding. Because the contribution amounts overlap, and because the parties neither identified language in the agreement nor an explanation from the district court supporting this double counting of damages, the court held that the district court's decision to combine the amounts was in error. Accordingly, the court vacated the award of combined contribution amounts and remanded for further proceedings. The court addressed remaining claims and affirmed the district court's judgment in all other respects. View "American Midwest, Inc., et al. v. Clapper, et al." on Justia Law