Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Cadlerocks Centennial Drive, LLC entered into a loan secured by a mortgage on its property. Daniel Cadle executed a personal guaranty on the loan. The original lender subsequently assigned the mortgage and related documents to Wells Fargo Bank as trustee for registered holders ("Trust"). ORIX Capital Markets, LLC was the special servicer of the Trust and began servicing the loan. Cadlerocks later defaulted on its loan, after which the Trust commenced foreclosure proceedings. ORIX then filed this lawsuit against Cadlerocks and Cadle, alleging breaches of the various agreements related to the loan. Among those documents was an indemnity agreement, under which Cadle and Cadlerocks agreed to indemnify the original lender and its assignees for liabilities "sought from or asserted against" the indemnitees connected with the presence of hazardous material on or around the property. ORIX conducted environmental tests on the property, and the district court held that ORIX was entitled to recover the majority of the costs associated with the environmental testing under the indemnity agreement. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the part of the district court's order awarding costs associated with environmental testing, holding that the cost of the tests that ORIX conducted fell outside the scope of the indemnity agreement. Remanded. View "ORIX Capital Markets, LLC v. Cadlerocks Centennial Drive, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janet Knutsen appealed a superior court decision to deny her motion for summary judgment and and for granting defendant Vermont Association of Realtors, Inc.'s (VAR) motion for summary judgment on her consumer fraud claim arising out of her purchase of a home in Moretown. Plaintiff argued that VAR's form purchase and sale agreement, which was used in her real estate purchase (to which VAR was not a party) violated the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) in that two provisions of the form were unfair and deceptive, and that she was therefore entitled to damages under section 2461(b) of the CFA. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly held that 'VAR's sole connection to this case was its drafting of the template clauses that [plaintiff] and her buyer's broker used for the purchase of the house, and that could not support a consumer fraud claim. View "Knutsen v. Dion" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents owned adjoining parcels of property. After the parties purchased their properties, they learned they would be entitled to free gas from a well drilled on a property adjoining Respondents' property. In order to access this gas, Petitioners obtained permission from Respondents to install a gas line across Respondents' property. Several years later, Respondents demanded that Petitioners remove the gas line from their property. Petitioners refused to remove the gas line and filed a civil action seeking injunctive relief. The circuit court ordered Petitioners to remove the gas line, finding that Respondents properly withdrew their permission to cross their property and that Petitioners had no easement or continuing right to cross Respondents' property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding (1) Respondents revoked their permission to place a gas line across their property; (2) Petitioners were not entitled to any easement across Respondents' property; and (3) removal of the gas line from Respondents' property was required. View "Wilson v. Staats" on Justia Law

Stephen and Elizabeth Schultz contracted with Benchmark Builders, Inc. for the construction of a home. The Schultzes refused to close because they claimed the home was not built in conformance with the contract and Benchmark sued for specific performance or, in the alternative, for money damages for breach of contract. The Schultzes answered and filed a counterclaim for breach of contract seeking money damages for the return of earnest money they had paid and also for the value of certain fixtures they purchased and that had been installed in the home. They also sought attorney fees resulting from the alleged breach. The jury returned a verdict form that found for the Schultzes both as to Benchmark's claim and the Schultzes' counterclaim. The jury awarded the Schultzes zero dollars on the claim for light fixtures, zero dollars for return of the earnest money, and $16,555 on the claim for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals held the Schultzes were entitled, as the “prevailing party” to the award of attorney fees pursuant to the parties' contract and thus affirmed the award. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the parties' contract allowed for an award of attorney fees to a party that recovered no money damages or other relief that it sought. Under the terms of the contract, the fact that the jury did not award actual damages did not mean the Schultzes could not be deemed the prevailing party to the lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Benchmark Builders, Inc. v. Schultz" on Justia Law

This appeal involved two separate actions that were consolidated. In the first action, a married couple raised allegations of fraud and other claims against Residential Finance Corporation (RFC), which had brokered two refinancings of the couple's residential mortgage. The first action was consolidated with a foreclosure case filed later against the couple. Appellant and RFC were named as third-party defendants in the foreclosure case. After consolidation, the case was bifurcated on the basis of subject matter for trial purposes and was scheduled to go to trial only on the refinancing issues. Judge Robert Nichols denominated Appellant as a codefendant in that trial. Appellant field an action for a writ of prohibition to prevent Nichols from requiring him to be a defendant in the trial. The court of appeals denied the writ. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellant could not establish the elements for a writ of prohibition, as Appellant had an adequate remedy at law and Nichols did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction over Appellant. View "State ex rel. Shumaker v. Nichols" on Justia Law

