Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case involved a dispute between a condominium association (the Council) and one of its co-owners (Ballard) regarding the need to replace and who should bear the cost of replacement of a two-story wall of windows in Ballard's condominium. Ballard filed suit against the Council seeking damages for breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty, among other claims. The Council, meanwhile, replaced the wall of windows and filed a lien statement and lis pendens to serve as notice that it was asserting a lien against Ballard's condominium. The Council counterclaimed. Ballard amended her complaint to assert, inter alia, a slander of title claim. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded judgment to Ballard and ordered the Council to release its lis pendens notice and statement of lien from Ballard's condominium. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Ballard's slander of title claim was properly submitted to the jury; and (2) the court of appeals correctly determined that the Council did not have a fiduciary duty to Ballard, and therefore, the fiduciary claim should have been dismissed rather than a new trial ordered. Remanded. View "Ballard v. 1400 Willow Council of Co-Owners, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute between two developers over the payment of property assessments allegedly due under certain restrictive covenants. The plaintiff-below, The Reserves Management, LLC appealed two Superior Court rulings that granted summary judgment to defendants R.T. Properties, LLC, Mountain Range, LLC, Fountain, LLC, Waterscape, LLC, and Wind Chop, LLC. In April 2005, Reserves Development LLC, together with The Reserves Development Corporation, entered into a contract to sell seventeen lots to R.T. Properties, LLC. The Sale Agreement recited that R.T. Properties was “acquiring the Property in order to construct homes thereon for sale to the general public.” In November 2005, R.T. Properties transferred all seventeen lots to four affiliated entities—Mountain Range, LLC, Fountain, LLC, Waterscape, LLC, and Wind Chop, LLC. Three years later, the declaration of the sales contract was amended that obligated each lot owner to pay approximately $4,000 to Reserves. In September 2010, Reserves filed an action in the Superior Court against R.T. Properties to enforce the payment of the assessments allegedly due. R.T. Properties moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that under the Sale Agreement, the payment of assessments for each lot was to be deferred until the lot was transferred to a third party homebuyer and a certificate of occupancy was issued. The Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss, but ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of R.T. Properties with respect to all claimed assessments, except for a sewer connection assessments. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of R.T. Properties on a forbearance agreement defense, because material facts were in dispute. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "The Reserves Management Corporation, et al. v. R.T. Properties, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

Steve and Karen Donatelli hired D.R. Strong Consulting Engineers Inc. to help the Donatellis develop their real property. Before development could be completed, the Donatellis suffered substantial financial losses and lost the property in foreclosure. The Donatellis sued D.R. Strong for breach of contract, violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. D.R. Strong moved for partial summary judgment on the CPA and negligence claims. D.R. Strong argued that the negligence claims should have been dismissed under the economic loss rule because the relationship between the parties was governed by contract and the damages claimed by the Donatellis were purely economic. The trial court and Court of Appeals held that as a matter of law, the Donatellis' negligence claims were not barred. Finding no error in that analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Donatelli v. D.R. Strong Consulting Eng'rs, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, Sandpointe Apartments obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust to real property. Stacy Yahraus-Lewis personally guaranteed the loan. After Sandpointe defaulted on the loan, the interest in the loan and guarantee was transferred to CML-NV Sandpointe, LLC. In 2011, CML-NV pursued its rights under the deed of trust's power of sale provision and purchased the property securing the loan at a trustee's sale. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which limits the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by persons who acquired the right to obtain the judgment from someone else who held that right. Subsequently, CML-NV filed a complaint against Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis for deficiency and breach of guaranty. Yahraus-Lewis moved for partial summary judgment, requesting that the district court apply the limitation contained in section 40.459(1)(c) to CML-NV's action. The district court concluded that the statute applies only to loans entered into after June 10, 2011. Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that the statute may not apply retroactively, and therefore, the statute's limitations did not apply in this case. View "Sandpointe Apartments, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Burcalow Family, LLC purchased property that sat adjacent to The Corral Bar, Inc. property. Burcalow and The Corral signed a license agreement whereby The Corral agreed to pay Burcalow for the use of Burcalow's property for its drain field and well. After the license agreement expired, Burcalow filed suit against The Corral, alleging claims for trespass and a declaratory judgment. The Corral counterclaimed for, inter alia, prescriptive easement, detrimental reliance, and mistake. The district court (1) determined that The Corral possessed a prescriptive easement over and across Burcalow's property, and (2) rescinded the license agreement, ordering Burcalow to refund the fees The Corral had paid under the license agreement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) The Corral failed to demonstrate the elements required to establish a prescriptive easement; and (2) Burcalow's counsel did not make fraudulent representations entitling The Corral to rescind the parties' license agreement, and therefore, Burcalow did not have to return The Corral's payments made pursuant to the agreement. Remanded. View "Burcalow Family, LLC v. The Corral Bar, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Respondents obtained an adjustable rate mortgage loan from a mortgage company. Respondents executed a deed of trust on the real property being purchased and separately executed an arbitration rider. Respondents later defaulted on the loan, and Petitioner, which serviced the loan, assessed a number of fees. Respondents filed an action against Petitioner alleging violations of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act. Petitioner filed a motion to compel arbitration. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable under the Dodd-Frank Act and that it was procedurally and substantively unconscionable. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's requested writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court's order, holding (1) the Dodd-Frank Act did not apply to the mortgage loan because the loan was executed prior to the Act's enactment; and (2) the arbitration agreement was neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. View "State ex rel. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC v. Circuit Court of Kanawha County" on Justia Law

