Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Belmont, Inc., a meat and produce business, leased unfinished commercial real estate space from Tri-City Associates, LP, the owner and developer of a shopping center. The parties later filed claims against each other for breach of the lease. After a court trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Belmont on all claims, concluding that Tri-City materially breached the lease by failing to deliver the space in “broom clean” condition and failing to complete its allocated portion of the initiated construction, and that these failures excused Belmont from performance. Tri-City appealed, arguing, among other things, that it was excused by Belmont’s failure to give notice of the breach and an opportunity to cure under a notice-and-cure provision in the lease. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that conflicting authority and the circuit court’s failure to address the notice-and-cure provision prevented effective appellate review. Remanded to the circuit court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law on the effect of Belmont’s failure to give notice of breach and an opportunity to cure. View "Tri-City Assocs., LP v. Belmont, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, property owners, filed a quiet title action against owners of adjacent lots, seeking a declaration that express easements granted in favor of the adjacent lots were invalid. The defendants filed counterclaims asserting that the express easements were valid. Plaintiffs submitted to Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") a claim for defense pursuant to a policy of title insurance issued by Commonwealth insuring Plaintiffs’ property, but Commonwealth denied the claim. In the quiet title action, the district court extinguished the express easements and denied the counterclaims but concluded that the defendants possessed implied easements. While the quiet title action was pending, Plaintiffs filed the instant action against Commonwealth, seeking a determination that Commonwealth breached its duty under the policy by refusing to provide a defense to the counterclaims. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Commonwealth. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in sustaining Commonwealth’s motion for summary judgment because Commonwealth did not violate its contract with Plaintiffs by denying coverage or indemnification. View "Woodle v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In 2004, Robert and Cheri Knorr bought a lot and built a home on Lake Audubon. They owned the lake home debt free. When the national real estate market soured in the late 2000s, the Knorrs had to mortgage the lake property and other property to satisfy loan commitments. They were unable to make the mortgage loan payments on the property, so they turned to family members for assistance. According to the Knorrs, family members agreed to help them by purchasing their homes in Arizona and North Dakota and leasing them to the Knorrs with options to repurchase. The Knorrs' eldest daughter and her husband purchased the Arizona home and leased the property to the Knorrs with an option to repurchase. The Knorrs' daughter, Alonna, and her husband, Jon Norberg, allegedly agreed in late 2010 to also purchase the North Dakota lake home and lease it to the Knorrs with an option to repurchase. A lease agreement containing an option to purchase the lake home was executed by the Knorrs and sent to the Norbergs for their signatures. Alonna signed the agreement and claimed Jon did too, but that document was lost. Jon claimed the lake home was leased to the Knorrs but did not include a buy-back option. After transferring the lake home to the Norbergs, the Knorrs continued to live in the home, made monthly payments to Jon for an amount equal to the Norbergs' mortgage payments, paid all real estate taxes on the property, maintained the property, and paid all utilities and other expenses associated with the property. The Knorrs gave notice to the Norbergs, who were then experiencing marital difficulties, that they were exercising the option to purchase the lake property. Jon refused to recognize the option. Jon appealed the trial court's judgment allowing his in-laws to exercise the option. The Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in holding partial performance of an oral lease agreement with an alleged option to purchase removed the oral agreement from the statute of frauds. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for the court to consider the Knorrs' alternative theories of recovery based on equitable principles of promissory estoppel and constructive trust. View "Knorr v. Norberg" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Bank seeking to void a mortgage foreclosure sale of their home. Plaintiffs alleged that the Bank represented orally that it would postpone the foreclosure sale, but then proceeded to foreclose anyway. The court concluded that plaintiffs' claim of negligent misrepresentation was barred by the Minnesota Credit Agreement Status, Minn. Stat. 513.33, where any party asserting the existence of a credit agreement must comply with the writing and signature requirements of section 513.33. The court concluded that the complaint alleged a claim of promissory estoppel, rather than equitable estoppel, and was barred by the Minnesota Credit Agreement Statute. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of the Bank's motion to dismiss. View "Bracewell, et al. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Assoc." on Justia Law

Appellant entered into a mortgage with Aegis Lending Corporation. The mortgage was later assigned to Pacifica L. Ninteen, and the servicing rights were eventually transferred to Vantium Capital, Inc. (“Acqura”). After foreclosure proceedings were commenced against Appellant, Appellant filed suit against Acqura, alleging numerous state law claims. Specifically, Appellant claimed that Acqura’s violated its Servicer Participation Agreement with Fannie Mae by failing to follow guidelines applicable under the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. The district court dismissed the lawsuit, holding that Minn. Stat. 58.18(1) did not provide a private cause of action for Appellant to pursue damages for Acqura’s alleged violation of its agreement with Fannie Mae and that Appellant therefore lacked standing. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 58.18(1) provides for a private right of action and therefore gave Appellant standing to pursue her claim. View "Gretsch v. Vantium Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