John Hardy leased part of land to Littlebrook Airport Development Co. (LADC). John Hardy died, leaving his wife Jean as the sole surviving owner of the leased property. In 2005, Jean sold the leased property to and assigned her interest in the lease to Littlebrook Ventures (LV), which executed a mortgage in Hardy's favor. Pursuant to the mortgage LV agreed not to modify the lease without Hardy's prior consent. LADC then assigned its interest in the lease to Windmill USA. Windmill and LV purported to amend the lease in accordance with a previously executed declaration amendment. LV later conveyed the property back to Hardy by a deed in lieu of foreclosure. Hardy purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and conveyed it to Sweet Peas, LLC. Littlebrook Airport Condominium Association then brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment clarifying the rights of the parties pursuant to the lease. At issue was the effectiveness of the unrecorded amendment to the lease that violated the recorded mortgage covenant. The superior court concluded that the lease amendment was effective. The matter came before the Supreme Court on report. The Court discharged the report, concluding that acceptance of the report would improperly place the Court in the role of an advisory board. View "Littlebrook Airpark Condo. Ass'n v. Sweet Peas, LLC " on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Enerlex, Inc. offered to purchase plaintiffs'-appellees' mineral interest. At the time, plaintiffs did not know that their Seminole County mineral interests were included in a pooling order or that proceeds had accrued under the pooling order. Defendant admitted it knew about the pooling order and the accrued proceeds but did not disclose these facts in making the purchase offer. Plaintiffs signed the mineral deeds which defendant provided and subsequently discovered the pooling order, the production, and the accrued proceeds. Plaintiffs sued for rescission and damages, alleging misrepresentation, deceit and fraud. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the summary judgment. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded defendant obtained the mineral deeds from plaintiffs by false representation and suppression of the whole truth. Defendant was therefore liable to plaintiffs for constructive fraud. Rescission was the appropriate remedy for defendant's misrepresentation and constructive fraud. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the district court's judgment. View "Widner v. Enerlex, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2000, the Schuchmans purchased homeowner’s insurance from State Auto to insure a residence in Junction City, Illinois. About 10 years later, a fire severely damaged the insured house and the Schuchmans made a claim against the homeowner’s policy. After a lengthy investigation, State Auto denied the claim on the basis that the Schuchmans were not residing on the “residence premises,” as that term is defined by the policy, and were maintaining a residence other than at the “residence premises,” in violation of the policy’s Special Provisions. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of State Auto. The Seventh Circuit reversed, agreeing that the term “residence premises” is ambiguous and should be liberally construed in favor of coverage. View "Schuchman v. State Auto Prop. & Cas.Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Bank and Lumber Company had business and financial relationships with Sawmill. A few years into its operation, Sawmill began experiencing serious financial difficulties. Sawmill defaulted on approximately $1.4 million in loan obligations to Bank and owed Lumber Company approximately $900,000. Proceedings were initiated in bankruptcy court and district court. While the cases were pending, Sawmill was destroyed by fire. Bank recovered approximately $980,000 from Sawmill's insurance proceeds. In a subsequent case between Bank and Lumber Company, the jury determined that neither Bank nor Lumber Company was entitled to recover damages from the other. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit into evidence a particular letter written by the Bank president. View "H.E. Simpson Lumber Co. v. Three Rivers Bank of Mont." on Justia Law

Buyer purchased property located within a homeowners association. Buyer, who already owned other lots within the association, later canceled the contract with Sellers because he had not received mandatory disclosures from Sellers pursuant to the Maryland Homeowners Association Act, which requires that notice be given to "a member of the public who intends to occupy or rent the lot for residential purposes." Sellers sued Buyer for breach of contract, contending that Buyer was not a "member of the public" under the statute because Buyer, as a property owner in the association, already had access to the homeowners association policies and thus did not require disclosures making him aware of the relevant applicable rules and policies. The circuit court granted Buyer's motion to dismiss, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Buyer was a "member of the public" for purposes of the statute; but (2) the circuit court erred in granting Buyer's motion to dismiss because Sellers presented a justiciable issue of equitable estoppel based on Buyer's affirmative refusal to receive the requirement documents and information proffered to him by Sellers. View "Lipitz v. Hurwitz" on Justia Law