Cadlerocks Centennial Drive, LLC entered into a loan secured by a mortgage on its property. Daniel Cadle executed a personal guaranty on the loan. The original lender subsequently assigned the mortgage and related documents to Wells Fargo Bank as trustee for registered holders ("Trust"). ORIX Capital Markets, LLC was the special servicer of the Trust and began servicing the loan. Cadlerocks later defaulted on its loan, after which the Trust commenced foreclosure proceedings. ORIX then filed this lawsuit against Cadlerocks and Cadle, alleging breaches of the various agreements related to the loan. Among those documents was an indemnity agreement, under which Cadle and Cadlerocks agreed to indemnify the original lender and its assignees for liabilities "sought from or asserted against" the indemnitees connected with the presence of hazardous material on or around the property. ORIX conducted environmental tests on the property, and the district court held that ORIX was entitled to recover the majority of the costs associated with the environmental testing under the indemnity agreement. The First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the part of the district court's order awarding costs associated with environmental testing, holding that the cost of the tests that ORIX conducted fell outside the scope of the indemnity agreement. Remanded. View "ORIX Capital Markets, LLC v. Cadlerocks Centennial Drive, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janet Knutsen appealed a superior court decision to deny her motion for summary judgment and and for granting defendant Vermont Association of Realtors, Inc.'s (VAR) motion for summary judgment on her consumer fraud claim arising out of her purchase of a home in Moretown. Plaintiff argued that VAR's form purchase and sale agreement, which was used in her real estate purchase (to which VAR was not a party) violated the Vermont Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) in that two provisions of the form were unfair and deceptive, and that she was therefore entitled to damages under section 2461(b) of the CFA. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly held that 'VAR's sole connection to this case was its drafting of the template clauses that [plaintiff] and her buyer's broker used for the purchase of the house, and that could not support a consumer fraud claim. View "Knutsen v. Dion" on Justia Law

Petitioners and Respondents owned adjoining parcels of property. After the parties purchased their properties, they learned they would be entitled to free gas from a well drilled on a property adjoining Respondents' property. In order to access this gas, Petitioners obtained permission from Respondents to install a gas line across Respondents' property. Several years later, Respondents demanded that Petitioners remove the gas line from their property. Petitioners refused to remove the gas line and filed a civil action seeking injunctive relief. The circuit court ordered Petitioners to remove the gas line, finding that Respondents properly withdrew their permission to cross their property and that Petitioners had no easement or continuing right to cross Respondents' property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding (1) Respondents revoked their permission to place a gas line across their property; (2) Petitioners were not entitled to any easement across Respondents' property; and (3) removal of the gas line from Respondents' property was required. View "Wilson v. Staats" on Justia Law

Stephen and Elizabeth Schultz contracted with Benchmark Builders, Inc. for the construction of a home. The Schultzes refused to close because they claimed the home was not built in conformance with the contract and Benchmark sued for specific performance or, in the alternative, for money damages for breach of contract. The Schultzes answered and filed a counterclaim for breach of contract seeking money damages for the return of earnest money they had paid and also for the value of certain fixtures they purchased and that had been installed in the home. They also sought attorney fees resulting from the alleged breach. The jury returned a verdict form that found for the Schultzes both as to Benchmark's claim and the Schultzes' counterclaim. The jury awarded the Schultzes zero dollars on the claim for light fixtures, zero dollars for return of the earnest money, and $16,555 on the claim for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals held the Schultzes were entitled, as the “prevailing party” to the award of attorney fees pursuant to the parties' contract and thus affirmed the award. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the parties' contract allowed for an award of attorney fees to a party that recovered no money damages or other relief that it sought. Under the terms of the contract, the fact that the jury did not award actual damages did not mean the Schultzes could not be deemed the prevailing party to the lawsuit. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Benchmark Builders, Inc. v. Schultz" on Justia Law