The developer (“Developer”) of a residential community hired a general contractor (“Contractor”) to construct homes in the community, and Contractor subcontracted with Subcontractor for construction services. Subcontractor performed services on several homes, including Appellant’s. Because Subcontractor was not fully paid, it recorded liens on properties within the community, including Appellant’s. Subcontractor filed a civil action against Developer, Contractor, Appellant, and other homeowners, seeking to foreclose on its liens. Appellant filed a cross-claim against Developer and Contractor for breach of contract and seeking to recover attorney fees as damages. The district court denied Appellant’s request to recover attorney fees, concluding that, under the standard set forth in Horgan v. Felton regarding the recovery of attorney fees in cloud-on-title cases, because the breach of contract in this case related to title of real property, and because Appellant failed to allege and prove slander of title, she could not recover the attorney fees that she sought as special damages. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment to the extent that it denied Appellant’s request for special damages, holding that Horgan did not apply to preclude such recovery in this case. View "Liu v. Christopher Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellants appealed a district court judgment in a real property contract action. Based on Appellants’ failure to file their opening brief and appendix by the deadline and failure to comply with court rules and directives, Appellants’ appeals were dismissed. Appellants sought the en banc Court’s reconsideration, arguing that the dismissal of their appeals were based on the missteps of their lead appellate attorney, and therefore, the dismissal was contrary to the Supreme Court’s precedent recognizing public policy favoring dispositions on the merits. The Supreme Court denied en banc reconsideration, holding that precedential uniformity did not provide a basis to reinstate these appeals, as the policy was not absolute and must be balanced against countervailing policy considerations such as the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of appeals and judicial administration concerns. View "Huckabay Props., Inc. v. NC Auto Parts, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the State Center Project, a $1.5 billion redevelopment project intended to revitalize property owned by the State in Baltimore. In 2005, the State issued a public request for qualifications to solicit a master developer for the project. The State Center, LLC was chosen as the master developer. The Maryland Department of General Services (“DGS”), the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) and the State Center, LLC negotiated for the Project, entering a series of agreements between 2007 and 2010 to complete the Project in a timely manner. In 2010, Plaintiffs, property owners in downtown Baltimore and taxpayers, filed suit against the DGS, MDOT, and the State Center and its subsidiaries, seeking a declaratory judgment that the formative contracts for the Project were void and seeking an injunction to halt the Project. The trial court voided the formative contracts, concluding that they violated the State Procurement Law. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of laches due to an unreasonable delay in bringing their claims, causing prejudice to the defendants. View "State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Ann Shannon was the sole member of a limited liability company (LLC). In 2004, Shannon signed a lease for commercial space with the property’s owner, Rick Pannell, on behalf of the LLC. In 2005, the LLC was administratively dissolved. In 2006, Shannon and Pannell entered into a release of the old lease and a new lease. The new lease expressly stated that the LLC was the tenant and was signed by Shannon but did not mention Shannon’s company capacity in any direct way. Pannell subsequently sued for breach of the lease, naming the LLC and Shannon individually. Shortly after, the LLC was reinstated. The circuit court concluded that Shannon was entitled to immunity from personal liability and awarded Pannell damages against the LLC under the lease. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on the facts of this case, Shannon did not directly obligate herself because she clearly signed the lease in her representative capacity and the lease was expressly with the company; and (2) Shannon could not be personally liable under Kentucky’s Limited Liability Company Act or under the theory that she exceeded her authority as an agent of the LLC during the dissolution. View "Pannell v. Shannon" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the failure of Tamarack Resort, which was owned, developed, and operated by Tamarack Resort, LLC. The Resort was slated as a year-round community, complete with cross-country and downhill skiing, a championship golf course, hotel and conference facilities, retail shopping, restaurants, and lounges. Tamarack planned to offer a panoply of real estate options, including custom homes, condominiums, townhomes, chalets, and cottages. Construction at the Resort began in 2003. Housing units were built and sold, hotel facilities were developed, and by 2006, the ski areas, golf course, retail shops, and restaurants were up and running. In 2004, Tamarack hired Teufel Nursery as its landscape developer. Teufel provided landscaping services at the Resort from 2004 until early 2008. This appeal centered the priority of liens as between Teufel Nursery's mechanics lien and Credit Suisse's mortgages. The district court held that while Teufel had a valid and enforceable lien, it was inferior to Credit Suisse’s mortgages. On appeal, Teufel argues that such holding was in error and that the district court also erred in calculating Teufel's lien amount, interest, and attorney fees. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Credit Suisse v. Teufel Nursery" on Justia Law